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OVERVIEW OF PROJECT WORK AND OUTCOMES 
 
Non-technical summary  
Extreme weather events affect vulnerable urban areas adversely, with substantial damage, 
disruption of normal economic and social activities and services and loss of human life and can also 
alter the medium or long-term development trajectory of the cities. Thus, disaster management is 
an important context for integrating adaptation into decision-making for the cities at risk. The APN-
funded research project in Mumbai, Bangkok and Manila has been undertaken with the primary 
objective of identifying and measuring the short to medium-term impacts and responses to extreme 
weather events and their policy implications for long-term adaptation capacity and development 
planning for the cities. The project includes analysis of primary and secondary data to measure the 
physical, economic and social losses in the case study cities. We also examine the short to medium-
term responses from the local government and citizens and evaluate if they enhance the adaptation 
capacity of the cities to cope with future weather events and flood risks. This analysis has policy 
implications for disaster management, city resilience and adaptive capacity of the cities in the long-
term. The project is particularly relevant to the selected cities belonging to the developing world 
where natural disasters have long-term implications for development and poverty alleviation. 
 
Objectives  
The main objectives of the project were:  
1. Analysis of immediate to medium-term impacts and responses in the aftermath of extreme 
events of flooding faced by three coastal cities, Mumbai (India), Bangkok (Thailand) and 
Manila (Philippines) 
2. Examine the effects of short to medium-term responses to extreme events on enhancing the 
long-term adaptation capacity of these cities  
3. Explore the policy implications of the findings for long-term disaster management, city 
resilience and long-term development plans 
 
Amount received and number years supported 
The Grant awarded to this project: US$ 65,000 for One Year  
 
Activity undertaken  
In order to achieve the objectives, the following activities were carried out under the project:  
1. Developing a common methodology in the inception workshop held in December 2010 to 
identify and measure the immediate to medium-term impacts of selected weather events 
resulting in flooding in the three cities.  
2. Measuring physical, economic and social impacts of floods with particular focus on stock and 
flow variables using primary and secondary data  
3. Examining the short to medium-term responses of local government institutions and the 
community at large including households and private sector  
4. Exploring the linkages of the response measures to adaption capacity in the long-term and 
policy implications for development planning and city resilience 
5. Initiating the process for integrating post event recovery strategy with investment and 
development plans through stakeholder workshops that would lead to long term reduction 
in vulnerability and enhancement of adaptive capacity in the three cities 
 
Results  
The project findings in the three cities highlight their vulnerability to climate risks due to their 
geographic location, flood prone topography, large population with a major percentage living a life 
of poverty in informal settlements, changing land use pattern, rapid infrastructure development 
often by reclaiming land from sea (as in case of Mumbai) and inadequate civic amenities. The study 
 has examined the physical, economic and social impacts of selected extreme weather events leading 
to flash floods in the three cities. An important finding is that the huge monetary costs of these 
impacts are the uninsured losses borne by households belonging to poor strata of society and the 
private sector mostly engaged in informal activities. The study also examines the responses of local 
government institutions as well as people to cope with flooding. There are a number of public and 
private adaptation strategies that have been identified in this report. A significant finding is that all 
private initiatives and responses are a direct out-of-pocket expense for the concerned individuals or 
establishments. There is virtually no insurance cover that helps them to deal with the adverse 
impacts of floods and bring about changes or improvements in the existing infrastructure. Some of 
the public and private responses have the potential to enhance the medium to long-term adaptation 
capacity of the city to cope with future floods. However, there is a need to address the larger issues 
of climate risks and adaptation in the long-term development planning for the cities.             
 
Relevance to the APN Goals, Science Agenda and to Policy Processes 
The project is relevant to the climate agenda of the APN. The methodology developed and used in 
the project to identify and analyze the immediate to medium-term impacts and responses of 
flooding events is expected to improving the understanding of adaptation interventions coming 
from the government as well as communities. The project will help in enhancing the APN agenda 
of identifying and developing effective methodologies in different areas of global change research 
and transferring the knowledge base to the scientific community and policy makers. Better 
characterization of post-event impacts and the recovery process would further help in improving 
the disaster management interventions. The findings of this project will also help inform the 
broader “Cities at Risk” theme being developed by START and the new ICSU international science 
project on Integrated Research in Disaster Risk (IRDR). The UNEP has recently launched the Asia-
Pacific Climate Change Adaptation Network, supported by the UNEP regional office in Bangkok and 
by the governments of Japan and Sweden. This project will also contribute directly to the activities 
of this Network. 
 
Self evaluation  
The project has achieved its stated objective of analyzing the short to medium-term impacts and 
responses in the aftermath of extreme weather events leading to floods in the three cities. The case 
studies developed here further examine if the response measures undertaken by both local 
administration and communities has the potential to enhance the adaptation capacity of the city in 
the long-term. There are critical policy implications of the findings of this study, in particular, the 
huge monetary burden of the impacts of floods which is borne by the community in the absence of 
insurance coverage and other compensation or aid. Responses also mean the cost related private 
adaptation. Such private costs, especially the costs borne by the poor and vulnerable sections in 
these cities and informal sectors often go unaccounted for in usual damage impact assessment 
studies.  
 
Potential for further work  
The findings of the project are quite relevant for the three cities which are in transition and on a 
development path. It is extremely important that these findings are shared with the larger audience 
of policy makers, academia and local community to initiate a meaningful dialogue on climate risks, 
general perceptions about the adaptive capacity and how adaptation can be mainstreamed in policy 
processes. Therefore, the project should culminate in journal articles as well as be presented in 
different forums to make it more relevant. The next logical step would also be to study the policy 
processes further, especially the formulation of development and investment plans in the cities to 





































Not available now but we would be publishing two articles in peer-reviewed journals where all the 
collaborators would contribute.  
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It is now widely accepted that impacts of future climate change will often be observed through 
changes in the magnitude and frequency of existing climate-related hazards. Therefore, disaster risk 
reduction and management are important strategies for integrating or mainstreaming adaptation 
into decision-making. The project has undertake a detailed analysis of the immediate to medium-
term post-disaster impacts and responses in the aftermath of extreme weather events (flooding) in 
three Asian cities of Mumbai (India), Bangkok (Thailand) and Manila (Philippines). We quantify the 
impacts and evaluate if short to medium-term responses enhance the adaptation capacity of the 
cities for future climate risks. 
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It is now widely accepted that impacts of future climate change will often be observed through 
changes in the magnitude and frequency of existing climate-related hazards in the form of extreme 
weather events. Therefore, disaster risk reduction and disaster management is an important context 
for integrating or mainstreaming adaptation into decision-making for the cities at risk. 
  
Extreme weather events affect vulnerable urban areas (cities) adversely, with substantial damage 
and disruption of normal economic and social activities. The loss of physical, economic and financial 
resource base is also supplemented by the loss of economic and social services. This combination of 
stock and flow effects can potentially alter the medium to long-term development trajectory of the 
city. Most of the existing natural hazards and impacts literature focuses on short-term and 
immediate damage to human, built and natural capital, as measured by indicators such as mortality 
and insured losses to private and public property and infrastructure. Very few studies have critically 
examined the process and outcomes associated with immediate to medium-term responses from 
the governments as well as communities to understand the relation between short-term damage, 
short to medium-term responses and longer-term adaptive capacity in the affected cities. Effective 
adaptation planning requires not only the mitigation of immediate losses but also an enhancement 
of the speed and extent of post-disaster recovery. Of additional importance is the need to ensure 
that the post-event recovery leads to long-term reduction in vulnerability and enhancement of 
adaptive capacity. 
This research project aims to fill this research gap by undertaking an analysis of the immediate to 
medium-term post-disaster recovery scenario in the aftermath of extreme weather events of 
flooding faced by vulnerable cities in three Asian developing countries, namely, Mumbai (India), 
Bangkok (Thailand) and Manila (Philippines). The selected Asian cities fall under the densely 
populated low lying coastal areas described by the IPCC Fourth Assessment report as ‘key societal 
hotspots of coastal vulnerability’. With millions of people residing in these cities, the risk to life and 
property increases manifold with vulnerability to extreme weather events such as flooding. 
Incidentally, many instances of severe flooding due to heavy intensity precipitation have been 
recorded in these cities in recent years, including the unprecedented floods in Bangkok in 2011.  
The main objectives of the research project are:  
1. Analysis of immediate to medium-term impacts and responses in the aftermath of extreme 
events of flooding faced by three coastal cities, Mumbai (India), Bangkok (Thailand) and 
Manila (Philippines) 
2. Examine the effects of short to medium-term responses to extreme events on enhancing the 
long-term adaptation capacity of these cities 
3. Explore the policy implications of the findings for long-term disaster management, 
city resilience and long-term development plans 
 
The project has developed three case studies for the selected cities. Each of the studies have 
measured the physical, economic and social impacts of selected extreme weather events of flooding, 
identified the public and private responses in the short to medium-term and explored their policy 
implications for long-term adaptation capacity, city resilience and investment and development 
plans. Each study is based on the analysis of primary and secondary data pertaining to the selected 
events of flooding and their resultant physical, economic and social impacts. The impacts considered 
here include loss of life, injuries, damage to property and infrastructure, damage to economic stocks 
like physical capital, inventory and indirect impacts on flow variables like income, investment, 
employment and disruption of essential services. After measuring these impacts, the analysis has 
focused on the immediate to medium-term post recovery scenario, wherein, we have examined the 
































responses of the civic administration as well as citizens themselves to cope with future floods. The 
findings have significant policy implications for integrating adaptation strategies with long-term 
investment and development plans for the cities at risk. This exercise is particularly relevant to these 
cities belonging to the developing world, where natural disasters have long-term implications for not 
only economic development but poverty alleviation as well. 
Better understanding of the process of responding to climate-related hazards, including aspects such 
as relief and recovery is important for planning and implementing adaptation interventions. Given 
the rapid growth of urban infrastructure in Asian cities, it is important to ensure that this growth 
enhances climate resilience and adaptive capacity and is done in a manner sensitive to the 
possibilities of mal-adaptation. Therefore, the project is relevant to the climate agenda of the APN.  
The project has developed a methodology to identify and analyze the immediate to medium-term 
stock and flow impacts of flood events and has also tried to put a monetary tag on the uninsured 
losses which normally go unaccounted for in damage assessment exercises. We hope that the 
findings of the project will contribute to improving the understanding of vulnerability and the actual 
design and implementation of adaptation interventions by integrating climate risk considerations 
into decision-making at different levels.  
The project teams located in the three countries have jointly developed the methodology and have 
gathered the relevant data pertaining to impacts and responses in the respective cities. The 
methodology used here and the findings of the study are being shared with the policy makers, local 
government institutions and other stakeholders including the scientific and research community and 
local people through workshops and proposed publications in the pipeline. Vulnerability and 
adaptation to climate change have been recognized as important areas for scientific and institutional 
capacity-building. By linking leading institutions in the region, the project also presents an 
opportunity to strengthen the research capacity. In addition, the project has also directly engaged 
the local and regional decision-makers while carrying out the case studies which would help in better 
understanding and articulation of adaptation needs and options for future.  
This project report gives a detailed description of the methodology used in the case studies in the 
next section. Section 3 presents the results of the case studies and discusses the main findings. This 





As described earlier, this research project has developed three case studies for Mumbai, Bangkok 
and Manila. The project teams located in the three countries have jointly developed the 
methodology and have gathered the relevant data pertaining to impacts and responses in the 
respective cities. Each of the studies have measured the physical, economic and social impacts of 
selected extreme weather events of flooding, identified the public and private responses in the short 
to medium-term and explored their policy implications for long-term adaptation capacity, city 
resilience and investment and development plans. Each study is based on the analysis of primary 
and secondary data pertaining to the selected events of flooding and their resultant physical, 
economic and social impacts. The case studies also identify the immediate to medium-term post 
disaster responses of the civic administration as well as citizens to cope with future floods. The 
following activities have been carried out under this project in each of the cities:  
1. Measuring physical, economic and social impacts of floods with particular focus on stock and 
flow variables using primary and secondary data  
2. Examining the short to medium-term responses of local government institutions and the 
community at large including households and private sector  


































policy implications for development planning and city resilience 
4. Initiating the process for integrating post event recovery strategy with investment 
and development plans through active engagement and dialogue with the policy 
makers and other stakeholders through information dissemination and workshops 
that would lead to better understanding of adaptation needs in future 
 
We describe the methodology used for the case studies in detail in this section. The following sub-
sections give details like brief description of the selected extreme flood events, methodology used in 




Mumbai (formerly known as Bombay) is one of the largest mega cities with the population of more 
than 12 million. The city is the financial capital of India with a large commercial and trading base. 
With per capita income thrice that of the national average, Mumbai makes huge contribution to the 
total tax revenues of the country. The city is an important international sea port and strategic from 
defense perspective. Unfortunately, the city is also acutely vulnerable to climate risks due to its 
location on the sea coast, flood prone topography and the landmass composed largely of reclaimed 
areas. In recent years, Mumbai has been experiencing many weather events, including the extreme 
weather event in July 2005 that led to unprecedented floods, massive damages, loss of life and 
property and affected the economic and social activities adversely. Such events tend to have long-
term consequences for economic development and poverty alleviation in the city where majority of 
the residents (60% in case of Mumbai) live in slums and squatter settlements.  
The extreme weather event of July 2005 has been selected in this case study to examine the impacts 
and responses and to study the policy implications for long-term adaptation capacity. On July 26, 
2005, Mumbai was struck with a heavy storm. India Meteorological Department (IMD) weather 
station recorded 944mm rainfall (45% of the annual average rainfall in Mumbai) over a 24-hour 
period, with the highest precipitation (380 mm) for a few hours between 2.30 pm and 7.30 pm. This 
unprecedented rainfall coinciding with the high tide brought the city to a standstill. 22% of the city 
was submerged that day with very heavy flooding in the suburbs.   
In order to measure the stock and flow impacts of the July 2005 events and analyze the response 
strategies, the study has used both primary data collected from communities and secondary data 
collected from government institutions. The impacts include stock variables like loss of life, injuries, 
damage to property and infrastructure, damage to physical capital and inventory and health impacts 
as well as flow variables like loss of income, investment, employment and disruption of essential 
services like water and electricity. Similarly, response strategies are identified at both the 
institutional and community level. The study then focuses on the policy implications of the response 
efforts for disaster management, city resilience and adaptive capacity in the long-term.  
The methodology used in Mumbai case study is outlined here:  
1. Primary data were collected from households and commercial and small industrial 
establishments in Mumbai by administering a detailed questionnaire in six wards (administrative 
units) of Mumbai.  
a. Six flood prone wards in Mumbai – F North, F South, H East, K East, L and P North –
selected for the survey. These wards were most affected by July 2005 floods. They are 
low-lying and reclaimed areas or fall in the river flood plain making them more 
vulnerable to flash floods.  
































b. Detailed questionnaires were administered to 1168 households and 792 commercial and 
small industrial establishments spread over the six wards. The sample selected from the 
six wards is given in Table 1 below.  
c. Survey questionnaires pertain to impacts of July 2005 floods, community and 
administration response, costs of damage and repairs/replacements, response measures 
undertaken in the aftermath of July 2005 and experience of subsequent flood events 
 
Table 1: Ward-wise details of the sample selected in Mumbai 
Wards Total population Households Commercial & 
Industrial 
F North 5,24,393 177 102 
F South 3,96,122 103 149 
H East 5,80,835 176 98 
K East 8,10,002 241 139 
L Ward 7,78,278 231 204 
P North 7,98,775 240 100 
 
 
2. Information was also collection through unstructured interviews of selected local government 
officials working at the ward level, with Disaster Management Cell (DMC) and key planners.  
a. Personal interviews were carried out based on open-ended questions to understand 
their views on flooding events in Mumbai, climate risk perception, current adaptation 
events, level of preparedness and enhancing long-term coping capacity through short 
and medium-term measures undertaken by the local government  
3. Secondary data were collected from the DMC and other relevant departments within Municipal 
Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM), the civic authority, as well as private sector electricity 
utility to understand the magnitude of impact on city infrastructure and provision of services, 
relief and recovery efforts, disaster management priorities and practices and overall 
development planning process.  
The study reported the costs of damage to physical infrastructure as per the damage assessment 
reports of MCGM. For the primary data analysis, descriptive statistics were used to understand the 
average costs of damages to physical infrastructure, appliances and inventory as well as economic 
losses for households and commercial and small industrial establishments. These costs were 
extrapolated using certain assumptions to arrive at rough and indicative estimates of the total costs 
of direct impacts on households and other establishments due to July 2005 floods. The important 
point to be noted here is that these are uninsured losses and hence are normally not taken into 
account when damage assessment is done.  
For the indirect impacts like non-availability of goods and services and disruption of essential 
services like electricity, we used the proxy variables such as daily octroi collection at entry points 






































Bangkok, the capital of Thailand since 1782, is not only the country’s political centre, but also its 
administrative and economic heart. Located on the lower plain of the Chao Phraya River Basin, the 
city is now a sprawling urban agglomeration and one of Asia’s emerging megacities. The sheer pace 
of its spatial and demographic growth has meant that Bangkok itself has had to be continuously 
redefined. The city is now classified as the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR), an area of around 
1,569km2 that includes the five adjacent provinces of Samut Sakon, Nakhon Pathom, Nonthaburi, 
Pathum Thani and Samutprakarn. According to the National Statistics Office (NSO), Bangkok’s 
population in 2009 was at 5.701 million but other figures put the population at almost 10 million or 
even more, when unregistered migrants are factored in. Much of Thailand’s industrial and 
commercial capacity is concentrated within metropolitan Bangkok, as well as the bulk of its 
communications and transport infrastructure. In 2006, the year of this case study, the BMR 
generated 43% of Thailand’s GDP.   
This economic primacy, together with the expanding population, is a major dimension in the city’s 
increasing vulnerability and exposure to flooding. When a major flood event affects Bangkok, it not 
only threatens the political and administrative functioning of the capital, but also puts much of the 
country’s factories and industrial parks at risk, and by extension, the homes and livelihoods of 
hundreds of thousands of the city’s residents. A second important element in Bangkok’s 
development is its transition from a water-based urban form, when the city fabric was designed 
sympathetically around its natural climate and hydrology, to an impermeable ‘concrete pad’. This 
has weakened its capacity to cope with heavy rains.  
This study examines the impact of the 2006 floods, with a focus on four districts in the eastern 
region of Bangkok: Minburi, Nong Jork, Lat Krabang and Klong Samwa. During the 2006 flood, 
these districts were among the worst hit. As with other instances of flooding in Bangkok, the 
circumstances that led to the city’s inundation in 2006 were both unique and generalised. Heavy 
precipitation, large volumes of runoff from the north of the country and significant sea level rises 
due to seasonal high tides were all contributing factors. In response, the floodwater was managed by 
allowing the agricultural land north of the city to flood and also channelling the water to the east of 
the city, where the case study districts are located. In 2006, Thailand was affected by a number of 
tropical depressions between the months of August and October. These resulted in short periods of 
intense precipitation across Thailand during this period, on 27-31 August, 9-12 September and 18-23 
September. The last, the ‘Xangsane’ typhoon, occurred on 1-3 October. This triggered intense flash 
precipitation in Bangkok. 24 hours of heavy localized rain caused the city to be inundated as its 
drainage system was unable to cope with rainfall exceeding 60mm/hour.  
Estimating the full extent of the 2006 flooding and its impact requires a detailed and wide-ranging 
assessment of its effects. This study aims to develop, through a variety of measurements and 
proxies, a more comprehensive picture of the impacts of the 2006 flooding on communities in the 
four study districts. This case study uses the methodology outlined below: 
1. Secondary data: A diverse selection of secondary data, such as damage profiles, relief subsidies 
and mental health assessments were used in this study. The study draws on previous studies and 
assessments on the 2006 flood, some conducted in its immediate aftermath, that together 
illustrate some of the long-term consequences of the disaster for economic growth and social 
development in the case study districts.  
2. However, the available resources are relatively limited and so a full taxonomy of its effects is not 
possible. The quantifiable measurements are therefore confined to the aspects listed below: 
 
 
































Physical: Total inundated area  
Damage to property and infrastructure  
Loss of agricultural produce 
Environment:  Water quality 
Sanitary level 
Social:  Psychological assessment 
3. Secondly, fieldwork was undertaken in the case study districts, using semi-structured interviews 
with residents to gain a better qualitative understanding of the 2006 flooding.  
4. The primary data were collected in the four selected districts of Nong Jork, Minburi, Ladkrabang 
and Khlongsamwa, all located outside the King’s dyke in eastern Bangkok.  A total of 380 surveys 
were undertaken to assess flood-related impacts across four main sectors: 300 household 
samples, 50 agricultural samples, 28 business samples and 2 industrial samples, namely the 
Bangchan and Ladkrabang industrial estates, the only ones in the study area.  
In order to gauge the true effects of the flooding, the researchers designed a series of proxies to 
better measure the impacts, direct and indirect, on livelihoods and the local economy as seen in 
Table 2 below. This involved synthesizing existing data at the national level, together with the 
primary data gathered through the fieldwork.  
Table 2: Proxies for gauging flooding effects, by sector in Bangkok 
Sector Proxies 
Household Flood level / Flood duration / Cost of physical damage / Work absence / 
Health (physical and mental) 
Agricultural Flood level / Flood duration / Cost physical damage / Work absence / 
Product price 
Business Flood level / Flood duration / Cost of physical damage / Work absence /  
Stock / Custom and trade 




Metro Manila or the National Capital Region (NCR) is the center of political, economic, and socio-
cultural activities of Philippines. Its strategic location by Manila Bay and the mouth of the Pasig River 
accounts for the growth of the capital city. Being near a river and a good harbor made possible the 
development and expansion of the city of Manila to its suburbs in the last 30 years. With large in-
migration and rapid population growth, the city expanded to the suburbs, surrounding 
municipalities, and to risky areas for habitation (e.g., swampy areas, near or above esteros or water 
canals, along the river and earthquake fault lines). Socio-economic forces like land use, 
infrastructural development, building practices, urban development policies and programs have 
greatly shaped the settlement patterns of the city. In 2007, the National Statistics Office (NSO) 
reported that Metro Manila has 12 million residents but the average daytime population is about 16 


































unregulated, the vulnerability of populations, especially marginal sectors, to climate change-related 
effects like floods is quite high, reducing their potential for adaptation and resilience.  
This study was carried out in Metro Manila, in the Pasig-Marikina flood basin, with special focus on 
the cities of Marikina and Pasig. These cities suffered extreme flooding brought about by the tropical 
storm, Ondoy in late September 2009 and Pepeng in early October 2009. In this study, the impacts 
and responses to Ondoy in these cities were compared to another flooding event in 2011, the heavy 
rains and floods brought by Pedring and Quiel in September 2011 and early October 2011. Until 
tropical storm Sendong hit northen Mindanao and Eastern Visayas in December 2011, these were 
considered the worst to have brought extreme flooding to the national capital. 
The study utilized the following main data sources: 
1. Secondary data sources: The main secondary source utilized here to complement the current 
APN survey is the 2008 climate change household survey conducted by the author in the three 
flood plains of Metro Manila. 
2. Household and commercial surveys: This study interviewed 200 households1, sampled from 
those severely flooded communities in the extreme flooding of Ondoy in late September and 
Pepeng in early October 2009 located in the flood basin of the Pasig-Marikina River Basin, one of 
the three flood basins of Metro Manila (see map below). The other two flood basins are located 
in the cities of Kaloocan, Malabon, Navotas, and Valenzuela (KAMANAVA) and in the city of 
Taguig and the municipality of Pateros known as the West Mangahan area. These areas often 
experience flooding coming from the nearby riverine systems and the regular tidal/storm surges 
(see figure 1 below). To obtain the losses/damages and responses at the commercial-industrial 
level, the study conducted a survey of 100 commercial-industrial units or 50 in each of the cities. 
The above data sources were supplemented with key informant interviews and Focus group 
discussions (FGDs) among local and national officials, civil society leaders, influential private sector 
leaders, and community leaders/residents. Overall, the study assessed the vulnerability of Metro 
Manila residents and commercial-industrial establishments to extreme flooding in 2009 (Ondoy and 
Pepeng), their adaptive responses and potentials for mainstreaming these adaptations to urban 




                                                           
1 Originally, the study planned to interview 300 households obtained through systematic sampling with a 
random start but had to reduce this to 200 because the people were tired of being interviewed about the 
effects and their responses to Ondoy. In the same manner, 100 owners/managers of commercial and 
industrial units were expected to be interviewed in both cities but in the end we were able to process 87 
interview protocols because 13 respondents had several call backs that eventually we dropped them out 
of the sample.  
































3.0 Results & Discussion 
 
The project findings in the three cities highlight their vulnerability to climate risks due to their 
geographic location, flood prone topography, large population with a major percentage living a life 
of poverty in informal settlements, changing land use pattern, rapid infrastructure development 
often by reclaiming land from sea (as in case of Mumbai) and inadequate civic amenities. The study 
has examined the physical, economic and social impacts of selected extreme weather events leading 
to flash floods in the three cities. An important finding is that the huge monetary costs of these 
impacts are often the uninsured losses borne by households belonging to poor strata of society and 
the private sector mostly engaged in informal activities. The study also examines the responses of 
local government institutions as well as people to cope with flooding. There are a number of public 
and private adaptation strategies that have been identified in this report.  
We describe in this section the results of the analysis carried out using primary and secondary data 
in the three cities. The following sub-sections give details of the stock and flow impacts, the 
estimates costs of the damage during the extreme weather events on households and other 
establishments and response strategies adopted by local governments and people on their own 
(prominently in case of Mumbai). 
 
3.1 Findings of Mumbai study 
MCGM, the civic authority, undertook damage assessment exercise in the immediate aftermath of 
July 2005 floods and submitted the report to seek financial assistance from the central government 
under the CRF (Central Relief Fund). This exercise has estimated the cost of damages to municipal 
infrastructure including municipal buildings, water supply systems, roads and storm water drains to 
the tune of Indian Rupees (INR) 2475 Million or US$ 55 million. However, the damages and costs 
estimated by the government agencies reflect only a fraction of the total costs of damages to 
physical infrastructure and assets as the damages suffered by households and commercial 
establishments are not accounted for in the absence of insurance coverage and unavailability of 
data. To overcome this limitation of impact assessment, this study carried out the survey of 1168 
households and 792 commercial and small industrial establishments from six wards of Mumbai.  
In case of households, During the July 2005 floods, the average depth of flooding was 5 feet and the 
houses remained flooded for average 3 days. 59% said that the effect of floods on their families was 
high. Most surveyed households (69.35%) were in the lower middle-income category of INR 5000-
15000 followed by 16.52% earning less than INR 5000 per month and 10.62% earning INR 15000-
30000. On an average, the income loss due to floods was INR 5000 (84% respondents) and amount 
spent on repair/ rebuilding of house was INR 15000 (86% respondents). On an average time, it took 
the households around 8 days to complete the repair/reconstruction of the house.   
Table 3 shows the total costs of repair/replacement for the flood affected households. The costs 
estimated through the primary survey have been extrapolated for Mumbai by assuming that overall 
20% of households located in eastern and western suburbs were affected by floods in July 20052. It 
must be noted here that in the absence of insurance coverage, the huge costs calculated here to the 
                                                           
2 2001 census data show the total population of around 8.5 million in eastern and western suburbs of 
Mumbai. Assuming the average of 4 members per family, this translates to about 2.1 million households.   
We make a rough estimation that 20% of these households (about 420,000) were directly affected due to 
floods in July 2005 given the extent of flooding in suburbs and calculate the costs accordingly. It must be 
noted here that we are considering households who are located at the ground level and first storey of 
residential buildings. Hence 20% seems a reasonable estimate for directly affected households. This 
exercise provides at best only indicative estimates of the overall costs that households have had to bear in 


































tune of INR 12,000 million (US$ 267 million) are the out-of-pocket expenses borne by the city 
residents on account of floods.  
Table 3: Cost of repairs/replacement in households 
Item 
Average cost of 
repairs/replacement 












Estimated costs of 
damage in INR 
million 
Income loss 5000 84 352800 1764 
Reconstruction of 
house 
15000 86 361200 5418 
Stove 1500 57 239400 359.1 
Electric Fans 1000 35 147000 147 
TV 7000 42 176400 1234.8 
VCR/VCD 2700 7 29400 79.38 
Music System 3000 1 4200 12.6 
Motorcycle 8000 13 54600 436.8 
Refrigerator 7000 30 126000 882 
Washing Machine 6000 8 33600 201.6 
Furniture 5000 31 130200 651 
Wardrobes 4000 32 134400 537.6 
Utensils 3000 38 159600 478.8 
Total Estimated costs 
12202.68  
(US$ 267 million) 
 
The primary survey also covered commercial establishments like retail shops, IT centres, Jewellery 
stores, dairy, etc. and small industries such as manufacturing units and warehouses. Most of these 
are either located on the ground level in industrial parks or along the roadside and get affected by 
floods with heavy precipitation. During the July 2005 floods, the average depth of flooding reported 
by commercial establishments was 4 ft. The average time taken by them to get back to normal 
business was 3.5 working days. Once again, in the absence of insurance coverage (only 7% of the 
respondents claimed to have insurance coverage of any kind including life insurance), these 
establishments had to bear the burden of repairs and/or replacements for different physical assets 
damaged/destroyed during the July 2005 floods as seen in Table 4 below. The costs have been 
extrapolated for Mumbai by assuming that overall 40% of such establishments located in eastern 
and western suburbs were affected by floods in July 20053. 
 
                                                           
3 MCGM records show around 400,000 registered retail shops and other commercial establishments in 
the city out of which 60% or 240,000 are located in the suburbs. We make a rough estimation that 40% of 
these establishments were affected due to floods in July 2005 given the extent of flooding in suburbs and 
calculate the costs accordingly. This exercise provides at best only indicative estimates of the overall costs 
that such establishments have had to bear in the absence of insurance coverage.   
































Table 4: Cost of repairs/replacement in commercial & industrial establishments in Mumbai 
Item 
Average cost of 
repairs/replacement 





costs in survey 
Estimated 








40000 48 46080 1843.2 
Walls 11000 26 24960 274.56 
Windows 5000 4 3840 19.2 
Doors and 
mouldings 
6000 18 17280 103.68 
Electrical wiring 
and switches 
10000 28 26880 268.8 
Heating 10000 1 960 9.6 
Air conditioning 14000 1 960 13.44 
Machine tools 15000 25 24000 360 
Finished products 24000 28 26880 645.12 
Raw materials 20000 13 12480 249.6 
Inventory 24000 13 12480 299.52 




Source: Calculated based on primary data 
In addition to this, there are a number of indirect impacts like non-availability of essential supplies, 
price rise due to shortages and disruption of essential services that the respondents have reported. 
Some of the major problems faced by both households and commercial and industrial 
establishments are flood waters entering the premises, non-availability of local transportation, 
disruption of electricity and supply of clean drinking water. 70% households and 82% establishments 
reported that their premises were flooded with water. More than 80% households and 
establishments also reported non-availability of local transportation and disruption of electricity. 
62% households said that there was non-availability of food and other supplies. Data on daily octroi 
collections and daily electricity supply also show a major dip in the aftermath of floods. In fact, in 
case of electricity, it took the private utility nearly two weeks to restore the power supply back to its 
normal levels.  
The devastating floods of July 2005 became a real eye opener for the local administration and led to 
the formulation of the Disaster Management Plan for the city and other short to medium term 
measures to improve the coping capacity of the city to floods in future. Along with the local 
government, citizens – households and commercial/industrial establishments –also responded to the 


































The following are some of the important response measures: 
• In the immediate aftermath of the July 2005 floods, a Fact Finding Committee was appointed 
to look into the causes and to recommend activities to reduce the future risks of flooding in 
Mumbai. The committee came up with several recommendations, such as, upgradation of 
storm water drainage system, disaster management, river development and so on to 
improve the existing environment and upgrade and improve the governance and 
management to achieve sustainable development of Mumbai.  
• Accordingly, the Brihanmumbai Stormwater Disposal System (BRIMSTOWAD) is now being 
implementing at the cost of INR 1200 crore (approx. US$ 266 million). This project is 
doubling the capacity of the existing drains from 25 mm rainfall per hour to 50 mm per hour 
of rainfall.  
• A fully-equipped Disaster Management Cell (DMC) was made operational at MCGM 
headquarters in Mumbai after 2005. This cell has been given the responsibility of 
coordinating with different stakeholders and agencies for the rescue and relief operations in 
the event of floods during monsoon. 31 rain gauges have been installed and they feed 
rainfall data of 15-minute interval to the disaster control room. Alert is issued to the control 
rooms in each ward whenever the hourly rainfall exceeds 40 mm. 
• Greater Mumbai Disaster Management Action Plan (DMAP) came into existence in 2007. 
Under this plan, the risks and vulnerabilities associated with floods, earthquakes, landslides, 
cyclones, etc., have been identified. The plan envisages specific roles for different 
stakeholders including government agencies and community organizations. 
• As part of private responses, households and commercial and industrial establishments have 
undertaken steps like increasing height of the surrounding plot, reconstruction with stilt 
parking, repairing and elevating electrical meters, repairs to elevate and protect inventory, 
etc.     
• It must be noted that all private initiatives and responses in the absence of insurance 
coverage are direct out-of-pocket expenses for the individuals or establishments.  
 
3.2 Findings of Bangkok study 
Estimating the full extent of the 2006 flooding in Bangkok and its impact requires a detailed and 
wide-ranging assessment of its effects. Even among the four districts selected in the case study, the 
proportion of inundated area and the accompanying damage varied considerably. Reflecting the 
mixed character of these districts, as formerly agricultural regions now undergoing rapid 
suburbanization, the damage extended to national infrastructure such as roads and rail lines, 
community buildings, businesses, fisheries and farms, along with other less tangible dimensions, 
such as mental health, may not always be readily measurable.  
Table 5 gives an overview of the reported damage in each of the four case study districts on October 
5, just after the flooding. In particular, it gives an idea of the physical damage to communal 
infrastructure and the associated impacts this has on education, social life and mobility for residents. 
The damage to the rice growers was also substantial at 84 million baht, which shows the importance 
of agriculture in Bangkok, particularly in suburban and peripheral areas such as the study districts. 
Similarly, table 6 shows the impact of 2006 floods compared to the impacts of a ‘normal’ flood event 








































Table 5: Damage to national infrastructure and associated costs in 2006 
Infrastructure Damage Costs 
Highways 286 routes on 757 roads: 31 roads 
with no access.  
1,735 million baht ($58 
million): 1,650 million baht to 
rebuild damaged roads and 85 
million baht to restore 
accessibility to obstructed 
roads.  
Rural roads 496 routes:  12 roads with no access. 
467.6km of roads and 1,337m of 
bridge to be rebuilt.  
102 pipe and 49 land erosion projects. 
1,257.7 million baht (around 
$42 million) 




496 routes requiring protection from 
erosion/deterioration. 12 roads with 
no access. 
226 million baht (around $7.5 
million) 
 
Table 6: Flood related impacts in 2006 compared to ‘normal’ floods in 2010 
District 






 2006 2010 2006 2010 2006 2010 
Khlong Samwa 14,254 494 772 47 7.259 1.269 
Minburi 5,877 464 441 54 1.891 1.278 
Lad Krabang 14,826 410 325 &  
671 (inland 
fisheries) 
32 4.377 0.987 
Nong Chok 16,817 1,010 672 52 7.090 2.129 
 
This provides a fuller picture of flood-related costs to individuals and the community. Table 7 below 
summarizes the average loss for each household, business and farm in the sample communities.  
While it includes repair costs to housing, vehicles and other equipment, it also extends to the 
intangible or indirect losses that result from illness, work absence or additional transport costs 
caused by flooding.  Revenue shortfalls or unpaid leave create an added burden that conventional 
measurements of costs and losses often fail to capture. As Table 7 shows, these indirect costs are 
substantial for households, businesses and agriculture. In the case of businesses, the indirect costs of 
lost customers, work absence and the ‘invisible’ cost of flood prevention in fact exceed the direct 












































































































The results highlight the importance of a localized analysis of the impacts of flooding, as both the 
intensity and the nature of its effects vary considerably from district to district. Of the four, Minburi 
was the worst affected in 2006 and 2010. The impact was particularly pronounced in September and 
October, as residents suffered loss of livelihood as a result of economic disruption and health risks.  
Work absence is also an important indirect cost in the flooding. Nevertheless, work attendance 
remained relatively unaffected through the flooding, suggesting a comparatively high level of 
adaptation. However, within the agricultural sector work absence was a major problem as fields and 
land were inundated, in the worst cases potentially extending into weeks.  Interestingly, the 
relatively low impact of work absence on poor and affluent households was in fact similar for the 
lowest income (<10,000 Baht/month) and the highest income (>50,000 baht/month) households. 
































From these results, it would seem that low income households demonstrated a relatively high level 
of adaptation to the flooding. There are probably a number of dimensions to this that need to be 
explored further: for example, the limited ability of low income households to shoulder the costs of 
work absence, especially when they lack the security of formally salaried employment.  
With regards to flood preparedness, the results were poor at the household level in 2006: for 
instance, only 26% of households had stocked food and only 31% drinking water before the flood.  
However, this proportion rose substantially for the 2010 flood (to 37% and 41% respectively), 
suggesting that many households had learnt important lessons from the previous event. And when 
respondents were asked if in future they would be willing to stock up on supplies before flooding, 
for both goods around 75% of households answered positively. This suggests that local communities 
have the capacity to develop better preparation strategies and that there is still further potential to 
improve on these responses.  
Health care costs, whether for minor pharmaceutical purchases or more serious referrals, are 
another important indirect cost that is often overlooked in damage assessments. These costs are 
often not insubstantial. In Nong Jork, where much of the area is farmland, parts of the district 
experienced protracted flooding, with some areas submerged in over a foot of water for more than a 
month. As a result, the generally low income population was faced with a variety of health issues, 
such as dengue fever and foot-and-mouth disease.  
The costs of the flooding, through lost income and damaged infrastructure, were generally more 
severe for the community as a whole than individual households. If the impacts at a community level 
are more severe, as these results suggest, then this would reinforce the importance of collective 
adaptation and mitigation strategies at a community level.  
 
Table 8: Intensity of flood impact by sector and income level 
10,000- 30,000- 10,000- 30,000-
30,000 50,000 30,000 50,000
 Flood Level 57.14% 54.07% 52.22% 63.16% 32.14% 41.48% 47.78% 42.11% 45.45% 66.67% 60.00% 68.75% 57.14%
No. of Days Flooded 62.50% 47.41% 52.00% 52.63% 57.14% 38.52% 44.44% 42.11% 78.79% 75.00% 80.00% 56.25% 57.14%
Loss Incurred 44.64% 43.70% 45.56% 31.58% 30.36% 28.15% 28.89% 36.84% 42.42% 50.00% 40.00% 43.75% 50.00%
Work Absence * * * * 80.36% 87.41% 85.33% 84.31% 90.91% 91.67% 80.00% 56.25% 42.86%
Health * * * * 66.07% 59.26% 74.44% 68.42% * * * * *
Production Price * * * * * * * * 75.76% 58.33% 100.00% * *
Stock * * * * * * * * * * * 31.25% *
Customer * * * * * * * * * * * 43.75% 64.29%
PROXY 
PARAMETERS
Household Sector (300HH) Agricultural Sector(50) Business Sector(30)
Community Home
<10,000 >50,000 <10,000 >50,000 Farm Livestock Fishery Consumer Goods Services
 
 
Flood Level No.of flood days Loss Incurred Work Absence Health
High 30 cm > month >10,000 > week Admission
Medium 15 cm 1-4 week 5,000-10,000 3-5 days District Officer
Low 5 cm < week <5,000 1-2 days Store Purchases
No Impact No impact No impact No impact No impact No impact  
 
Within the agricultural sector, farmland was the worst affected by flooding in both 2006 and 2010, 
with levels in excess of a foot lasting over a month. Therefore, from one perspective, farmland is 
arguably the most vulnerable to flooding.  Nevertheless, it is important to note that fisheries were 
the most affected by the increasing cost of production in 2006. As for small businesses, the impact is 
less straightforward and depends in particular on the product of the enterprise. For instance, while 
the service sector was weakened by flood-related disruption, demand for basic consumer goods 
actually rose among residents who were more reliant on local shops to provide them with food and 
other provisions. The government therefore must factor these different effects into its assessments 


































Large areas of Bangkok were inundated in 2006 floods and this led to further measures in the 
aftermath of the event to strengthen the existing network to protect the city from runoff. The 
strategic focus since 2006, such as the Royal Irrigation Department (RID) master plan, is largely 
infrastructural, with an emphasis on creating and enhancing drainage and pumping. In partnership 
with the Department of Drainage and Sewage, the RID developed a 450 km2 protected area in the 
eastern suburbs beyond the King’s Dike, supported by a system of monitors and flood walls along 
the main canals to restrict inflows of floodwater from nearby. Three pumping stations have been 
constructed at Hok Wah Sai Lang, Saen Saeb and Pravetburirom to provide the system with an 
additional CMS of drainage capacity. These have been accompanied by strengthening the city’s 
retention and drainage capacity. 
Further, flood protection for the Chao Phraya Basin encompasses a broad range of different actors 
with a variety of specializations and institutional mandates. This includes sector-specific agencies, 
such as the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), the Royal Irrigation Department 
(RIG) and the Public Works Department (PWD), and administrative bodies with localized governance 
remits such as the BMA and the Local Administration Department (LAD).  
The BMA’s strategies focus primarily on three approaches: 
• Flooding prevention – achieved through both structural measures (such as polders, pumps and 
sewerage) and non-structural approaches (such as planning regulations, public communications 
and improved information gathering). While the former is typically employed in dense, inner city 
districts, the latter is often favored in low density residential and agricultural areas. This 
potentially suggests that in suburban areas, such as the case study districts, full prevention may 
not be achievable, but the negative effects of inundation can be substantially reduced.   
• Post-flood disaster recovery – focused on immediate mitigation through operating and 
maintaining pumping and drainage capacity, as well as developing a short term action plan. In 
2006, this included the installation of additional pumps in high risk areas, the release of surplus 
water into irrigation areas and upstream water retention.  
 
• Medium-term post-flood disaster recovery scenario – maintaining existing infrastructure and 
constructing additional capacity to sustain and enhance protective capacity, accompanied by 
measures to prevent and resolve flooding. Careful coordination, monitoring and evaluation is 
necessary to achieve this.  
 
As for the involvement of private sector and community in responding to flood threats, the BMA has 
already undertaken some projects to promote partnerships along these lines, such as the 2007 BMA 
Declaration of Cooperation on Alleviating Global Warming Problems, with 36 private and public 
sector signatories. In addition, in 2008 it implemented a ‘canal water quality improvement’ 
campaign to raise awareness of the importance of canal environments, with the participation of 
local canal side communities. Independent institutes such as the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center 







































3.3 Findings of Manila study 
The study carried out in Metro Manila selected two study areas, Marikina and Pasig City. Household 
and commercial surveys, key informant interviews, FGDs and secondary data sources have revealed 
the following impacts of 2009 floods on the households in the two cities:   
• Majority (90 percent in Marikina City; 71 percent in Pasig City) asserted that they suffered 
highly from the Ondoy floods in 2009. On the average, the flood waters in their homes 
reached an average of 20 ft., while in some it reached the maximum height 30 ft. in 2009. 
But of the two cities, Marikina had suffered more with 75 percent of their dwelling 
structures fully or partially damaged while only 35 percent of Pasig had suffered the same. 
• Most (81 percent) of their major repairs and reconstruction were concentrated on adding 
and repairing/repainting the floors, walls, and roofing of their homes while the rest (19 
percent) either constructed a new home, fixed their plumbing, drainage system and toilets.  
• On the average, it took them 30 days to complete the repair and reconstruction of their 
homes, with a small minority (10 percent) unable to do so because of not having the 
resources to do it or were prevented by the authorities to reconstruct their homes as these 
were located in danger zones. 
• In Marikina, affected residents spent an average of (Pesos) P141,000 compared to P12,000 in 
Pasig City to repair their damaged homes and appliances. The disparity is due to the fact that 
extreme flooding in Marikina hit more upper/middle-income households while in Pasig City 
the extreme floods (in terms of height and length) devastated mostly low and middle-
income households. 
• In terms of losing household assets, almost half (45 percent) of the surveyed households 
reported having lost severely, while 30 percent lost mildly and 16 percent had negligible 
losses.  
• On the average, 30 man-days were lost by the residents in 2009 because of the flood 
damage to their homes, basic services, and infrastructure (roads, bridges and water 
channels). Water supply was interrupted for 22 days and electricity could not be delivered 
for about a month (Marikina) and 14 days (Pasig). 
• Children’s schooling also suffered with about 70 percent of the households unable to send 
their children to school.  
• In terms of income loss, the respondents averaged losing P21,000 per household (average 
salary of public school teacher is P10,000) with some reaching P500,000 income loss due to 
Ondoy floods. 
• Most (almost 80 percent) of the respondents suffered from coughs/colds and fever 
due to the floods. About 40 percent complained of diarrhea and stomach ailments. 
On the average, they spent P6,517 for medical expenses, with some families 
spending a maximum of P70,000 during the Ondoy floods. 
 
Below is a comparative summary of costs and losses (Table 9 and 10) incurred prior, during, and 








































Table 9: Costs due to floods in Marikina and Pasig city during 2009 floods 
Summary of Costs/Losses Due to Floods (monthly)
Pre-Ondoy Ondoy Period Post-Ondoy
Men 
HH






Absences from school 6 8 14 17 6 7
Number of workdays lost 
from sickness due to flood
5 7 9 10 5 8
Number of work days lost 
due to flood
6 8 20 22 6 9
Average income loss due to 
floods
P1,715 P3,250 P7,250 P6,450 P2,750 P3,400
Average amount of spent on 
medicine
P300 P400 P3,200 P3,000 P500 P450
Average losses (appliances, 
etc.)
P25,000 P20,000
Average income P6,250 P5,000 - - P6,500 P4,200
 
 
Table 10: Costs of basic needs in Marikina and Pasig city during 2009 floods 
Summary of Costs of Basic Needs/Services (in pesos, 
monthly, US$ 1=P43)
Pre-Ondoy Ondoy Period Post-Ondoy
Men 
HH





































(mud, waist deep; 
cleaning – 2 weeks – one 
month)
P300 P310 P2,000 P2,000 P360 P320






































In case of commercial establishments, the survey targeted 100 establishments (50 in each city) but 
processed only 85 research protocols. With regards to damages to their buildings and properties, the 
respondents reported an average of P85,316, while damages to equipment, appliances and furniture 
amounted to a median average of P100,000. Their expenses for repair for buildings amounted to 
median average of P10,500. Meanwhile, their expenses on repairs of equipments/appliances 
amounted to a median average of P50,000. After the floods, other costs involved disinfecting, 
sanitation and rehabilitation. The respondents reported spending a median average of P5,000. Flood 
fighting/control costs on the other hand, yield a median average of P37,500. Costs of removing 
debris from the premises amounted to a median average of P8,000. Meanwhile, the respondents 
reported a median average loss of net income due to flood interruptions of P50,000. Total annual 
revenue lost to floods had a median average of P225,000. Majority (96 percent) of the 
establishments stopped work or closed operation because of damage to physical structures, 
equipment and/or their places remaining inaccessible due to the floods. The average time needed to 
recover was 1-2 months.  
 Most of the responses coming from households can be categorized into the following: 1) physical-
structural adjustments, and 2) changes in lifestyles and habits. About one-third added a floor or 
raised the floor and strengthened the foundation of their homes. They also moved the storage of 
goods, valuables, and irreplaceable goods to a higher level so these won’t get wet or damaged. They 
also become more diligent in cleaning their surrounding canals/drainage channels for 
garbage/debris.  
Overwhelming 83 percent surveyed households claimed to have been assisted by the local/city 
government with food and clothing. In case of manufacturing sector, many  relocated their activities 
to other parts of the city where flooding is less likely to occur. This was a strategy adopted by large 
commercial and industrial establishments in the city.  For those who remained or did not relocate, 
they just strengthened their buildings or build upper floors where they conduct their business. 
Meanwhile in Pasig, most of the factories were compelled by the City Environment Office (CENRO) to 
follow safety standards.  
As regards the immediate and medium-term responses of the city/local government are concerned, 
these can be summarized into: 1) evacuation, 2) restoration of basic services and 3) rebuilding of 
infrastructural support. Also, in Marikina City, communicating the risk of city flooding is now very 
much institutionalized in their early warning system, indicated by the siren signals according to the 
water level in the Marikina bridge. Meanwhile, Pasig City has also installed an early warning system 
communicated through the city’s disaster risk reduction management (DRRM) council and to the 
barangay/community DRRM counterpart bodies. 
Given the challenges and learnings from the disastrous events of 2009, several policies and programs 
were enacted by the Congress. Two overarching frameworks for adapting to climate change were 
crafted, the 2010 National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management and the 2011 National 
Framework Strategy on Climate Change. Each was drafted in compliance with the law by virtue of 
the “Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010” and the “Climate Change Act 
of 2009”. The first provides for the creation of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Management Council; the second, for the Climate Change Action Plan approved for implementation 
by President Benigno Aquino III towards the end of November 2011. 
Similarly, Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010 was signed, amending the 30-year 
old Presidential Decree 1566. This law mandated that each city/municipality must have a disaster 
risk reduction and management plan. Meanwhile the Climate Change Action Plan made the first law 
more actionable by specifying the programs to be implemented by the Climate Change Commission 



































3.4 Enhancing adaptation through response measures 
As seen in the previous sub-sections, both government and citizens have responded to the threat of 
floods by undertaking a variety of short to medium-term measures in the three cities. The important 
issue to be discussed here is whether and how far do these response measures add to the existing 
adaptation capacity and would they succeed in enhancing the adaptation capacity in the long-term. 
We discuss here the important issues related to adaptation capacity in the three cities. 
As for Mumbai, there are a number of issues related to public and private response measures that 
need to be highlighted here: 
• BRIMSTOWAD is a major policy initiative that is expected to improve the existing and age-old 
storm water drainage system in Mumbai and replace it with the one that will be much more 
effective in dealing with greater intensity rainfall. Once the project is implemented completely, it 
is expected to improve the flood situation in Mumbai as the new system is being designed for 50 
mm rainfall per hour instead of 25 mm per hour design currently in place. Also, the project has 
been designed for the runoff coefficient of 1 instead of 0.5 due to the land use changes that 
have occurred in the city in past few decades. Thus BRIMSTOWAD is expected to increase the 
adaptation capacity of the city for flash floods caused by heavy intensity rainfall in future. 
• However, if an extreme weather event like July 2005 were to occur again in the next few 
decades, even the design criteria used under BRIMSTOWAD will not be enough to cope with the 
ensuing floods in low-lying areas. Thus, we need to note this that the residual impacts of the 
weather events would still be faced by the city and cannot be done away with completely.  
• In addition to revamping the storm water drainage network, MCGM has started clearing clogged 
drains every year before monsoon. Regular widening and desilting of drains is undertaken. 
However, there are multiple agencies involved in this, such as, MMRDA, Public Works 
Department, Railways, Mumbai Port Trust and Airport Authority of India. Unless there are 
coordinated and well synchronized efforts undertaken by these agencies, isolated efforts will not 
help in the long-run to cope with floods.   
• As regards the disaster management plan formulated by the local authorities, the plan is quite 
comprehensive and defines the role of different stakeholders as seen in the earlier discussion. 
However, the plan is generic in nature and has less operational value as pointed out by the fact 
finding committee. Also various planning and implementing agencies in Mumbai often operate 
as islands making it difficult to have a well coordinated response in case of disasters or weather 
events. 
• There are a number of steps taken up by the civic authority, MCGM in recent years based on the 
recommendations of the fact finding committee, to improve the disaster response and 
management. Accordingly, the rainfall data are now available with the automatic weather 
stations for 15-minute interval which can be used to issue early warning to ward control rooms. 
This will improve the response and coping capacity in the long-run. The 15-minute interval 
rainfall data over a number of years in future can also be used to analyze the intensity and 
pattern of rainfall in the city and early warning systems and response measures can be 
improvised accordingly. 
• The early warning system currently being used by the control room looks effective on paper. 
Regular information regarding rainfall intensity and traffic diversion is given to the general public 
through the website maintained by the MCGM. Yet, the awareness levels regarding such 
systems are very poor. For example, our primary survey reveals that 91% households did not 
even know about the DMC and 99% were not aware of the website that gives out such 
information. 88% were not aware of the emergency contact number. Thus, awareness-building 
is the key to making early warning systems effective and add to the coping capacity in future. 
• Measures related to infrastructure improvements would require a longer time frame given the 
socio-economic and political dynamics in the city. Also, the land use policies and planning will 
not be effective unless they are coupled with strategies to deal with slum settlements and 
































migrants into the city. The experience of the city dwellers in the aftermath of 2005 floods only 
shows that the city administration and other stakeholders would need more specific strategies 
and an integrated approach to build resilience of the city to climate risks. 
• As for the planning process, development planning takes environment into consideration at the 
generic level. But climate risks and associated impacts of heavy precipitation, sea level rise and 
storms are uncertain and varied in nature. What is needed is more scientific knowledge base 
related to such risks, their impacts on the city and technical knowledge related to how we can 
mitigate and adapt to such risks. This would increase the possibility of mainstreaming climate 
risks and adaptation into the planning process. 
• As regards the efficacy of private response measures in enhancing the adaptation capacity to 
deal with floods in the long term, it is too early to evaluate this given the information we 
received through the primary survey. It must be noted that these responses are strictly private in 
nature with individual initiative and without any public or government intervention in it. As such 
there are no benchmarks to evaluate how efficient these responses are.     
In case of Bangkok, the following issues need to be highlighted here: 
• Given different strategies adopted by the authorities for flood control in the aftermath of 2006, 
the unprecedented flooding in 2011 have clearly shown that much more needs to be done to 
enhance adaptation capacity of the city in the long-term. As the fieldwork for this study was 
concluding, the city was presented with one of the worst extreme flood events. According to the 
Federation of Thai Industries, the cost to the seven hardest hit industrial estates could reach $13 
billion, involving 891 factories and 460,000 workers.  
• While there is no room in this study to examine the extreme flood event of 2011, it is worth 
noting a number of elements that highlight the persistence of many key issues.  
o The official response to the flooding was sharply criticized for its lack of institutional 
coordination, the divisive relationships between different agencies and the strong 
degree of politicization that accompanied relief efforts.  
o While some institutional reforms have been made since 2006, the overall challenges of 
fragmented governance were still apparent.  
o In today’s context, when Bangkok is a sprawling metropolis with much of its population 
and industry concentrated in the suburbs outside its core, the strong focus on securing 
the city centre does little to alleviate the suffering of hundreds of thousands of the city’s 
residents.  
o The protection of inner Bangkok was regarded as coming at the expense of other 
neighborhoods that were forced to suffer deeper and more prolonged bouts of flooding 
as a result.  
• To be effective, adaptation strategies must be supported by adequate and multidimensional 
data. Previous risk assessments have been hampered by information shortfalls, ranging from a 
lack of baseline climate data to the marginalization of non-technical considerations such as 
socioeconomic vulnerability, water security and health profiles. Data gathering should also 
include a localized focus, as in this study, on the specific circumstances of individual districts.   
• The dysfunctional nature of the city’s flood management must be addressed through national 
and municipal governance reform. This should resolve a broad range of ongoing challenges, 
including poor institutional coordination, deficient city planning, funding constraints, poverty-
related vulnerability and building code development.  
• The flood protection strategy will also necessarily require a site-specific perspective and 
potentially the decentralization of some authority to districts and communities.  
• Meaningful stakeholder participation is essential, drawing on the widest possible range of 
actors. This should include not only the various responsible public sector bodies, but also local 


































• Flood protection measures must develop a long term planning vision. Too much effort is 
expended on reactive measures once flood events have already occurred, with limited 
preparation or anticipation of projected future trends. Furthermore, strategic directions are 
often only partially or inconsistently implemented, as with development restrictions in the 
eastern areas of Bangkok where the study districts are located.  
• Flood protection strategies must consider not only the technical and economic implications of 
flooding, but also the social and human dimensions. Flooding has been widely regarded in the 
past as a water management issue, rather than a complex phenomenon that impacts livelihoods, 
urban development and other fields.  
• Even in the aftermath of the 2011 flood, the BMA’s flood prevention plan still appears to 
concentrate primarily on infrastructure development in both the short and long term. Yet the 
risks of flooding are not only environmental, but socioeconomic in nature.  
• Flood prevention therefore requires an integrated approach that spans health, waste 
management and the dynamics of agglomeration economies. 
For Manila, the following issues regarding adaptation need to be highlighted here: 
• Floods and storms continue to cause severe economic damage to Philippines as evident from 
repeated flood events, the latest one in December 2011. Thus, the fundamental lesson that has 
to be inscribed into people’s life-ways and institutions is the urgent need to develop a culture of 
disaster prevention, mitigation, adaptation and safety behavior. 
• But Philippine society, especially government institutions, is not able to effectively fulfil the 
responsibility in implementing the required engineering, land zoning, infrastructure planning and 
sustainable relocation of people. 
• Commercial and other private sector interests and informal settlers continue to build over, 
across, beside waterways or in mountain slopes/hills that obstruct, constrict and deflect 
water/river flows.  
• As far as relocation as a strategy is concerned, majority of commercial establishments who 
refuse to follow safety standards imposed by the city have moved to cities that are not so strict 
in imposing restrictions. Overall, this poses problems when considered at the macro level, 
because local government units (LGUs), in order to attract business often relax the compliance 
standards. 
• In case of households, making people move constitutes the most challenging task for LGUs as 
most residents do not want to leave their homes because of theft/loss of belongings. They 
would rather climb up to the ceilings/roofs of their houses than move. 
• It is apparent from the focused group discussions that the design of the recovery and 
reconstruction program must be transparent, accountable and must deliver evidence-based 
results and outcomes. Also, the approach must be community-based, people-centred and 
equitable and should focus on reduction of future risks in recovery and reconstruction. 
• The crafting of local risk reduction and management plans at the barangay (community), city, 
and provincial levels provide a very promising scenario. These local plans drawn locally and 
elevated to the city level make design strategies contextually-specific and more appropriate, 
responsive and effective for local needs. 
• The findings of this study suggest the need for a bottom-up process where the particular 
environmental and social-political-economic vulnerabilities of the affected communities are 
integrated in the “Local Climate Action Plans” and the “Local Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Management Plans” which builds into an integrated “Municipal/City Climate Action Plans” and 
“Municipal/City Disaster Reduction and Management Plans”. 
• These vulnerabilities should also be calibrated well at the governance level, thus moving towards 
water-based urban design, vertical urbanism and green economy, technologies and architecture 
can be programmed or mainstreamed into urban development.  
 


































As stated earlier, this research project undertakes an analysis of the immediate to medium-term 
post-disaster recovery scenario in the aftermath of extreme weather events of flooding faced by 
vulnerable cities in three Asian developing countries, namely, Mumbai (India), Bangkok (Thailand) 
and Manila (Philippines). The project has developed three case studies for the selected cities. Each of 
the studies have measured the physical, economic and social impacts of selected extreme weather 
events of flooding, identified the public and private responses in the short to medium-term and 
explored their policy implications for long-term adaptation capacity, city resilience and investment 
and development plans.  
Each study is based on the analysis of primary and secondary data pertaining to the selected events 
of flooding and their resultant physical, economic and social impacts. The impacts considered here 
include loss of life, injuries, damage to property and infrastructure, damage to economic stocks like 
physical capital, inventory and indirect impacts on flow variables like income, investment, 
employment and disruption of essential services. After measuring these impacts, the analysis has 
focused on the immediate to medium-term post recovery scenario, wherein, we have examined the 
responses of the civic administration as well as citizens themselves to cope with future floods. The 
findings have significant policy implications for integrating adaptation strategies with long-term 
investment and development plans for the cities at risk. This exercise is particularly relevant to these 
cities belonging to the developing world, where natural disasters have long-term implications for not 
only economic development but poverty alleviation as well.  
The main objectives of the research project are:  
1. Analysis of immediate to medium-term impacts and responses in the aftermath of extreme 
events of flooding faced by three coastal cities, Mumbai (India), Bangkok (Thailand) and 
Manila (Philippines) 
2. Examine the effects of short to medium-term responses to extreme events on enhancing the 
long-term adaptation capacity of these cities 
3. Explore the policy implications of the findings for long-term disaster management, 
city resilience and long-term development plans 
In order to achieve the objectives, the following activities were carried out under the project:  
1. Developing a common methodology in the inception workshop held in December 2010 to 
identify and measure the immediate to medium-term impacts of selected weather events 
resulting in flooding in the three cities.  
2. Measuring physical, economic and social impacts of floods with particular focus on stock and 
flow variables using primary and secondary data  
3. Examining the short to medium-term responses of local government institutions and the 
community at large including households and private sector  
4. Exploring the linkages of the response measures to adaption capacity in the long-term and 
policy implications for development planning and city resilience 
5. Initiating the process for integrating post event recovery strategy with investment and 
development plans through stakeholder workshops that would lead to long term reduction 
in vulnerability and enhancement of adaptive capacity in the three cities 
 
The project findings in the three cities highlight their vulnerability to climate risks due to their 
geographic location, flood prone topography, large population with a major percentage living a life 
of poverty in informal settlements, changing land use pattern, rapid infrastructure development 
often by reclaiming land from sea (as in case of Mumbai) and inadequate civic amenities. The study 


































to flash floods in the three cities. An important finding is that the huge monetary costs of these 
impacts are the uninsured losses borne by households belonging to poor strata of society and the 
private sector mostly engaged in informal activities. The study also examines the responses of local 
government institutions as well as people to cope with flooding. There are a number of public and 
private adaptation strategies that have been identified in this report. A significant finding is that all 
private initiatives and responses are a direct out-of-pocket expense for the concerned individuals or 
establishments. There is virtually no insurance cover that helps them to deal with the adverse 
impacts of floods and bring about changes or improvements in the existing infrastructure. Some of 
the public and private responses have the potential to enhance the medium to long-term adaptation 
capacity of the city to cope with future floods. However, there is a need to address the larger issues 
of climate risks and adaptation in the long-term development planning for the cities 
Overall, the project has achieved its stated objective of analyzing the short to medium-term impacts 
and responses in the aftermath of extreme weather events leading to floods in the three cities. The 
case studies developed here further examine if the response measures undertaken by both local 
administration and communities has the potential to enhance the adaptation capacity of the city in 
the long-term. There are critical policy implications of the findings of this study, in particular, the 
huge monetary burden of the impacts of floods which is borne by the community in the absence of 
insurance coverage and other compensation or aid. Responses also mean the cost related private 
adaptation. Such private costs, especially the costs borne by the poor and vulnerable sections in 
these cities and informal sectors often go unaccounted for in usual damage impact assessment 
studies. 
This research project in a way highlights the cost of inaction if very little is done in future to enhance 
the coping capacity of the cities for future weather events and climate risks in general. The project 
puts forth a convincing argument that adaptation strategies need to become a part of mainstream 
planning while devising strategies of developing infrastructure, housing, transport network and 
other facilities and services in the city. Although adaptation is costly, the costs of inaction can prove 
to be costlier. Hence, there is a need for integrated and coordinated efforts from all agencies 
including local government, planners, public utilities and community at large to work towards 
greater adaptation to future climate risks for the city.  
 
5.0 Future Directions 
 
The findings of the project are quite relevant for the three cities which are in transition and on a 
development path. It is extremely important that these findings are shared with the larger audience 
of policy makers, academia and local community to initiate a meaningful dialogue on climate risks, 
general perceptions about the adaptive capacity and how adaptation can be mainstreamed into 
policy processes. Therefore, the project should culminate in journal articles as well as be presented 
in different forums to make it more relevant.  
We envisage the following logical steps to take this research theme further: 
• There is a need to study the policy processes further, especially the formulation of development 
and investment plans in the cities to understand how climate risks and adaptation can be 
incorporated into these plans. 
• There seems to be a communication gap among scientific community, technocrats and designers, 
urban planners, disaster management specialists and public representatives as far as future 
climate risks faced by cities, their potential impacts, required defense mechanism and 
preventive actions. We need an integrated project where these stakeholders are brought 
together as a part of a capacity-building exercise and their perspectives are shared to decide the 
future course of action as far as mainstreaming adaptation is concerned. 
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1. Introduction  
Mumbai (formerly known as Bombay) is one of the largest mega cities in the world in terms of 
population and is currently ranked 4th after Tokyo, Mexico City and New York1. The city is the 
financial capital of India with a large commercial and trading base. It plays host to a number of 
industries, multinational companies and important financial institutions. With per capita income 
thrice that of the national average, Mumbai makes huge contribution to the total tax revenues of 
the country. The city is an important international sea port and strategic for the country from 
defence perspective. Unfortunately, Mumbai is also acutely vulnerable to climate risks due to its 
location on the sea coast, flood prone topography and the landmass composed largely of reclaimed 
land. Also, the most vulnerable section among the residents is the slum dwellers and squatter 
communities in the city that comprise more than 60% of the total residents as per the preliminary 
estimates of the 2011 census. Therefore, it is critical for the city to assess the vulnerabilities and 
devise adaptation strategies to cope with future climate risks. 
In recent years, Mumbai has been experiencing many weather events, including the extreme 
weather event in July 2005 that led to unprecedented floods, massive damages, loss of life and 
property and affected the economic and social activities adversely. Such loss of physical, economic 
and financial capital, while important in itself, leads to a loss of economic and social services over a 
longer-term. Extreme weather events tend to have long-term consequences for economic 
development and poverty alleviation in the city and can potentially alter the development trajectory 
permanently. Accompanied by physical, economic and social vulnerabilities in cities like Mumbai is 
their low adaptive capacity due to constraints on physical, financial and human resources.  
It is now widely accepted that impacts of future climate change will often be observed through 
changes in the magnitude and frequency of existing climate-related hazards in the form of extreme 
weather events. Therefore, disaster risk reduction and disaster management is an important context 
for integrating or mainstreaming adaptation into decision-making for the cities at risk. With this in 
view, the present study has been undertaken to assess the vulnerability of the coastal city of 
Mumbai to climate change in general and heavy precipitation events in particular. The study seeks to 
understand the impact that such precipitation events and resultant flash floods tend to have on the 
households and commercial establishments in the city. It further seeks to evaluate the community 
and institutional responses to floods and current adaptation efforts. The ultimate aim of the study is 
to understand the implications of short-term responses and adaptation efforts for long-term 
development planning of the city. 
1.1 Coastal megacity of Mumbai  
Mumbai is located on the western seacoast of India on the Arabian Sea at 18053’ N to 19016’ N 
latitude and 720 E to 72059’ E longitude. Mumbai is an island outside the mainland of Konkan in 
Maharashtra State and is separated from the mainland by a narrow creek known as Thane Creek and 
a Harbour Bay. The city is surrounded on three sides by the sea: Arabian Sea to the West, Harbour 
Bay in the West and Thane Creek in the East. The height of the city is just 10-15 meters above the 
sea level in most parts. The city occupies an area of 468 square kilometres (sq. km.) and its width is 
17 km. east to west and 42 km. north to south2. The entire region encompasses rich natural 
heritage, such as, hills, lakes, coastal water, forests, and mangroves, alongside built areas. 
Greater Mumbai Region (GMR, referred to as Mumbai in the text) consists of 7 islands in the city 
area and 4 islands in the suburbs. The present day city is divided into two revenue districts, Mumbai 
City District, i.e, the island city in the South and Mumbai Suburban District comprising the Western 
and Eastern suburbs. As the original cluster of seven islands was joined to form the present city, a 
































large part of the City and Suburban District is built on the land reclaimed from the sea. The coastline 
of Mumbai has been reclaimed for development purposes; e.g., areas like Cuff Parade and Mahim 
creek were wetlands, later reclaimed for residential and commercial uses. The new industrial, 
commercial and residential settlements have also developed along the reclaimed coastal areas 
which are low-lying and flood prone.  
The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) is the primary agency responsible for 
governance of the GMR or Mumbai city. The city is divided into different administrative zones known 
as ‘wards’ to facilitate the day-to-day functioning of the civic authority. The map of Mumbai city, 
including the location of different administrative wards is shown in Figure 1 below. MCGM has a long 
history in urban governance. It was the first municipal corporation established in India in the year 
1882. Since then, the civic body has been responsible for the provision of civic amenities, education, 
public health, art and culture and heritage conservation in the city. MCGM holds the distinction of 
being one of the largest local governments in the Asian continent3. For administrative purposes, 
Mumbai Metropolitan region (MMR) has been designated to combine GMR and the surrounding 
areas of Thane, Navi Mumbai, Ulhasnagar, Mira Road, Vasai, Virar, Bhayandar, Bhiwandi, Karjat, 
Alibaug, etc. Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA), set up in 1975, is 
responsible for planning and coordination of the development activities of this region. The total area 
of the MMR, excluding Mumbai city, is 3887 sq. km., with a population base of 5.90 million as per 
2001 census4. These surrounding areas are significant for the economy and transportation services in 
Mumbai, as thousands of people travel everyday from these areas into the city for employment.  
1.2 Description of the study 
The present study analyzes the immediate to medium-term post-disaster recovery scenario in the 
aftermath of flooding caused by heavy intensity precipitation in Mumbai in July 2005. The study 
identifies the developmental impacts of this extreme weather event and explores their policy 
implications for long-term disaster management, city resilience and adaptation strategies. The study 
identifies the adaptation efforts undertaken by the local government and communities in the 
aftermath of July 2005 floods and assesses the potential for these efforts to enhance the adaptation 
capacity of the city in the long run.  
The study uses both primary data collected from communities and primary and secondary data 
collected from government institutions pertaining to July 2005 floods, their resultant physical, 
economic and social impacts and response strategies taken up since then. The impacts include stock 
variables like loss of life, injuries, damage to property and infrastructure, damage to physical capital 
and inventory and health impacts as well as flow variables like loss of income, investment, 
employment and disruption of essential services like water and electricity. Similarly, response 
strategies are identified at both the institutional and community level. The study then focuses on the 
policy implications of the response efforts for disaster management, city resilience and adaptive 
capacity in the long-term. The study aims to bring out the long term policy implications for 
integrating adaptation strategies into long-term investment and development plans for the city.  
The methodology used in the study is outlined here:  
• Primary data collected from households and commercial and small industrial establishments 
in Mumbai by administering a detailed questionnaire Six flood prone wards in Mumbai – F North, F 
South, H East, K East, L and P North –selected for the survey and questionnaires administered to 
1168 households and 791 commercial and small industrial establishments spread over the six wards. 
The sample selected from the six wards is given in Table A1 in the annexure. Further, the six ward 



































• Survey questionnaires pertain to impacts of July 2005 floods, community and administration 
response, costs of damage and repairs/replacements, response measures undertaken in the 
aftermath of July 2005 and experience of subsequent flood events 
• Special section on awareness of climate change added to the questionnaire to understand 
the climate risk perception among people 
• Information collection through Unstructured interviews of selected local government 
officials working at the ward level, with Disaster Management Cell (DMC) and key planners. Details 
of the interviews are given in Table A2 in the annexure.  
• personal interviews carried out based on open ended questions to understand their views 
on flooding events in Mumbai, climate risk perception, current adaptation events, level of 
preparedness and enhancing long-term coping capacity through short and medium-term measures 
undertaken by the local government  
• Secondary data collected from the DMC and other sources within MCGM as well as a private 
sector electricity utility to understand the magnitude of impact on city infrastructure and provision 
of services, relief and recovery efforts, disaster management priorities and practices and overall 
development planning process 
1.3 Outline of the report 
The outline of the case study presented here is as follows. Section 2 takes an overview of reviews 
the physical, economic and social vulnerabilities in Mumbai city from the perspective of heavy 
precipitation and risk of flooding. This section presents the historical data on the rainfall pattern and 
resultant flash floods and takes an overview of weather/climate risks for Mumbai city. Section 3 
describes the catastrophic event of July 2005 which witnessed unprecedented rainfall and flooding 
in Mumbai.  The focus of the section is on the physical and economic impacts during the July 2005 
floods. The information gathered through the primary survey of households and commercial and 
industrial establishments as well as secondary data from government sources is used here to 
understand the impacts on stocks and flow variables. The responses to floods including efforts taken 
up by local government institutions and communities are reviewed in Section 4. This section once 
again uses primary and secondary data to identify the response measures. Section 5 seeks to 
understand the efficacy of response measures in increasing the coping capacity of the city for future 
floods in the long-term and looks at the possibility of mainstreaming adaptation to climate risks into 
the development planning of the city. Section 6, the concluding section, summarizes the overall 
findings of the case study.  





































































2. Vulnerabil ity and climate risks  
The geographical location of the city and its physical, economic and social characteristics make the 
city more vulnerable to the threats posed by climate risks, such as, sea level rises, storms and floods. 
This section looks at each of these vulnerabilities in detail. The rainfall pattern as recorded by the 
weather stations since 1970s and the risk of flooding in the city is also described here. A number of 
studies have tried to project the climate risks for Mumbai, a review of which is brief undertaken 
towards the end of this section.  
 
2.1 Physical and socioeconomic vulnerabil ity 
Mumbai, being on the seacoast, experiences a tropical savanna climate5,6 with a heavy southwest 
monsoon rainfall of more than 2100 millimetres a year in the monsoon season between June and 
September. The City District receives the average total annual rainfall of 2146.6mm, whereas, it is 
2363.0 mm in the suburbs. The flash floods that led to the complete disruption of normal life in 
Mumbai in July 2005 were the result of an unprecedented rainfall of 944.2 mm on July 26th in the 
Suburban District7. Further, most parts of the present day city are built on the reclaimed land. The 
city is about 10-15 metres above sea level in many places8. The airport area is only 7.5 metres above 
sea level. Similarly major commercial and residential areas like Bandra-Kurla Complex, Wadala and 
Worli are low-lying areas. Thus, heavy precipitation often causes flash floods. There are 40 chronic 
flooding locations identified in the Greater Mumbai Disaster management Action Plan (DMAP) that 
are spread over the island city and eastern and western suburbs. These flooding spots are a worry 
for the civic administration as heavy precipitation often causes flooding in the local settlements and 
disrupts traffic and normal city life. 
Being a coastal city, Mumbai is also prone to cyclones and gusty winds. There are a number of wards 
along the coast (Arabian Sea and Thane Creek) that are vulnerable to cyclonic impacts. For instance, 
in wards A – D, G-North, G-South, S and T, the (DMAP) has identified settlements that are acutely 
vulnerable to cyclones. There settlements were originally fishing communities, but are now home to 
many slums along the coast. Given the poor quality of construction material used by these homes, 
they are extremely vulnerable to cyclones and winds9.  
As per 2001 census, Mumbai has over 276,000 dwellings (residential, industrial and commercial) of 
which 60% are non-engineered constructions, which correspond with the large presence of slum 
settlements10. Such constructions are more vulnerable to extreme weather events. Many slum 
settlements, generally located on the hill slopes, bottom of hills or near abandoned quarries, face 
the risk of landslides usually occurring during heavy rains with gusty winds. DMAP identifies 117 such 
settlements which are extremely vulnerable to landslides, loss of life and damage to property in case 
of heavy precipitation.  
Perhaps the most important factor enhancing the vulnerability of the city to climate risks is the ever 
growing population of Mumbai. The city population has grown steadily in the last 5 decades. There is 
a consistent growth from about 3 million in 1951 to 8 million in 1981 to 12 million in 2001 as per the 
Census figures, with the population density of about 30,000 per sq. km. 11. As the financial capital of 
the country, Mumbai attracts a large workforce, which adds to the pressure on basic infrastructure, 
civic amenities and housing. It also leads to congestion, heavy vehicular traffic, growth in illegal slum 
dwellings, unhygienic living conditions and the problem of solid waste disposal.  
Mumbai, with a large population to cater to, requires basic infrastructure in the form of a large 
transport network of railways and roadways. Thousands of people avail of this huge network every 
day. However, this massive network is not sufficient for a large population moving in a single 
direction during peak business hours. Most commercial activity is concentrated in the island city in 
the south. The movement between south and north for business purposes in the peak hours places a 
































huge burden on the transport network. The road network has become very congested over the years 
with increasing number of vehicles and more people traveling to and from the city. For instance, 
people residing in surrounding areas of Mumbai, known as the MMR, use the railways and roads 
network to come to the city everyday for employment or business. In addition to this, Mumbai has 
an international airport located in the middle of the city, catering to more than 4 million 
international travelers and 4.2 million domestic travelers12. The massive transportation network is 
extremely vulnerable to weather events, as was apparent during the July 2005 floods and would 
suffer from massive damages and costs from flash floods, storm surges and sea level rises.  
The preliminary estimates of Census 2011 suggest that 60% population in Mumbai lives in slums. 
Due to increasing costs of land and material, it has become virtually impossible for the poor and low-
income households to acquire residential property in the city. As a result, the base of slum-dwellers 
has increased tremendously. Slums have mushroomed in almost all the wards of Mumbai, along the 
coast, on the hill slopes, along the highways, railways and in low-lying areas. Many settlements lack 
basic infrastructure like water, sanitation and legal electricity connections. They are non-existent on 
city’s development plans. None of the 2335 settlements are recognized on the developmental plan 
of Mumbai and the land under slums has development plan reservations, even though some 
settlements have existed before development plans were formulated13. Further, regular 
displacements prevent slum-dwellers from settling in safe and secure localities and they move 
towards landslide prone areas, low-lying regions, and unsafe dumping sites. 
Given the increasing population and majority living a life of poverty and destitution, health 
vulnerabilities are imminent. As the Mumbai Human Development Report 2009 indicates, the overall 
life expectancy in Mumbai is much lower at 52.6 years for males and 58.1 years for females14. 
Tuberculosis (known as a poor man’s disease), HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Jaundice are some of the 
major killers in the city. Infant mortality is 36.66 per 1000 live births and malnourishment is rampant 
among slum children. The city boasts of enviable health infrastructure compared to other Indian 
cities, yet the public health facilities are grossly insufficient to cater to such a huge population and in 
the event of a disease outbreak, the civic machinery does not have adequate infrastructure to deal 
with the health emergency. 75-80% population depends on relatively expensive private healthcare 
facilities for treatment and coverage of health insurance negligible15.   
As regards economic vulnerability, Mumbai has a pre-eminent position in the country as the 
commercial and trading base. The per capita income of city residents is twice that of Maharashtra 
State and thrice that of the national average16,17. Mumbai is also an important source of tax revenue 
for the country. In recent years, the share of tertiary sector in Mumbai’s income has increased, 
whereas, the share of secondary sector has remained almost stagnant. Most industries in Mumbai 
are located in eastern and northeastern corridor with a few in the western region. The industrial 
units are in mixed areas as no buffer zone is provided for them. In fact, Mumbai was the first City 
Corporation to adopt the concept of a development plan under which industrial zones were allowed 
to be used for residential and commercial purposes18. Therefore, there is no clear distinction 
between residential, commercial and industrial zones for the city. The land use pattern in the city 
has also undergone major changes in recent years with the conversion of industrial areas into 
residential and commercial complexes. The climate vulnerability of Mumbai, therefore, means a 
threat to the life and property within the city, impact on the entire development trajectory and the 



































2.2 Rainfall  pattern and risk of f looding 
As mentioned earlier, Mumbai receives an average of 2129 mm of rainfall per year during the 
monsoon season between June and September. The India Meteorological Department (IMD) records 
the cumulative rainfall for 24 hours at two weather stations, Colaba (located in island city) and 
Santacruz (Western suburb) and reports it through its weather bulletin every day19. The annual 
recorded rainfall at both weather stations between 2000 and 2008 is shown in Figure 2. As seen in 
the figure, in most years, especially after 2005, annual rainfall has exceeded the average. Since 2006, 
MCGM has installed 34 automatic rain gauges spread across all the wards, out of which 28 currently 
transmit rainfall data to the Disaster Control Room (DCR) with 15-minute interval20. However, the 
current database of 15-minute interval rainfall is not adequate enough as regards the time horizon 
to understand the precipitation pattern across different areas within the city.   
 
Figure 2: Annual recorded rainfall in 2000-2010 in Mumbai 
 
Source: India Meteorological Department, www.imd.gov.in  
As per the IMD criteria, forecast of ‘heavy’ rainfall is issued if the precipitation is more than 65 mm 
in a day and warning of ‘very heavy’ rainfall is issued if it is more than 135 mm during the day21. The 
number of days of heavy and very rainfall between 2001 and 2008 is shown in Table 1 below. As the 
table indicates, heavy to very heavy rainfall is not uncommon during the monsoon season in the city.  
The days when the daily rainfall is above 65 mm are critical from the point of view of flooding in the 
city. In fact, very high rainfall of greater than 200 mm per day is also not uncommon during the 
onset phase of monsoon. The historical data going back to 1886 for Colaba and 1957 for Santacruz 
reveals that in any year, the probability of 24-hour rainfall exceeding 200 mm is 50% for Santacruz 
and 33% for Colaba22.  
































Table 1: Intensity of rainfall in Mumbai (Number of days in a year) 
Year No rainfall Below 65mm 65-135mm 135-200mm Above 
200mm 
2001 23 94 6 2 - 
2002 40 77 4 1 - 
2003 18 92 9 3 1 
2004 30 82 11 - - 
2005 32 79 7 4 3 
2006 17 93 7 4 2 
2007 19 92 8 1 2 
2008 31 78 9 4 3 
Source: MCGM, Disaster Management Cell 
As discussed in the previous section, many low-lying and reclaimed parts of Mumbai are prone to 
flooding. The chronic flooding spots in the city have been identified by the civic administration 
depending on the past experience. They are shown in Figure 3 below. There are 55 chronic flooding 
spots spread over the island city and the suburbs. The flooding spots correspond to the low-lying 
areas, reclaimed areas and areas in the river flood plains. For instance, the flooding spots in the 
island city are low lying areas and also on reclaimed land with no natural drainage outlet. The central 
area is barely two to three meters above sea level and surrounded by hills. It is, thus, prone to 
flooding in monsoon. In the western and suburbs, major flooding spots are in the river flood plains. 
There are four main streams or rivers in Mumbai suburbs – Mithi, Dahisar, Poisar and Oshiwara. 
When the rainfall exceeds the retention capacity of their basins, floods occur in Mumbai suburbs. 
Mithi river has the largest catchment area and is the natural drainage system in the suburbs. 
Flooding caused by overflowing of this river can create major floods in Mumbai as seen during the 
extreme precipitation event of July 26, 2005.   
The instances of flooding over the last decade are shown in Table 2 below. Flooding is believed to be 
dependent on the following factors23,24: 
• Intensity and duration of the rainfall per hour,  
• Timing of high hide   
• Topography of the area, in particular, the height compared to the mean sea level 
• Percentage of runoff and carrying capacity of storm water drainage (SWD) system 
In recent years, DCR at MCGM has been recording rainfall from 28 rain gauges in different wards for 
a 15-minute interval. However, the time horizon of this database is as yet not sufficient and reliable 
enough to investigate the causal relationship between flooding and intensity and duration of rainfall 






































Source: MCGM (2010), Flood Preparedness Guidelines 2010, www.mumbaimonsoon.com  
































Table 2: Recorded instances of flooding in Mumbai 
Year Island city Eastern suburbs Western 
suburbs 
2000 55 49 106 
2001 85 46 93 
2002 86 50 106 
2003 86 41 123 
2004 56 56 88 
2005 90 91 190 
2006 107 137 339 
2007 66 25 70 
2008 60 24 53 
Source: MCGM, Disaster Management Cell 
Compared to the other cities in the country, Mumbai has a well-designed but age old storm water 
drainage (SWD) system in place. This system was designed for the rainfall intensity of 25 mm per 
hour and a coefficient of runoff of 0.50. With rapid urban development and encroachment on 
natural water ways, the carrying capacity of the system has substantially reduced and the runoff has 
increased considerably. Therefore, the city has been getting flooded frequently. A number of studies 
and committee reports from Natu Committee Report in 1975 to IIT Bombay study to abate flooding 
at Milan Subway and Grand Road/Nana Chowk (two chronic flooding spots) in 2005, have tried to 
suggest remedial measures for flood abatement in the city25. The BRIMSTOWAD Report of 1993 has 
been an important study to identify potential improvement of SWD system in the city. The 
recommendations of this report are currently being implemented at least partially in the aftermath 
of the catastrophic event of July 26, 2005. The implementation of this report and implications for the 
SWD system in the city are discussed in detail in Section 4 of the study.  
2.3 Future cl imate risk projections 
The coastal location of Mumbai puts it at greater risk of sea-level rise, flooding, high winds, cyclones 
and coastal erosion. The city has regularly been facing weather events of heavy precipitation leading 
to floods and landslides during the monsoon season. On many occasions, heavy rains over the city 
have been the result of tropical storms or cyclones that hit the city or pass nearby. Studies carried 
out over the past decade indicate that Mumbai is likely to be highly vulnerable to climate risks with 
majority of its population living on the flood prone and reclaimed land. Estimates obtained in 2001 
from the Goddard Institute for Space Studies26 suggest that in the Canadian Climate Centre’s 
business-as-usual emissions (A2) scenario and sustainable path (B2) scenario, the average annual 
temperatures in the city would increase by 1.750C and 1.250C respectively. Mumbai is also predicted 
to have an average annual decrease in precipitation of 2% for the A2 scenario and an increase of 2% 
in the B2 scenario. Perhaps, the most damaging scenario for the city is the predicted sea-level rise of 
50cm by 205027. Flooding along coastal and low-lying areas would increase dramatically endangering 
the slums located there. Vulnerability assessment undertaken by Schiller et al. (2007)28 further 
suggests that a ‘bundle’ of stresses, such as, Mumbai’s flat topography, geology, wetlands and flood 
prone areas, projected sea-level rise, building conditions including not meeting building codes, 
squatter settlements, flood-ravaged buildings, poor sanitation and waste treatment and low 
incomes reducing the ability for disaster preparedness will create an enhanced vulnerability for the 
city.  
An OECD study29 has analyzed the recurrence of an extreme weather event like July 2005 for 


































magnitude is greater than 200 years. However, with imminent climate change, today’s extreme 
events could become more frequent. For instance, a 1 in 10 event could occur every other year. 
Using the Storm Water Management Model of USEPA, the study further explores the future flood 
footprints for Mumbai. By 2080, the study finds extended flood footprints in the city with deeper 
flooding in more vulnerable areas. The total costs of such an event by 2080 would dramatically go up 
to US$ 2300 million from the present-day costs of US$ 650 million.  
Yet another OECD study30 has done a global screening of 136 coastal cities to identify their exposure 
to storm surges and high winds. The study has also investigated how climate change is likely to 
impact these cities through coastal flooding by 2070s. For the present day conditions (reference year 
2005), Mumbai is ranked the first among top ten coastal cities in terms of exposed population. The 
total exposed population to weather events resulting from current climate conditions in Mumbai is 
estimated at 2.787 million. Under the future climate conditions, the population exposed to weather 
events like storm surges and flooding will go up to 11.418 million. Similarly, the value of exposed 
assets is currently US$ 46.20 billion, which would dramatically increase to US$ 1598.05 billion by 
2080. Further, the city is ranked 2nd in terms of population exposure to future climate conditions by 
2080, second only to another vulnerable coastal city in India, Kolkata (formerly Calcutta). Mumbai is 
also among the top 20 cities with greatest exposure to extreme sea-level and with greatest exposure 
to wind damage from tropical cyclones. The city is also expected to have a high exposure to coastal 
flood risk in the 2070s. The study further emphasizes that exposure will not necessarily translate into 
impact if effective adaptation and risk management strategies are in place. However, for a city like 
Mumbai with far lower standards of adaptation and risk management or flood defences, the impacts 
of extreme weather events are likely to be large in future. 
A recently concluded OECD study (2010)31 has demonstrated an approach to assess the future risks 
from extreme weather events and quantify the benefits of different adaptation options on a city-
scale. The study focuses on applying this approach to flood risk in Mumbai. The findings of the study 
suggest that by 2080, in a SRES A2 ‘upper bound’ climate scenario, the likelihood of a 2005-like 
event will more than double. The total direct and indirect losses from such an event would also triple 
to around US$ 1890 million. The study specially looks at the marginalized population comprising a 
large number of households in the city (engaged in the informal sector) who would suffer from the 
total losses of US$ 250 million. The analysis further shows how the adaptation efforts could 
significantly bring down the costs of extreme flooding events in future. 
3. Extreme floods of July 2005: Impact assessment 
On July 26, 2005, Mumbai suburban district and the entire MMR region were struck with a heavy 
storm. India Meteorological Department (IMD) weather station located at Santacruz (suburb in the 
west), recorded 944mm rainfall (45% of the annual average rainfall in Mumbai) between 8.30 am on 
July 26 and till 8.30 am on July 2732, with the highest precipitation for a few hours between 2.30 pm 
and 7.30 pm as can be seen in Figure 4 below. The IMD forecast had predicted heavy to very heavy 
rainfall for the day which meant 65–125mm in 24 hours. The actual rainfall was so huge in 
magnitude that the administration had no guidance or prior experience to react to such a situation33. 
This unprecedented rainfall coinciding with the high tide brought the city to a standstill. The heavy 
flooding on this day was on account of the very heavy downpour 380 mm for 3 hours between 14.30 
and 17.30 as seen in Figure 3. This intensity was 5 times more than the intensity of rain for which the 
old SWD system had been designed (25 mm per hour) and also 2.5 times more than the system 




































Figure 4: Rainfall in mm on July 26-27, 2011 
 
Source: MCGM (2006), Fact finding committee on Mumbai floods, Final Report 
The following would give an idea of the magnitude of the deluge and the impact on the city35,36: 
• Excluding hilly areas of forest and lakes, 22% of the city land was submerged in rainwater on July 
26-27, 2005. 
• Around 2 million people were stranded in transit or took shelter in different transportation 
modes. Another 2.5 million people were under water for hours. Around half of them were the 
poor living in the slums of Dharavi, Sion, Kurla, etc.  
• Civic amenities such as electricity, water supply and transportation and communication 
networks were completely shut down. 
• 150,000 people were stranded at the two main train stations, CST and Churchgate and 
thousands more had to wade through the dirty and contaminated water for 24-48 hours to 
reach their destination. The air traffic had to be suspended for 2 days due to submergence of the 
airport. 
• It took 1-4 weeks for the train and bus services to start normal functioning between Mumbai 
and surrounding MMR region. Road and train services to other areas within and outside the 
state were also disrupted for 3-10 days. 
• The worst-hit were the low-lying areas and the poor living in slums or squatter settlements along 
the pavements and near railway tracks. 
• Floods claimed more than 700 lives in the city. More than 14,000 houses were completely 
damaged and more than 357,000 houses were partially damaged. 
• The total cost of damages has since been estimated at Indian Rupees (INR) 306 crores (US$ 68 
million @ 1US$ = Rs.45). 
• The most extensive loss was suffered by trade and commerce as a large number of shops, 
commercial establishments and warehouses suffered heavy losses due to flooding. The Indian 
Merchants Chamber has estimated these losses to the tune of INR 5000 crores (US$ 1100 
million). 
• In the immediate aftermath, Mumbai also saw 3000 hospital admissions due to gastroenteritis, 


































3.1 Direct and indirect impacts  
From the impacts perspective, an extreme weather event (often termed as a natural disaster), 
implies a combination of losses in physical, financial and human capital and reduction in economic 
activities of investment, consumption, production and employment37. This combination of losses in 
stocks and reduction in flows due to extreme events may be so severe that they may actually alter 
the medium to long-term trajectory or development path of a region38.    
However, most impact assessment studies tend to measure the economic losses in terms of the 
most easily measured direct losses, i.e. the financial costs of visible physical damage to existing 
infrastructure and property. Indirect or secondary impacts such as the effect on provision of goods 
and services, provision of public utilities like water and electricity, transportation and mobility and so 
on are typically not measured due to practical difficulties39 arising out of data availability and 
absence of measurable variables. This can be overcome by the use of proxy variables to some 
extent, although these variables may not be able to measure the exact indirect impacts.  
From the perspective of cities in the developing world, there is further caution that needs to be 
exercised when we interpret the measured impacts of extreme weather events. Such impact 
assessments tend to focus on insured losses and mortality as these can be measured easily and 
directly. However, a major part of the local economy is in the informal sector, where the prevalence 
of insurance for physical assets is minimal. Hence, the losses of the informal sector are not captured 
when impact assessments are done. The ground reality for such cities is that insured losses and 
mortality are just a fraction of the total losses that communities suffer. Most of the losses are out-
of-pocket expenses that do not get accounted for when direct impacts are measured.  
To overcome some of these aspects of impact assessments, the present study does not rely only on 
the insured physical and financial losses measured by the authorities in the aftermath of the July 
2005 event in Mumbai. An extensive primary survey has been carried out in six wards of Mumbai 
which have many chronic flooding spots. These wards are the most affected when flash floods occur 
in Mumbai during monsoon. This section describes and measures the impacts of the extreme 
weather event of July 2005 in Mumbai based on the government reports on damage assessment as 
well as the primary survey. The focus of this section is on the impacts on both stocks and flows, i.e., 
direct impacts on physical infrastructure and economic losses and indirect impacts on services and 
provisions.       
3.1.1 Direct impacts: stock variables  
MCGM undertook damage assessment exercise in the immediate aftermath of July 2005 floods and 
submitted the report to seek financial assistance from the central government under the CRF 
(Central Relief Fund). Table 3 and 4 below outline the overall impacts assessed by the MCGM and 
the cost of damages to municipal infrastructure including municipal buildings, water supply systems, 
roads and storm water drains for which the relief was sought to the tune of INR 2475 Million or US$ 
55 million7 under the CRF40. In addition to this, the health impacts of the severe floods, while 
accounting for the incubation period for most diseases up to two weeks after the floods have been 





                                                           
7 For conversion of INR to US Dollars, the exchange rate used throughout this study is 1 US$ = INR 45. 
































Table 3: Overall impacts of July 2005 floods as assessed by MCGM 
Item Impact 
Estimated loss of life As per Government records 445 people lost their lives 
Names of roads 
blocked/congested 
Most arterial roads and highways in the suburbs severely 
affected due to waterlogging and traffic jams resulting from 
vehicle breakdown in deep waters 
Estimated number of 
establishments/vehicles 
damaged 
– Residential establishments - partly damaged:  50,000 
– Residential establishments - fully damaged:  2,000 
– Commercial establishments:  40,000 
– Vehicles:  30,000 
Effect on train services Heavy rains led to railway tracks being submerged and 
consequent stoppage of services on central (main and harbour 
lines) and western railways  
Effect on air services Heavy rains led to airport being flooded.  Additionally there was 
extremely poor visibility as a result of which flight services in and 
out of Mumbai stopped on the night of the 26th July 2005 
Effect on power supply Electricity supply stopped in most parts of Mumbai’s Western 
Suburbs in the night of 26th July 2005 
Water supply Pumping stations at Deonar, Chunabhatti and Shiv Tekdi 
submerged in flood water affecting pumps, motors and control 
panels.  
Sewerage Severe damage caused to 11 pumping stations and surrounding 
structures.  These included STP’s at Versova, New Versova, 
Goregaon, Saki naka, Malad, Kherwadi and Khar. 
Storm Water Drains Water entrances, flood gates, manholes, and nallahs at several 
places were damaged 
Roads Approximately 6 bridges, 154 major roads, 229 minor roads and 
10 cement concrete roads have been damaged. 
Source: MCGM report on relief measures and damage assessment 
Table 4: Cost of damages to Municipal infrastructure during July 2005 floods 
Item  Amount in INR million 
Health  
MCGM Medical Colleges 4.73 
Peripheral Hospitals 11.46 
Muni Properties & Buildings 8.28 






Waste Management  
Sewerage Operations 13.67 
Solid Waste 90.44 
Strom Water Drains 144.90 
Total Cost 2475.27 (US$ 55 million) 


































Table 5: Health impacts as on August 12, 2005 in Mumbai 
 Source: Govt of Maharashtra (2005), Maharashtra Flood Damage 2005 
However, the damages and costs estimated by the government agencies reflect only a fraction of the 
total costs of damages to physical infrastructure and assets as the damages suffered by households 
and commercial establishments are not accounted for in the absence of insurance coverage and 
unavailability of data. To overcome this limitation of impact assessment, this study carried out 
survey of households and commercial and small industrial establishments in six wards which were 
severely affected by floods in July 2005 and continue to get affected by flash floods each monsoon 
season. The ward-wise breakup of the sample size in the primary survey is given in Table A1 in 
Annexure. 
3.1.1.1 Households  
The primary survey covered randomly selected households in six flood affected wards of Mumbai. 
The households selected by the survey are located on the ground level or first storey of a building as 
these are likely to be most affected by floods. During the July 2005 floods, the average depth of 
flooding was 5 ft and the houses remained flooded for average 3 days. 59% also said that the effect 
of floods on their families was high, while 24% reported that there was medium impact of floods on 
them. Most surveyed households (69.35%) were in the lower middle-income category of INR 5000-
15000 followed by 16.52% earning less than INR 5000 per month and 10.62% earning INR 15000-
30000. On an average, the income loss due to floods in 2005 was INR 5000 (84% respondents) and 
amount spent on repair/ rebuilding of house was INR 15000 (86% respondents). On an average time, 
it took the households around 8 days to complete the repair/reconstruction of the house. 
Table 6 shows the total costs of repair/replacement for the flood affected households. The costs 
estimated through the primary survey have been extrapolated for Mumbai by assuming that overall 
20% of households located in eastern and western suburbs were affected by floods in July 20058. It 
must be noted here that only 6.8% (80 out of the surveyed households) have any form of insurance 
cover. Furthermore, only 3.59% (41 out of the surveyed households) have claimed insurance for 
damages due to flooding. Thus, the huge costs calculated here to the tune of INR 12,000 million (US$ 
267 million) are the out-of-pocket expenses borne by the city residents on account of floods.  
                                                           
8 2001 census data show the total population of around 8.5 million in eastern and western suburbs of 
Mumbai. Assuming the average of 4 members per family, this translates to about 2.1 million households.   
We make a rough estimation that 20% of these households (about 420,000) were directly affected due to 
floods in July 2005 given the extent of flooding in suburbs and calculate the costs accordingly. It must be 
noted here that we are considering households who are located at the ground level and first storey of 
residential buildings. Hence 20% seems a reasonable estimate for directly affected households. This 
exercise provides at best only indicative estimates of the overall costs that households have had to bear in 
the absence of insurance coverage.   
































Table 6: Cost of repairs/replacement in households  
Item 
Average cost of 
repairs/replacement 












Estimated costs of 
damage in INR 
million 
Income loss 5000 84 352800 1764 
Reconstruction of 
house 
15000 86 361200 5418 
Stove 1500 57 239400 359.1 
Electric Fans 1000 35 147000 147 
TV 7000 42 176400 1234.8 
VCR/VCD 2700 7 29400 79.38 
Music System 3000 1 4200 12.6 
Motorcycle 8000 13 54600 436.8 
Refrigerator 7000 30 126000 882 
Washing Machine 6000 8 33600 201.6 
Furniture 5000 31 130200 651 
Wardrobes 4000 32 134400 537.6 
Utensils 3000 38 159600 478.8 
Total Estimated costs 
12202.68  
(US$ 267 million) 
Source: Calculated based on primary data 
In case of households, impacts that need special consideration are the health impacts in the 
aftermath of July 2005 floods. The most prevalent diseases during monsoon in the city as reported 
by households are Malaria (86.5%) followed by fever (82%) and other diseases like typhoid, jaundice 
and diarrhoea as seen in Table 7 below.  
 
Table 7: Diseases prevalent during monsoon 








Stomach Infection 38 
 
There was a reported increase in the incidence of diseases after the July 2005 floods as seen in Table 
8. 87% responded that there was an increase in the incidence of malaria followed by typhoid (50%), 



































Table 8: Increased incidence of diseases after July 2005 floods 








 3.1.1.2 Commercial  and small  industrial  establishments  
The primary survey covered commercial establishments like retail shops, IT centres, Jewellery stores, 
dairy, etc. and small industries such as manufacturing units and warehouses. Most of these are 
either located on the ground level in industrial parks or along the roadside and get affected by floods 
with heavy precipitation. During the July 2005 floods, the average depth of flooding reported by 
commercial establishments was 4 ft. However, 30% reported the average depth of 5-8 ft. The 
average time taken by them to get back to normal business was 3.5 working days. However, 15% 
reported spending between 1 to 2 weeks before the business operations could resume once again. 
In the absence of insurance coverage (only 7% of the respondents claimed to have insurance 
coverage of any kind including life insurance), these establishments had to bear the burden of 
repairs and/or replacements for different physical assets damaged/destroyed during the July 2005 
floods. In addition, they also had to spend on account of clean-up, loss of income, operating costs 
and other emergency expenses when flood waters entered their establishments.  
Table 9 and 10 show the total costs of repair/replacement and other flood related expenses. The 
costs estimated through the primary survey have been extrapolated for Mumbai by assuming that 
overall 40% of such establishments located in eastern and western suburbs were affected by floods 
in July 20059.This allows us to arrive at rough and indicative estimates for the costs of damage faced 
by the largely informal private sector in Mumbai that includes small retail shops based on the 
ground level and small industrial establishments.  
Table 9: Cost of repairs/replacement in commercial & industrial establishments  
Item 
Average cost of 
repairs/replacement 





costs in survey 
Estimated 








40000 48 46080 1843.2 
Walls 11000 26 24960 274.56 
Windows 5000 4 3840 19.2 
Doors and 
mouldings 
6000 18 17280 103.68 
                                                           
9 MCGM records show around 400,000 registered retail shops and other commercial establishments in 
the city out of which 60% or 240,000 are located in the suburbs. We make a rough estimation that 40% of 
these establishments were affected due to floods in July 2005 given the extent of flooding in suburbs and 
calculate the costs accordingly. This exercise provides at best only indicative estimates of the overall costs 
that such establishments have had to bear in the absence of insurance coverage.   


































10000 28 26880 268.8 
Heating 10000 1 960 9.6 
Air conditioning 14000 1 960 13.44 
Machine tools 15000 25 24000 360 
Finished products 24000 28 26880 645.12 
Raw materials 20000 13 12480 249.6 
Inventory 24000 13 12480 299.52 




Source: Calculated based on primary data 
Table 10: Costs incurred on account of floods (in INR) 
Item 










number of  
establishmen
ts affected  
Estimated 
costs  in INR 
million 
Disinfecting  premises 18000 58 55680 1002.24 
Clearing debris and damaged 
items 
13000 22 21120 274.56 
Loss of income due to 
business interruption 
16000 36 34560 552.96 
Increased alternative 
operating costs 
10000 23 22080 220.8 
Emergency expenses during 
floods 
26000 8 7680 199.68 
Loss due to suspended 
production 
22000 20 19200 422.4 




Source: Calculated based on primary data 
 
3.1.2 Indirect impacts: Flow variables  
Besides the damages to physical assets and economic losses on account of that, there are a number 
of indirect impacts that households and commercial and industrial establishments suffered from 
during the floods. The survey questionnaire tried to capture some of these impacts by asking them 
about the other problems they faced on account of non-availability of essential supplies, price rise 
due to shortages and disruption of essential services. The problems faced during the 2005 floods by 



































Table 11: Major problems faced during July 2005 floods 
Problem 
% among surveyed 
households ( n=1168) 
% among surveyed 
commercials & small 
industries (n=792) 
House/office flooded with water 70 82 
Non-availability of local transportation 87 82 
Price rise of essential commodities 67 65 
Non-availability of food and other 
household supplies 
62 - 
Non-availability of raw materials - 56 
Disruption in communication services 61 66 
Disruption of electricity  83 88 
Non-availability of clean drinking water 75 79 
House flooded with sewerage/garbage 80 - 
Non-availability of fuel 51 46.5 
 
Some of the major problems faced by both households and commercial and industrial 
establishments are flood waters entering the premises, non-availability of local transportation, 
disruption of electricity and supply of clean drinking water. 77% of households reported that on an 
average, during the floods water was available for about 15 hours. 43% further reported that on 
average water supply was discontinued for 3 days while electricity supply was discontinued for 5 
days.  
As discussed earlier, although indirect impacts of weather events are critical in terms of disrupting 
the normal life of the affected residents, they often cannot be assessed properly due to difficulties of 
measurement and unavailability of sufficient data. The nature of these impacts is such that there is 
often a qualitative or subjective element attached to them which also makes the measurement 
difficult. In the present study, we have tried to capture the impact of provision of essential 
commodities and services like electricity supply during the extreme event of July 2005. As directly 
measuring the shortages of essential commodities in the city during floods is difficult, we have used 
octroi collections done by MCGM at 5 entry points into the city as proxy for provision and availability 
of essential supplies of goods including fuel for the residents. Figure 5 shows the average collections 
at the five entry points for the month of July 2005 and a visible dip in the collections from July 27 to 
July 31 when the city was coping with floods. The strong dip in octroi collections at all the entry 
points are an indication of supplies of essential commodities getting affected for a number of days 
after the heavy precipitation occurred on July 26. Also, the dip in octroi collections is also a net 
economic loss to the civic authority, which needs to be considered when assessing the monetary 
losses on account of floods.  
Another important service affected by floods was electricity supply in the suburbs. Figure 6 shows 
the daily distribution of power supplied to the households in the western suburbs by the private 
utility, Reliance Energy. The time period of July 11-August 20, 2005 is plotted here to show a 
substantial dip in the daily power drawn by households and commercial and industrial consumers. 
As the figure shows, it took the private utility nearly two weeks to restore supply back to normal. 
The disruption of electricity supply affects the normal life for households and also causes direct 
economic losses to the commercial and industrial consumers who are dependent on power supply to 
conduct their business. Although we have tried to capture the economic losses to these consumers, 
it is difficult to separate the losses on account of disruption in power supply. Another important 
point to be noted here is that reduction in the daily drawal of electricity is a net loss to the utility as 
well and it needs to be accounted for when calculating the monetary losses due to floods.  
































Figure 5: Octroi collections at entry points during July 27-31, 2005 
 
Source: Octroi Department, MCGM 
 
Figure 6: Daily power supply between July 11 and August 20, 2005 
 


































4. Response measures 
The deluge of July 26, 2005 caught the civic administration as well as residents unawares and in the 
absence of an early warning system and near-total collapse of communication and transportation 
network, the administration faced the tough task of responding to the situation and implementing 
the rescue and relief measures.  
The civic administration, without prior experience or guidance in managing a disaster of this kind, 
responded to the situation by undertaking the following rescue and relief measures42: 
• Organized safe evacuation of people through boats & buses & providing shelters in public 
buildings, schools & transit shelters 
• Community kitchens started & free food grains provided. 
• Traffic police & Fire brigade cleared 26,000 stranded vehicles by 2.30 pm on 27th July 
• Power & water supply restored and train services resumed on 28th July 
• 24,000 animal carcasses disposed & more than 200,000 metric tonnes of garbage removed 
• The rescue teams of MCGM & the Fire Brigade undertook 282 major & minor rescue operations 
which included rescuing school children & around 3,700 stranded people from 140 marooned 
buses 
• Post flood sanitation measures like extensive spraying of disinfectants ( in open spaces & waste 
collection areas) & insecticides undertaken  
• Restoring supply of drinking water to affected areas using additional tanks, repair of damaged 
pumps & repair of pipelines 
• Comprehensive healthcare services, health camps, outreach program & 130 specially constituted 
medical teams helped treat over 300,000 patients. Additional doctors, admission capacity & 
significant drug reserves made available to the affected people 
Role of NGOs and individuals in providing relief during the devastating floods needs a special 
mention here. MCGM coordinated relief work at many places with the help of social service 
organizations (such as Nirmala Niketan College of Social Work and Tata Institute of Social Science). 
Over 20 NGOs including Akanksha, Yuvak Pratishthan, Apnalaya and industry houses (e.g, Tata Group 
through Dorabjee Tata Trust) also volunteered their help38. Coordination mechanism was set up 
through the DMC to coordinate the continuing relief operations by individuals, industry houses and 
NGOs. Food packets and drinking water was arranged for the stranded people with the help of NGOs 
and Social Organizations. Individuals or common people also played a major role in relief & rescue 
measures. Community kitchens were started and free food grains were provided by the Government 
of Maharashtra (GoM) and MCGM as well as voluntary NGOs and individuals. Common people threw 
open their doors to welcome anyone affected by floods. Stranded people who had nowhere to go 
were welcomed & were allowed to stay till the floods ceased. People came out wholeheartedly to 
help in co-ordination & relief operations. 
The devastating floods of July 2005 became a real eye opener for the local administration and led to 
the formulation of the Disaster Management Plan for the city and other short to medium term 
measures to improve the coping capacity of the city to floods in future. Along with the local 
government, citizens – households and commercial/industrial establishments –also responded to the 
threat of recurrent floods and undertook a variety of measures in the aftermath of July 2005 floods. 
This section takes an overview of the response measures implemented by the civic authorities and 
citizens including households and the private sector. The important question to be addressed here is 
how effective are these response measures in enhancing the adaptation capacity of the city in the 
long-run. A discussion on this question is done towards the end of this section.    
 
 
































4.1 Local government institutions 
In the immediate aftermath of the July 2005 floods, a Fact Finding Committee was appointed to look 
into the causes and to recommend activities to reduce the future risks of flooding in Mumbai. The 
committee was asked to analyze the short-term and long-term factors responsible for the floods that 
created havoc on July 26-27, understand the present status and limitations of the storm water 
drainage network, development of river basins in the city and factors that impede their natural flow 
and finally suggest guidelines for preparing long-term development plans that would overcome 
future flood situations. The committee came up with several recommendations, such as, 
upgradation of storm water drainage system, disaster management, river development and so on to 
improve the existing environment and upgrade and improve the governance and management to 
achieve sustainable development of Mumbai. Specifically the committee is of the view that a 
measured, well thought out plan and interventions should address the issues of frequently 
encountered floods in Mumbai region, land use planning, encroachments, population density, 
sustainability of present-day exploitation of water and natural resources.  
The two most important recommendations of the committee pertain to the improvement of the 
disaster management system (DMS) in the city and risk zoning. The specific suggestions regarding 
both are highlighted in Box 1 below. 
 
The fact finding committee further suggested some activities as given below: 
• Restore the existing degraded rivers and river-banks to initiate recovery of the urban ecosystem 
• Provide river flushing system to initiate rejuvenation of river channels 
• Rejuvenate degraded urban ecosystems including lakes / ponds, rivers, creeks, and costal zones 
• Restore the Mangrove-Ecosystem and rejuvenate the coastal zones 
• Rejuvenation and environmental upgradation of hills, slopes, and lakes / ponds in Mumbai 
Region 
• Improve municipal solid waste management systems 
• Upgrade the sewage treatment plants and sewerages 
• Construct detention basins and infiltration zones for flood control and provide spaces for people 
to escape to in case of disasters and calamities 
• Remove encroachments and strictly adhere to the Development Plan (DP) 
• Demarcate potential flood-zones on DP sheets. Develop a policy for management of 
development in those areas and amend DC rules suitably                                                                                                                                   
• Strengthen monitoring, assessment and auditing of environmental and ecological status-related 
activities in Mumbai Region 
• Empower the “Disaster Management Authority” to monitor, assess and audit environmental and 
ecological status after any disaster 





































Box 1: Suggestions of the fact finding committee 
 
Important suggestions of the Fact Finding Committee on Mumbai Floods 
Improving disaster management system (DMS): 
• Revamping the disaster management plan as the plan document looks more generic rather than 
an operational one 
• Vulnerability analysis should be carried out for the city  
• Disaster analysis should be based on probabilistic approach and relevant data should be 
available with all the agencies providing essential public services to the city where the data are 
compiled and analyzed systematically during the disaster free periods 
• It is the intensity of the rainfall rather than average rainfall that needs consideration for floods in 
the city 
• Disaster Management Plan (DMP) needs analytical approach to consider the 5 rivers and other 
water courses in the city and surrounding areas to manage storm water flows 
• Issues like low levels of Mumbai’s coastal areas, evacuation plan for the city, shelter places, etc. 
need special consideration in the DMS 
• DMP needs scientific back-up, proper risk assessment and vulnerability analysis to become more 
effective  
• Roles and responsibilities of different officers should be specified in the standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) for different categories of disasters 
Risk zoning: 
• Reclaimed lands have the tendency of settling which needs to be considered for long-term 
projections of submergence while doing vulnerability analysis 
• More than 50% population lives in slum colonies which are highly vulnerable to floods and other 
risks. Hence, risk zoning is required to plan for preventive measures like infrastructure provisions 
and post disaster rescue and relief 
Early warning mechanism: 
• Daily rainfall record has little relevance for precipitation analysis as intense precipitation does 
not occur uniformly over longer time period 
• There is a need to develop a well coordinated rainfall analysis and forewarning system as IMD’s 
forecasting for day’s occurrence is not effective 
• MCGM should develop its own system of recording 15-minute interval rainfall data and issuing 
alert signal if rainfall exceeds 40 mm in an hour 
 
(Source: MCGM (2006), Fact Finding Committee on Mumbai Floods , Final Report, Volume I, March 
2006)  
 
The committee also recommended conducting the following studies for Mumbai: 
A) Comprehensive study of Mithi River ecosystem, environmental impact of Worli-Bandra sea link 
project & investigating the hydrology of the bay area with 3-D model for long-term prediction 
B) Comprehensive study of environmental impacts of MUIP/ MUTP’s reclamation and building 
projects in Mumbai. 
C) Ecosystem health indicators 
D) Study to estimate the “carrying-capacity” of Mumbai’s urban ecosystem vis-à-vis the issue of 
transportation, housing, sanitation, and drinking water 
 
Some of the recommendations of the fact finding committee, especially those pertaining to the 
improvement in the DMS have seen been partially implemented as can be seen from the ensuing 
discussion. 

































4.1.1 BRIMSTOWAD Project 
The Brihanmumbai Stormwater Disposal System (BRIMSTOWAD) is a project planned to 
overhaul Mumbai's storm water drainage system. The estimated budget for implementing the 
project was INR 1200crore (approx. US$ 266 million) as of August 2005. Mumbai has a drainage 
network, which in many places, is more than 100 years old, consisting of 2,000 km of open drains, 
440 km of closed drains, 186 outfalls and more than 30,000 water entrances. The capacity of most of 
the drains as per the original design is around 25 mm of rain per hour during low tide, which is 
exceeded routinely during the monsoon season in Mumbai, which witnesses more than 1400 mm 
during June and July. The drain system works with the aid of gravity, with no pumping stations to 
speed up the drainage. Most of the storm water drains are also choked due to the dumping of 
garbage by citizens. Portions of Mumbai like Bombay Central and Tardeo remain below sea level. 
Reclamation of ponds and obstructions in drains due to cables and gas pipe exacerbate the problem. 
The final report for the upgradation of the storm water network was submitted in the year 1993. The 
project was not acted upon due to lack of funds till the catastrophic floods in 2005. The work started 
only after the floods of July 2005 and subsequent recommendations of the fact finding committee. 
Following are the recommendations suggested by BRIMSTOWAD project report and subsequent 
studies. There is a consensus in all studies regarding the action plans, including:  
• To provide storm water pumping stations 
• To increase capacity of drains wherever necessary 
• To improve flood gates at various places 
• To repair dilapidated drains and augment the capacity wherever necessary 
• To remove obstruction of water pipelines and cables  
• To widen, deepen and extend the nallahs/drains and rehabilitate as per govt. policy 
• To desilt and maintain SWD during rainy season by various equipments.   
Some important points of the BRIMSTOWAD are worth considering: 
 The project was conceived after major floods in Mumbai in 1985. Watson Hawksley was 
appointed as consultants to design the drainage system from Sandhurst Road to Milan subway in 
1989. 
 A proposal was submitted in 1993 for a project which involved replacement of drains, setting up 
of pumping stations at Worli, Haji Ali and Cleaveland Bandar,construction of a five-metre wide 
road alongside major drains for desilting, removal of obstructions from the drains and 
rehabilitation of slum-dwellers .  
 The initial estimated cost of the project was around INR 600 crores. Around INR 143 crores was 
spent on the project till 1998. By 2005, the project cost had gone up to INR 1200 crores. 
 Consultants used the software named “Wallrus” which has been developed by Hydraulics 
Research Station of Wallingford, Oxon, U.K. which simulates mathematical model of a catchment 
for a particular storm (rainfall) hydrograph and verifies results against the tide curve.  
 As of now out of 20 works of Phase-I, 11 have been completed and 9 are in progress.  Out of 38 


































 BRIMSTOWAD report could not be fully implemented because of financial constraints. However 
much better gains could have been achieved with whatever amount has been spent, if proper 
priorities were followed systematically. 
4.1.2 Disaster Management Action Plan 
In December 2005, in the aftermath of the unprecedented Mumbai floods, Government of India 
enacted the Disaster Management Act, following which National Disaster Management Authority 
and State Disaster Management Authorities were set up in India. The Act also sought to constitute 
Disaster Response Fund and Disaster Mitigation Fund at national, state and district levels. It was post 
July 2005 floods that a fully equipped Disaster Management Cell (DMC) was made operational at the 
BMC headquarters. Many recommendations of the fact finding committee as outlined in Box 1 
above were brought into practice since then to improve the response to disasters. Accordingly, 
Greater Mumbai Disaster Management Action Plan (DMAP) came into existence in 2007. Under this 
plan, the risks and vulnerabilities associated with floods, earthquakes, landslides, cyclones, etc., have 
been identified. The plan envisages specific roles for different stakeholders as outlined in Table 12 
below. Also, the plan envisages specific relief and mitigation measures for Mumbai43: 
 Infrastructure improvements: The mitigation strategy under the plan seeks to improve the 
transport, services and housing infrastructure. These include improvements in road and rail 
networks, sanitation and sewer disposal system, storm water drainage systems, slum 
improvements, housing repairs and retrofitting programmes.  
 Contingency plan: This strategy includes plans to provide extra transportation if the major 
transport systems fail, transit camp arrangements, improvements in wireless communication 
and public information systems and NGO volunteers’ assistance.  
 Land use policies and planning: The Draft Regional Plan for MMR Region 1996-2011 provides a 
basic framework for the land use policies for the city. This plan includes strategies like protection 
of landfill sites, control on land reclamation, shifting of hazardous units from residential areas 
and decongestion. 
Table 12: Role of different stakeholders to tackle flood risks 
Stakeholder  Current /  Expected roles 
National,  state and 
distr ict  disaster 
management authorit ies 
  Prepare polic ies,  p lans and guidelines for disaster 
management 
 National Disaster Management Authority to declare nation-wide 
policies 
 Constituting National Institute of Disaster Management that 
imparts training and research and develops nationwide 
database on policies and prevention mechanisms 
 Constituting National Disaster Response Force 
 State Disaster Management Authority to prepare the state-level 
plans 
 District Authority as district planning, coordinating and 
implementing body for all disaster management functions 
 District Authority functions include mitigation and 
































preparedness, response, relief and rehabilitation 
Local  authority (MCGM 
– specif ic  to Mumbai)  
  Impart training to employees to cope with disasters  
 Maintenance of resources for managing any extreme events 
 Ensuring that all construction activity conforms to prescribed 
standards and specifications (building codes, earthquake and 
fire proof construction, coastal zone regulations, FSI regulations, 
etc.) 
 Relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction activity in affected 
areas 
MCGM and MMRDA 
  Infrastructure improvement in terms of transport,  
services and housing 
 Projects like MUTP and MURP to work towards these objectives 
 Constructing flyovers, additional roads and road over bridges to 
reduce the traffic density and congestion in identified spots of 
high traffic density 
 Road improvement programme to improve the conditions of 
roads particularly before monsoon 
 Slum Rehabilitation Scheme to improve the quality of housing 
for slum dwellers and scatter communities 
MCGM – storm water 
drainage department  
 Regular de-silting (cleaning) of nallahs (narrow waterways) to 
reduce the tendency of flooding or choking during heavy 
precipitation 
 Augmenting the capacity of the present storm water drains 
 All flood gates manned to operate them during high and low 
tides 
 Chronic flooding spots management by deploying special sqauds 
MCGM – early warning 
system 
 Automatic weather stations with rain gauge monitoring system 
to be installed across city to monitor rain intensity to facilitate 
early warning 
 Anti-flood control rooms in all wards with equipped staff, 
wireless equipments, etc. 
 A list of days when there is a hide tide of 4.7 mtrs and above to 
be prepared and distributed to railways, police and the district 
collector 
 Nodal officer of MCGM to brief print, audio and visual media to 
provide timely and clear information and put a stop to rumours 


































installed at different places in city 
 Booklet of all important contact numbers to be distributed 
widely 
Police and f ire  br igade 
departments  
 Police departments to work with municipal authorities to 
respond quickly and effectively to extreme events 
 Identify and get equipped with specific equipments and facilities 
required to respond to extreme events 
 Commissioned six command centres of fire brigade capable of 
acting independently 
 Three highly trained search and rescue teams to be deployed 
and each team equipped with enhanced equipments 
MCGM – public  health 
department  
 Preventive measures to stop the spread of water, food borne 
and vector borne diseases 
 Information to be disseminated to the general public about 
prevention and cure of such diseases 
 Keep stock of essential medicines, vaccines and pest control 
chemicals and equipments 
 Provide immediate and urgent health services through primary 
health centres and hospitals run by the civic authority 
MCGM – contingency 
plan 
 Each ward to identify five schools as temporary transit camp 
during disasters 
 BEST (transport authority in Mumbai) to put in service extra 
buses in case of transport failure 
 Disaster management Cell to be equipped with all state-of-art 
communication equipments and networks to control the rescue 
and relief operations 
NGOs 
 Role in setting up an effective communication and public 
information system 
 Role in rescue, relief and rehabilitation activities by providing 
volunteers 
 To create awareness among people and educate them about 
extreme events and level of preparedness 
Communities  
 Based on past experience, perhaps the most crucial role 
performed by communities and individual people in helping 
with rescue and relief work 
Source: Govt. of Maharashtra, (2007), Greater Mumbai Disaster Management Action Plan 
 
































4.1.3 Disaster Management Cell ,  MCGM 
It was post July 2005 floods that a well equipped Disaster Management Cell (DMC) became 
functional at MCGM headquarters. This cell has been given the responsibility of coordinating with 
different stakeholders and agencies for the rescue and relief operations in the event of floods during 
monsoon. As per the recommendations of the fact finding committee, 31 rain gauges have been 
installed and they feed in rainfall data of 15-minute interval to the disaster control room. The rain 
gauges are set up at the fire station of each ward to. Alert is issued to the control rooms in each 
ward whenever the hourly rainfall exceeds 40 mm. In addition to this, the IMD also provides regular 
forecasts and issues warnings of heavy to very heavy rainfall when necessary. The response 
hierarchy in case of rainfall exceeding 40 mm per hour or a warning coming from the IMD is shown 
in Figure 7 below. 
Figure 7: Hierarchy of response to flood alert 
 
Source: Based on information in MCGM (2010), Flood preparedness guidelines 2010, 
www.mumbaimonsoon.com 
The Disaster control room works 24x7 and has hotlines connected to each ward, major hospitals, 
news channels and other agencies and is well equipped with a standard operating protocol (SOP) 
with a set of priorities to tackle emergency situations. Each ward is given SOPs to follow which are 
updated regularly. Each ward has its own inventory of telephone numbers and contacts such as 
blood bank, medical staff, NGOs and so on, to be contacted for help. Rescue measures and capacity 
building have been polished since 2005 and there are few NGOs identified which can be called for 
help in case of emergency. NGOs are deployed only for extending the manpower depending on the 
intensity of the situation.  DMC plans to include GIS surveillance in future to quicken the response 
time. The whole idea of improvisation in the system is to “minimise the response time”.  Also, certain 


































incident. Boats and trained swimmers have been kepi in contacts in case of emergency. In addition 
to this, the general public can access ward specific updated information on the website maintained 
by the DMC www.mumbaimonsoon.com. This website provides information to the citizens about 
real time rainfall data, tidal data and traffic diversions, etc.  
4.2 Households  
In addition to the response measures undertaken by the local civic authority, citizens have 
responded to the threat of flooding by undertaking different measures in the aftermath of July 2005. 
We have captured some of these measures through the primary survey. The households have 
undertaken repairs on their own to prevent flood waters from entering their premises as shown in 
Table 13.  
Table 13: Major repairs undertaken by surveyed households since 2005 
Item  % of households 
(n=1168) 
Increasing height of surrounding ground 42 
Reconstruction of house with stilt parking 11 
Repairing & elevating electrical meters 27 
Repairs inside house to elevate furniture 31 
Repairs inside house to elevate electronic gadgets 33 
Repairing/ modifying toilets 11 
 
In addition to these repairs, the households have reported the following measures undertaken every 
year to prepare for monsoon in general and floods in particular. The percentages of respondents are 
given in the brackets. 
• Repairing roof/ terrace (60%) 
• Cleaning surrounding ground/ compound (41.5%) 
• Start using boiled water for drinking (65%) 
It must be noted here that only 6.8% surveyed households (80 out of the total respondents) have 
any form of insurance cover. Further, only 3.5% claimed insurance after 2005 floods. Again a 
negligible percentage received financial assistance from the authorities for house damage, vehicle 
damage, food and clothing and disability. This indicates the extent of private costs borne by citizens 
on account of floods.    
4.3 Private sector  
The primary survey of commercial and industrial establishments throws light on how these 
establishments have responded to the threat of floods in the aftermath of the July 2005 event and 
have undertaken measures to cope with floods in subsequent years. We asked these respondents 
about the agencies they contact during floods when the water enters their establishments. An 
overwhelming 75.5% said that they did not contact anyone and only 15% reported contacting the 
local ward office of MCGM. 7% contacted the police and 4% contacted the local fire brigade. These 
































establishments have undertaken repairs on their own after their experience of the July 2005 floods 
to prevent flood waters from entering their premises and/or reducing the damage indoors as shown 
in Table 14 below.  
Table 14: Major repairs undertaken by surveyed establishments since 2005 
Item % of commercial & industrial 
establishments (n=792) 
Increase the height of the surrounding plot 72.9 
Reconstruction with stilt parking 12.5 
Repairing and/or elevating electrical meters 50.1 
Repairs inside the office premises 42.6 
Repairs outside the office premises 17.2 
Repairs done to elevate and protect inventory 7.3 
 
The most important aspect to be highlighted here is the fact that only 7.3% (58 out of the total 
respondents) have any form of insurance cover to assure them financial assistance against the 
damage done to the building, inventory and other assets during floods. Further, only 3% received 
financial assistance from the MCGM and state government after the July 2005 floods on account of 
office and asset damage. Hence, all the repairs undertaken by these respondents to reduce the 
impact of floods in subsequent years have been out-of-pocket expenses borne entirely by these 
establishments.    
In addition to these repairs, these establishments have reported the following measures undertaken 
every year to prepare for monsoon in general and floods in particular. The percentages of 
respondents are given in the brackets. 
• Repairing the roof (64.4%) 
• Cleaning and clearing the surrounding area/ground (57.7%) 
• Overhauling of vehicles (10.5%) 
• Overhauling of machinery (24.9%) 
5. Enhancing adaptation through response measures  
As seen in the previous section, both government and citizens have responded to the threat of flash 
floods during monsoon by undertaking a variety of short to medium-term measures. The important 
issue to be discussed here is whether and how far do these response measures add to the existing 
adaptation capacity and would they succeed in enhancing the adaptive capacity in the long-term. 
Adaptation measures are usually classified as 
either public or private. Planned adaptation is 
public adaptation usually undertaken through 
a deliberate public policy decision, e.g., 
BRIMSTOWAD being implemented in Mumbai 
in the aftermath of July 2005 floods. 
Autonomous or spontaneous adaptation is 
private adaptation undertaken by households 
or communities on their own without 
intervention from the authorities. We have 
discussed a number of such steps taken up by 
households and commercial and industrial 
establishments in Mumbai. This section looks 


































data gathered from citizens through primary surveys, government reports and personal interviews 
carried out with government officials are being used.  
As for the public adaptation measures undertaken in Mumbai, there are a number of issues that 
need to be highlighted here: 
• BRIMSTOWAD is a major policy initiative that is expected to improve the existing and age-old 
storm water drainage system in Mumbai and replace it with the one that will be much more 
effective in dealing with greater intensity rainfall. Once the project is implemented completely, it 
is expected to improve the flood situation in Mumbai as the new system is being designed for 50 
mm rainfall per hour instead of 25 mm per hour design currently in place. Also, the project has 
been designed for the runoff coefficient of 1 instead of 0.5 due to the land use changes that 
have occurred in the city in past few decades. Thus BRIMSTOWAD is expected to increase the 
adaptation capacity of the city for flash floods caused by heavy intensity rainfall in future. 
• However, if an extreme weather event like July 2005 were to occur again in the next few 
decades, even the design criteria used under BRIMSTOWAD will not be enough to cope with the 
ensuing floods in low-lying areas. Thus, we need to note this that the residual impacts of the 
weather events would still be faced by the city and cannot be done away with completely. But 
the magnitude of such impacts is likely to reduce given the new design of the storm water 
drainage network. 
• In addition to revamping the storm water drainage network, MCGM has started clearing clogged 
drains every year before monsoon. Regular widening and desilting of drains is undertaken. 
However, there are multiple agencies involved in this, such as, MMRDA, Public Works 
Department, Railways, Mumbai Port Trust and Airport Authority of India. Unless there are 
coordinated and well synchronized efforts undertaken by these agencies, isolated efforts will not 
help in the long-run to cope with floods.   
• As regards the disaster management plan formulated by the local authorities, the plan is quite 
comprehensive and defines the role of different stakeholders as seen in the earlier discussion. 
However, the plan is generic in nature and has less operational value as pointed out by the fact 
finding committee. Also various planning and implementing agencies in Mumbai often operate 
as islands making it difficult to have a well coordinated response in case of disasters or weather 
events. 
• The DMAP looks comprehensive on paper, yet does not provide any specific timeframe for 
achieving the mitigation measures. Again, no specific attention is given to adaptation strategies 
which may be more important in the short to medium-term to deal with the climate risks of 
flooding, storms and cyclones. 
• There are a number of steps taken up by the civic authority, MCGM in recent years based on the 
recommendations of the fact finding committee, to improve the disaster response and 
management. Accordingly, the rainfall data are now available with the automatic weather 
stations for 15-minute interval which can be used to issue early warning to ward control rooms. 
This will improve the response and coping capacity in the long-run. The 15-minute interval 
rainfall data over a number of years in future can also be used to analyze the intensity and 
pattern of rainfall in the city and early warning systems and response measures can be 
improvised accordingly. 
• The early warning system currently being used by the control room looks effective on paper. 
Regular information regarding rainfall intensity and traffic diversion is given to the general public 
through the website maintained by the MCGM. Yet, the awareness levels regarding such 
systems are very poor. For example, our primary survey reveals that 91% households did not 
even know about the DMC and 99% were not aware of the website that gives out such 
information. 88% were not aware of the emergency contact number. Thus, awareness-building 
is the key to making early warning systems effective and add to the coping capacity in future. 
































• The disaster control at the central level is found to be well managed, but there are shortcomings 
at the ward level like the shortage of trained staff and often the junior engineers have to 
manage the control rooms at wards on rotational shifts. Also, the ward officers have stated that 
the approach is essentially top-down and they have very little say and flexibility in implementing 
response measures. Many affected wards that we interviewed have also complained of 
BRIMSTOWAD getting delayed and work slowing down as memories of July 2005 fade fast. 
Further, there are delays in sanctioning projects at ward level and knowledgeable officers are 
frequently transferred before such projects are underway.  
• Measures related to infrastructure improvements would require a longer time frame given the 
socio-economic and political dynamics in the city. Also, the land use policies and planning will 
not be effective unless they are coupled with strategies to deal with slum settlements and 
migrants into the city. The experience of the city dwellers in the aftermath of 2005 floods only 
shows that the city administration and other stakeholders would need more specific strategies 
and an integrated approach to build resilience of the city to climate risks. 
• As for the planning process, development planning takes environment into consideration at the 
generic level. But climate risks and associated impacts of heavy precipitation, sea level rise and 
storms are uncertain and varied in nature. Therefore, the planners feel that it is not feasible to 
include climate risks into the planning process per se. What is needed is more scientific 
knowledge base related to such risks, their impacts on the city and technical knowledge related 
to how we can mitigate and adapt to such risks. This would increase the possibility of 
mainstreaming climate risks and adaptation into the planning process.     
Given the public response measures like revamping the storm water drainage network and 
improving the disaster response strategies plus the regular cleaning and desilting of drains, it is 
pertinent to examine what has been the experience of the citizens as regards intensity and depth of 
flooding post 2005 event. In subsequent years, the intensity of flooding has not reduced as reported 
by 65% respondents. However, the depth of flooding on average since the 2005 event has been 
around 2 ft. But some areas have reported 3-4 ft. water levels inside their homes and 
establishments. 42% households also reported that their house has experienced flooding for about 4 
days in recent years. Further, 85% respondents are of the opinion that the local government 
authorities are not doing enough to prevent flooding in the city. 87% feel that it is the primary 
responsibility of MCGM to prevent floods in the city, but 60% also feel that the state government 
should also actively take this responsibility. It is further interesting to note that 85% of the 
respondents are aware of climate change and most consider the problem as either very serious or 
serious. Majority of them (84% of respondents) also feel that the authorities should have better 
infrastructure in place to deal with climate risks and more than 42% are of the opinion that quick 
response is the key to dealing with the adverse impacts of climate change.  
As regards the efficacy of private response measures in enhancing the adaptation capacity to deal 
with floods in the long term, it is too early to evaluate this given the information we received 
through the primary survey. This is the only study carried out so far in Mumbai that has tried to 
capture private responses. It must be noted that these responses are strictly private in nature with 
individual initiative and without any public or government intervention in it. As such there are no 
benchmarks to evaluate how efficient these responses are. Many responses like repairing the 
premises are essentially short-term in nature, whereas responses like raising the plot level, raising 
other infrastructure like electric meters to protect them from flooding would be expected to have 
medium-term impact on the adaptation capacity. What must be highlighted over here is that all 
private initiatives and responses are a direct out-of-pocket expense for the concerned individuals or 
establishments. There is virtually no insurance cover that would help them to deal with the adverse 



































6. Conclusion  
To summarize, the study carried out for Mumbai assesses the impacts and responses to the July 
2005 catastrophic flood event in Mumbai. Unlike the impact assessments which focus on insured 
losses to property and infrastructure, this study has tried to capture physical and economic losses 
suffered by households and commercial and small industrial establishments that are essentially 
uninsured in nature. We have also tried to identify the short to medium-term responses coming 
from the local government as well as citizens themselves. The study also looks at how and if at all 
these responses add to the adaptation capacity of the city in the long run and what are the policy 
implications of the findings for the long-term development and investment planning. Some of the 
highlights of the study are given below: 
• The extent of vulnerability of the city to climate risks, in particular, heavy precipitation and 
flooding is assessed here. We find that the city is vulnerable to climate risks due to its proximity 
to sea, flood prone topography, large scale reclamation done for further development, huge 
population with more than half staying in informal settlements or slums and inadequacy of basic 
civic services for water, sanitation, solid waste and public health. 
• The review of scientific literature further highlights how the city is at great risk from sea-level 
rise, heavy precipitation and flooding, high winds, cyclones and coastal erosion. Further, with 
imminent climate change in future, an event like July 2005 could become more frequent, the 
flood footprints might deepen in more vulnerable areas and the costs of such events would also 
go up dramatically. 
• The catastrophic event of July 2005 with unprecedented heavy rainfall of 944 mm in a single day 
disrupted the life in the city completely with millions affected due to near shut-down of 
electricity, water supply, transportation and communication services.  
• There was massive damage to municipal and private infrastructure with costs of damages 
estimated at US$ 68 million. The private sector establishments suffered massive losses as it took 
1-2 weeks for the city to back to normal. There are some estimates which show that the losses 
might have been as high as US$ 1100 million.       
• When damage or impact assessments for such events are undertaken, the focus is largely on 
insured and direct physical and economic losses which are easily measurable. However, out 
study shows how insured losses are only a fraction of the total loss that citizens suffer from in 
the event of extreme weather events 
• As seen from the extrapolated costs, there are huge costs that city residents have to bear. For 
example, our estimates indicate that the households might have spent around US$ 267 million 
on account of repairs or replacements of damaged assets. There is increased incidence of health 
impacts such as malaria, dengue and typhoid as well in the aftermath of the floods. But we have 
not been able to estimate the costs of health impacts due to inadequacy of data. 
• For the commercial and small industrial establishments, we have estimated US$ 90 million spent 
on account of repairs or replacements and US$ 59 million on account of flood water entering the 
premises, subsequent clean up, loss of income and emergency expenditure.   
• It must be noted however that these are only rough and indicative estimates for the costs of 
damage faced by the households and largely informal private sector in Mumbai. The actual costs 
may be much higher as our assumptions are quite moderate. For cities in the developing world, 
these findings are quite relevant as there is a large presence of informal sector whose losses do 
not get accounted for, although they form a substantial part of the overall costs.  
• Further, for a city like Mumbai with more than 50% population living a destitute life in slums 
with unsafe and unhygienic conditions, weather events mean substantial costs on account of 
physical, economic, social and health impacts. In our primary survey, for majority of the 
households, the average family incomes are in the lower middle-income category of INR 5000-
15000 per month (US$ 100-300). For such households, the physical and economic losses as 
indicated in Section 3 earlier are substantial.    
































• The most important issue here is that for almost all the households and private sector 
establishments, the costs of damages are out-of-pocket expenses due to the absence of 
insurance cover or aid or financial assistance coming from the government. 
• Besides the direct losses, there are a variety of indirect impacts which are difficult to measure 
but are equally important. This study has tried to capture some of the impacts like non-
availability of food and other essential supplies, disruption of electricity services by using proxies 
like daily octroi collections at entry points to the city and daily electricity supplied by a private 
utility.  
• The study has further looked at responses from the local government institutions, households 
and private sector. Some of the public and private responses have the potential to enhance the 
medium to long-term adaptation capacity of the city to cope with future floods. However, there 
is a need to address the larger issues of climate risks in the development planning for the city.  
• As of now, planning looks at these issues in a generic manner. Given the uncertainty associated 
with climate risks in future and given the lack of scientific and technical knowledge base 
regarding these issues at the local level, planning process is not equipped to integrate 
adaptation to climate risks into mainstream planning and substantial efforts in this direction are 
required in future.  
The findings of this study in a way highlight the costs of inaction if very little is done in future  to 
enhance the coping capacity of the city for future weather events and climate risks in general. 
Mumbai is currently in the process of drafting the new development plan that is expected to be 
implemented in the near future. The findings of this study put forth a convincing argument that 
adaptation strategies needs to become a part of mainstream planning while devising strategies of 
developing infrastructure, housing, transport network and other facilities and services in the city. 
Although adaptation is costly, the costs of inaction can prove to be costlier. Hence, there is a need 
for integrated and coordinated efforts from all agencies including local government, planners, public 
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Table A1: Ward-wise details of the sample selected for primary survey 
Wards Total population Households Commercial & 
Industrial 
F North 5,24,393 177 102 
F South 3,96,122 103 149 
H East 5,80,835 176 98 
K East 8,10,002 241 139 
L Ward 7,78,278 231 204 
P North 7,98,775 240 100 
 
 
Table A2: Details of personal interviews  
Name of THE Officers 
 
Designation Org. / dept 
Mr. Minesh Pimple 
 





Asst. Shift In- charge 
 
MCGM 
Mr. Mahesh Narvekar 
 
Chief Officer, DMP & CCSRS 
 
MCGM 
Mr. A.A. Pawaskar    
 




Mr. H.A. Kale    
 






















































































Figure A2: Ward map of F North 
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Bangkok is not only Thailand’s political, economic and administrative capital, but also a regional and 
global hub. In recent decades, it has transformed from a compact urban core into a sprawling 
megacity. Today, in addition to the original centre, the city also extends into its five neighboring 
provinces and forms a single agglomeration, the Bangkok Metropolitan Region: around 15% of the 
country’s population resides here. However, alongside its economic and demographic vitality, 
Bangkok is highly vulnerable to climate change and other environmental issues. In particular, due to 
the ‘three waters’ of runoff, rain and sea rise, together with its low-lying topography of 1.0-2.0 
meters, much of the capital is prone to inundation.  Section 1, Bangkok: An overview, summarizes 
these issues and presents some of the key data.  
 
Despite the city’s extensive flood-protection system, comprising not only the historic network of 
canals but also the more recent development of the King’s Dyke and additional drainage and 
pumping infrastructure, it is clear that Bangkok is still vulnerable to major flooding. Floods have been 
a regular occurrence in Bangkok throughout its recent history, with major events occurring in 1942, 
1978, 1980, 1983, 1995, 1996, 2002 and 2006, the year of the case study in this report. During the 
field research in 2011, however, the city experienced its worst flooding in more than fifty years. Yet 
this vulnerability will only increase in the future, when it has been projected that the city will be 
unable to withhold more than a 1-in-10-year flood event, due to the expected effects of climate 
chance and land subsidence.  Combined, these environmental factors are forecast to increase the 
costs and coverage of flooding substantially: in an A1F1 climate scenario, the costs of a 1-in-30-year 
flooding event are estimated to rise from $1.059 billion in 2008 to as much as $4.454 billion in 2050. 
The city’s exposure, both in assets and population, will also be substantially increased by its forecast 
levels of growth in its built up area and its spatial extension. According to the OECD, by 2070 
Bangkok will be the seventh most vulnerable coastal city in the world to flooding in terms of 
population, and the tenth most vulnerable in terms of assets.  
 
Section 2, Case study: The 2006 flood, presents the background to Bangkok’s flooding in 2006. The 
2006 flood was precipitated, as with other major flood events, by several factors.  Heavy continuous 
rain brought on by a tropical depression in the region led to intense localized rainfall in the city at 
the beginning of October. At the same time, large volumes of runoff were flowing in from the north: 
85% of the annual rainfall as concentrated in September and October, while much of the upstream 
dam capacity was strained to its limits. Finally, at critical moments in late October and early 
November, the sea level rose to a peak of 2.22MSL: the maximum threshold before the Chao Phraya 
riverbank begins to flood is 2.5MSL. The city centre was protected, but the areas north of the city 
were allowed to flood, with flood flows also directed to the east of Bangkok. This report profiles the 
effects in four case study districts in the eastern suburbs of Bangkok: Minburi, Nong Jork, Lat 
Krabang and Klong Samwa. All of them are in Bangkok’s traditionally agricultural hinterland and 
located at a very low land elevation of 0.8-1.5 MSL. Each of them has distinct physical, social and 
economic characteristics, yet all were impacted to varying degrees by the flooding and reflect 
Bangkok’s rapid urbanization in their mix of agricultural, industrial and residential uses. Importantly, 
the areas also illustrate the experience of the many residents living outside the inner city’s 
established polder system.  
 
Section 3, Impact assessment of the flood, begins with an overview of the available secondary data 
on the impact of the flooding. Damage assessments should be holistic, reflecting not only the 
economic costs but also the environmental, social, psychological and health effects. Yet the official 
data is generally technical in nature, concentrating on infrastructure damage and compensation 
disbursements, and national in focus with little disaggregation at the district or community level.  As 
































a result, the local and non-physical impacts of the flooding are largely overlooked. Consequently, the 
research team on this study selected a total of 380 sample households, businesses and industrial 
estate to develop a more comprehensive picture of the flood. Using semi-structured surveys in 
sample communities within the districts, the team employed a series of sub-proxies, including 
physical damage, health costs, transport and work absence, to assess the direct and indirect flood-
related costs to communities, businesses and individuals in the 2006 flood. This was with the aim of 
developing a more fine-grained understanding of the true costs of the flooding, particularly to 
socially vulnerable groups. The team also analyzed the flood protection measures of Bang Chan 
Industrial Estate, Minburi, and hosted a community workshop with stakeholders, researchers and a 
hydrological expert from the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment.   
 
The results highlight the importance of a localized analysis of the impacts of flooding, as both the 
intensity and the nature of its effects vary considerably from district to district. Of the four, Minburi 
was the worst affected, particularly as residents suffered loss of livelihood as a result of the 
economic disruption and health threats. As with the other districts, the indirect costs of the flooding 
at times exceeded the direct physical damage, though this is not generally recognized in official 
assessments. The research findings highlighted the significance of work absence as a major indirect 
cost: while the impact on individual households was relatively moderate, the agricultural sector was 
severely affected. Medical care was another indirect expense for inundated communities with the 
spread of diseases such as dengue fever and foot-and-mouth disease.  
 
 Another important finding was that that the costs of the flooding, through lost income and damaged 
infrastructure, was generally more severe for the community as a whole than individual households. 
If the impacts at a community level are more severe, as these results suggest, then this would 
reinforce the importance of collective adaptation and mitigation strategies at a community level. 
Currently, preparedness in the event of extreme flooding is generally undertaken privately by 
individual households, with government encouragement focusing on self-reliance and personal 
initiative. But to minimize the very substantial community-wide costs of the flooding, there needs to 
be a platform for collective action.  
  
The research also disaggregated its findings by income group and occupation to develop a clearer 
picture of the effects of the flooding on different groups. One significant finding was that the work 
absence levels of the poorest households were, as for more affluent households, relatively low. This 
suggests that, contrary to what might be expected, the poorest households demonstrated a relatively 
strong adaptive capacity. Economic insecurity may be a significant element in this, however, and 
further research is required to ascertain the nature of their adaptation strategies.  
 
The results also highlight the varying impacts on different business and occupational sectors. 
Farming, according to the survey results, was the worst affected within the agricultural sector, with 
levels in excess of a foot lasting over a month. Fisheries, on the other hand, though less vulnerable to 
direct physical damage, was most exposed to the rising production costs as a result of the flooding. 
As for small businesses, the impact was less straightforward and depended in particular on the 
product of the enterprise. While the service sector was weakened by flood-related disruption, 
demand for basic consumer goods actually rose among residents who were more dependent on local 
shops to provide them with food and other provisions. Again, these nuances potentially have 


































Section 4, Adaptation Responses, outlines the recent adaption responses in Bangkok, particularly 
since 2006. These responses have been largely structural in nature and focused primarily on 
mitigation. Yet Bangkok’s future will depend in great part on its capacity for long term adaptation to 
its flood risk: the city should be aiming for a state of ‘safe failure’ where in the event of major 
flooding exceeding the capacity of its protective infrastructure, the effects are minimized. This can 
only be achieved if efforts are infrastructure is supported by non-structural measures, such as better 
land use regulations. Another persistent issue is the fragmented and divisive nature of governance in 
Bangkok, particularly its flood management structures. In addition to the complex and often 
conflicting mandates of different ministries, tensions exist between national and municipal 
authorities, and even within the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) the different provinces have 
autonomous administration with limited coordination between them. Furthermore, there is also 
very limited participation, between the authorities the private sector and local communities, making 
collective adaptation a remote possibility.  
 
Section 5, Conclusion: Mainstreaming adaptation into long-term planning, drawing on the findings 
of the research team, highlights some of the main policy directions the city’s future strategic 
framework should follow. A long term adaptation strategy that is collective and participatory, guided 
by adequate data and a deeper recognition of the complex social dimensions of flooding, is crucial. 
Together with substantial national and municipal governance reform, this approach will help to 
address these challenges and preserve Bangkok’s immense social and economic vitality.  
 
 
1. Bangkok: an overview 
 
1.1 City Demographics and Urbanization trends 
Bangkok, the capital of Thailand since 1782, is not only the country’s political centre but also its 
administrative and economic heart. Located on the lower plain of the Chao Phraya River Basin, the 
city is now a sprawling urban agglomeration and one of Asia’s emerging megacities.  The sheer pace 
of its spatial and demographic growth has meant that Bangkok itself has had to be continuously 
redefined. The city is now classified as the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR), an area of around 
1,569 km2 that includes the five adjacent provinces of Samut Sakon, Nakhon Pathom, Nonthaburi, 
Pathum Thani and Samutprakarn. 
 
Bangkok’s status as the country’s largest demographic concentration is unquestioned, with an estimated 
15% of Thailand’s population located in the greater Bangkok metropolitan area. This reflects a long 
historic trend, going back to the late nineteenth century, of disproportionate demographic growth in 
Bangkok.  By 1937, for instance, the BMA’s population was already 15 times that of Chiang Mai, its 
closest urban competitor and the country’s largest urban settlement after Bangkok. By 1991, 
Bangkok was 41 times the size of Nakhon Ratchasima, at that point the country’s second largest city, 
ahead of Chiang Mai. The exact number of Bangkok’s rising demographic remains unclear, however, 
and estimates vary considerably. According to the National Statistics Office (NSO), Bangkok’s 
population in 2009 was at 5.701 million – but UN DESA data puts it considerably higher, at 6.902 
million. Other figures put the population at almost 10 million or even more, once unregistered 
migrants are factored in. In part, these discrepancies may reflect different perspectives on what 
constitutes Bangkok geographically: Bangkok City, the BMA or the BMR. Furthermore, for a number 
of reasons the official data may underestimate the true extent of the population: in 2000, for 
instance, while the number of registered residents was only 6.3 million, the actual population was 
thought to be closer to 8.9 million.  The capital’s demographic boom is projected to continue into 
































the future. By 2050, according to one projection, the population will have reached 10.55 million in 
Bangkok City, and almost 16 million in the BMR as a whole.  
 
This consolidation has been sustained by a long period of accelerated economic growth in the 
capital: much of Thailand’s industrial and commercial capacity is concentrated within metropolitan 
Bangkok, as well as the bulk of its communications and transport infrastructure. In 2006, the year of 
this case study, the BMR generated 43% of Thailand’s GDP.  As a result, given its accelerating growth 
and status as Southeast Asia’s main business hub, the capital continues to act as a population 
magnet, both nationally and globally, for migrants in search of employment opportunities. While 
Thais from other parts of the country, particularly areas where traditional livelihood opportunities 
such as agriculture have been contracting, have migrated to the capital in growing numbers, 
Bangkok also continues to attract large volumes of international migrants from adjacent countries 
and other regions.  
 
This economic primacy, together with the expanding population that it attracts, are major 
dimensions in the city’s increasing vulnerability and exposure to flooding. When a major flood event 
affects Bangkok, it not only threatens the political and administrative functioning of the capital, but 
also puts much of the country’s factories and industrial parks at risk - and by extension, the homes 
and livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of the city’s residents. The nature of Bangkok’s 
development is also significant: the various symptoms and side effects of urbanization in Thailand 
are particularly pronounced in the capital. This is particularly evident in the rapid pace of Bangkok’s 
urban growth. In recent years this growth has been particularly intense throughout the metropolitan 
region: the BMR saw a 74% increase in urban development between 1998 and 2003 alone.  
 
However, it is not just the speed but also the nature of this change that poses serious challenges for 
Bangkok’s future, particularly with regards to flooding. One of the city’s most visible characteristics, 
driven by the growing population and other factors such as rising car ownership and weak planning 
regulations, is the accelerating spatial expansion towards its periphery – the ‘suburbanization’ of 
Bangkok. Economically, this is already clear from the spread of industrial development into what is 
termed the Extended Bangkok Metropolitan Region (EBMR), an extended region comprising the 
BMR and the Eastern Seaboard, a total of 19 provinces: in 2001, it accounted for 68% of the 
country’s nominal GDP.  But it is also reflected in the relocation of the city’s residents in increasing 
numbers to the margins of the metropolis. In Nonthaburi Province, for example, the population grew 
by 47% during 2002-2007. Within the city centre, on the other hand, population density has 
declined. Though it increased throughout the 1970s and 1980s, this trend reversed sharply in the 
1990s and by 1998 was only 155 persons/ha, compared to 222 persons/ha in 1970. While the 
population of inner Bangkok decreased from 3.25 million in 1978 to 2.86 million people in 2000, the 
population in the outer areas of Bangkok increased from about 670,000 to 1.12 million people 
during the same period. It is likely that the majority of its future growth will be in satellite 
developments in its metropolitan areas, rather than the city centre.  
 
A second important element in Bangkok’s development is its transition from water-based urban 
form, when the city fabric was designed sympathetically around natural climate and hydrology, to an 
impermeable “concrete pad”. For instance, until recently Bangkok benefitted from a complex 
network of canals and water catchments to assist flood drainage. However, with dramatic 
redevelopment of the city, much of this system has disappeared beneath highways, factories and 
housing. This has substantially weakened its capacity to cope with heavy rain. Furthermore, the 
fabric of the capital has moved away from traditional “amphibious” structures that were designed in 
response to environmental threats, in particular its low-lying topography and flood-prone hydrology 



































1.2 Climate and Coastal Vulnerability 
1.2.1 Natural Environment and Hydrology 
Bangkok spans a total of 1,569 km2 in the lower part of the Chao Phraya River Basin. This is the 
largest basin in the country and at 159,000 km2 amounts to around 35% of the country’s entire land 
mass. Four main tributaries converge at Nakhon Sawan, a province north of Bangkok, and become 
the Chao Phraya River. This continues to flow south through the capital and out into the Gulf of 
Thailand.  The river’s flow capacity varies considerably from as much as 4,000 CMS in NakornSawan 
and Chainat, to 1,500 CMS in Ayutthaya and 3,000 CMS in Bangkok. The average annual discharge of 
the river is 770 m³/s, but can reach significantly higher at certain times, particularly during a flood. In 
1995, for instance, it reached a peak of 4,560 m³/s.  
 
Bangkok itself is located in a low-lying area of the basin, with an average ground elevation of only 
1.0-2.0 meters above sea level. Some parts of the city are in fact at sea level as a result of land 
subsidence. Furthermore, the city is only 33km north of the coast. Its geography therefore makes it 
naturally susceptible to flooding, both from large volumes of runoff from the north of the country 
and tidal inflows from the sea.  The volume of these floods can be immense: 31,000 million cubic 
meters for a flooding event with a 1-in-30-year probability. Given its location at the bottom of the 
alluvial plain, near the mouth of the Chao  Phraya, in these conditions Bangkok runs the risk of 
becoming a ‘bottleneck’ as the water drains into the Gulf of Thailand, resulting in over 30 days of 
flooding in many parts of the city.  
 
Bangkok’s flood vulnerability is determined by three major water sources – rainfall, river runoff and 
tidal flows. Consequently, the capital is sometimes known as the “city of three waters”. The worst 
cases are most likely to occur when these three sources combine to make the conditions necessary 
for a major flooding event.  
 
• Rainfall: Estimates of Bangkok’s annual rainfall are wide-ranging of rainfall every year, though 
this varies greatly from year to year: according to one set of figures, rainfall within the Chao 
Phraya River averages 1,099mm, but may range between a minimum of 354mm and a maximum 
of 2,471mm. Rainfall also varies greatly from month to month, from as little as 5mm in 
December to 305mm in September. Peak rainfall patterns typically occur twice yearly, in May-
June and September-November. However, the great majority (88%) of this rainfall occurs during 
the wet season between May and October, particularly in the peak period of September and 
October, when tropical cyclones occur. Generally, the impact of the rainy season is cumulative 
and spread out over several months. However, at its most intense, when a heavy spell exceeds 
the city’s drainage capacity, excess rainwater may result in intermittent, localized flooding in 
low-lying areas. 
 
• River Runoff: During the rainy season, water runoff plays a vital role in irrigating the paddy fields 
and agricultural plains to the north of Bangkok. The surplus runoff then passes through the city’s 
canal network and into the Chao Phraya River, from where it travels through Bangkok down to 
the Gulf of Thailand. However, though on average the Chao Phraya has a flow capacity of 2,500-
3,000 CMS, larger volumes may result in flooding. For example, runoff in excess of 3,500 CMS 
will raise its water level to 2.1 metres above sea level – high enough to inundate the lowest lying 
areas of the riverside.  
 
• Tides: At certain times, the Chao Phraya River is also strongly affected by the incoming tide from 
the Gulf of Thailand. The tide levels are cyclical and vary during the day, between -0.5m and 
1.5m, though they may rise considerably higher: in 1995, for instance, levels reached 2.5m. 
However, tidal levels are also affected by seasonal variation, generally peaking in November and 
December, just after the rainy season has come to an end. The tidal rises are particularly evident 
































in the lower stretch of the Chao Phraya river, between 23 km and 57 km from its mouth. Higher 
tides, combined with peak river flow from runoff and rainfall, may lead to flooding.  
 
1.2.2 Bangkok’s flood protection system 
Bangkok’s drainage system has been constructed around its extensive 2,606 km network of canals. 
These khlong, 1,655 of them in all, vary greatly in size with the largest spanning a width of 50 
meters. Given Bangkok’s susceptibility to flooding, the canals play an essential role in draining and 
conveying storm water through the city to the Chao Phraya River. While much of this infrastructure 
is a historic legacy from the days when Bangkok was a water-based city and dubbed ‘the Venice of 
the East’, the conduits and canals are supported by well-developed technologies including U-shaped 
boxes, round type drains, pumping stations, movable pumps and gates. However, as discussed in 
section 1.1, the effectiveness of this infrastructure has been weakened by the city’s rapid 
development, submerging many of its canals and drainage channels beneath concrete.  
 
As the city has intensified and expanded, thus becoming more exposed to the risk of flooding, 
further measures have been put in place to manage and mitigate the potential effects. However, 
much of the investment for this has been granted reactively, in the wake of a major disaster. 
Following the catastrophic floods of 1983, when the Rangsit irrigation areas suffered four months of 
flooding, the King’s Dyke was constructed at the northern and eastern boundaries of Bangkok to 
prevent water in the eastern flood plain from inundating the city centre. Submersible equipment 
was also installed in several pumping stations on the Chao Phraya River. Later on, in the wake of the 
devastation of the 1995 floods, the BMA received government funding to construct 77km of barriers 
along the river, still ongoing when the 2006 flood hit Bangkok and finally completed in 2010. A 
Second Master Plan for the Chao Phraya Delta was also developed by a consortium of specialists and 
the Thai government, with support from the World Bank. This involved a major macro-level review 
of the causes and consequences of the flood, with a focus on both immediate and long term flood 
alleviation strategies.  
 
Today, a substantial polder system encloses inner Bangkok, with 10 sub-polders supported by 
drainage tunnels and pumps to redirect the water into the river. The main roads and rail lines within 
the protected area serve as the polder’s primary dykes. Polder systems have also been developed in 
the eastern and western areas of the city. In the west, this is supported by a series of dykes by the 
river and fortified by two khlong, the Mahasawas and Bangkok Noi canals, to protect the areas inside 
the dykes flooding. On the eastern side of the city, the King’s Dyke is supported by around 20 
retention ponds with a combined capacity of 6 million cubic meters. An additional retention pond in 
the south has an additional 6 million cubic meters in storage. 7 supersized drainage tunnels have 
also been constructed to accelerate drainage. These tunnels lie 15-22 meters underground and have 
a current operational capacity of 95.50 CMS, with another 60 CMS under development. Pumping 
stations speed the water through them and into the river10.  During the wet season, a total of 15 sub-
polders covering 168 km2 are in operation to support the drainage of surplus water on either side of 
the river.  
 
Within the city, then, Bangkok’s flood management essentially works through three main methods. 
Firstly, it prevents the flow of water from outside, through the construction of dykes and 
embankments. Secondly, it evacuates the water from within the polder with pumps and drainage 
tunnels. Thirdly, it temporarily stores water in retention ponds or ‘monkey cheeks’.11 Yet Bangkok’s 
                                                           
10 Department of Drainage and Sewage, BMA (2009). Flood Protection in Bangkok. Paper revised from Vitoonpanyakij, C. (2007). 
Flood protection in BMA 2006. 
11 Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Green Leaf Foundation and United Nations Environment Programme (2009). Bangkok 


































relative exposure to flooding is also determined by ‘manmade’ factors, such as the operation of its 
dams12.  In terms of the upstream management of the runoff, much of the monsoon rain is stored in 
around 3,000 dams and then strategically released for agricultural irrigation during the dry season. 
The two largest, the Bhumibol and Sirikit dams, together manage the runoff from 22% of the area of 
the Chao Phraya Basin13.  The construction of these dams, in 1964 and 1971 respectively, has 
generally helped reduce flooding risk. Nevertheless, extreme weather events are still capable of 
exceeding their capacity, to devastating effect: for instance, in 1995, when storms in the upper 
watershed led to the release of 2,900 million cubic meters of runoff14.  
 
Despite these considerable investments, funding constraints have nevertheless prevented the city 
from fully realizing its flood protection strategy. For instance, one important element of the post-
1995 Second Master Plan was the construction of a river diversion to eastern Bangkok along the 
Praong Chaiya-Nuchit canal. However, the high costs of land around Suvarnbhumi airport and 
associated expenses such as heavy pumping of floodwater at low elevations proved prohibitive, 
although the scheme was proposed again after the 2006 flooding15. Furthermore, as extreme 
flooding events demonstrate, the existing system is not sufficient to protect large areas of Bangkok 
from the potential threat of flooding. Though its protective infrastructure has been strengthened 
greatly in recent decades, Bangkok is still becoming increasingly vulnerable to flooding16. Nor is this 
infrastructure necessarily capable of withstanding major events: for instance, the King’s Dyke is 
designed primarily as a solution to the city’s regular low level flooding rather than low frequency, 
high impact flooding events such as 1-in-50 year events17. The projected risks relating to climate 
change and other environmental and developmental factors, and the implications these may have 
for the city’s future, are examined in greater detail in section 1.3.  
 
1.3 Past food events and future risks 
1.3.1 Past events 
The particular circumstances of every flood event in Bangkok is unique.  Nevertheless, the city’s 
chronic vulnerability is reflected in its long history of flooding, with major events in 1942, 1978, 
1980, 1983, 1995, 1996, 2002 and 2006. The floods of 1983 and 1995 were especially intense, with 
both serving as landmarks that led to substantial investments in mitigation and protection strategies. 
The latter, estimated to have a 1-in-30-year frequency, flooded 65% of the BMA with depths of up to 
2 meters, with some districts still inundated in December18.  The flooding killed over 400 people and 
                                                           
12 Sapphaisal, C. (2007). Planning and Flood Mitigation for the Chao Phraya River Basin. Retrieved at: 
http://www.rid.go.th/thaicid/_5_article/2550/chukiat.swf 
13 UNESCO World Water Assessment Programme (2003), Chapter 16: Chao Phraya River Basin, Thailand. In UN World Water 
Development Report 1: Water for People, Water for Life.  
14 ADB/JICA/World Bank (2010). Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities, p.25. Retrieved at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Resources/226300-1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf 
15 Vongvisessomjai, S. (2007). Flood Mitigation Master Plan for Chao Phraya Delta. Paper presented at the 4th INWEPF Steering 
Meeting and Symposium. Retrieved at: http://web.rid.go.th/ffd/papers/Paper-Session%201/p1-
04%20Flood%20Mitigation%20Master%20Plan.pdf 
16 Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Green Leaf Foundation and United Nations Environment Programme (2009). Bangkok 
Assessment Report on Climate Change 2009. Bangkok: BMA, GLF and UNEP 
17 Whereas major urban centres in the Netherlands, for example, have typically designed to withstand a 1-in-10,000-years flood. 
IRIN, ‘How to build a flood-resilient city’. November 28, 2011. Retrieved at: 
http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=94319 
18 ADB/JICA/World Bank (2010). Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities, p.25. Retrieved at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Resources/226300-1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf 
































impacted on almost 4 million others in the country19. More recently, in 2011, Bangkok experienced 
one of the worst flood events in its history. Hundreds of lives were also lost and as of December 1, 
2011, according to World Bank calculations, the total cost economic damages and losses in the 
country amounted to $45.7 billion20.  
  
1.3.2 Future risks 
Bangkok’s vulnerability to flooding and other environmental challenges, such as heat waves, is 
projected to increase substantially in the coming decades. Some of the likely impacts, such as shifts 
in sea, temperature and precipitation levels, will result from climate change. There are other 
significant environmental issues beyond this, however, including the spatial pattern of future urban 
development and the accumulating effects of land subsidence. 
 
In terms of climate change, Bangkok is already one of the most vulnerable areas in Southeast Asia21 
and has been identified by the IPCC as a future ‘hotspot’ due to the destabilizing effects  projected 
on the city’s hydrometeorology22.  Much of Thailand’s 2,615 km coastline is at risk, including 
Bangkok, with areas such as the district of Bang Khuntien especially vulnerable23. Global warming 
has already resulted in Thailand’s rivers becoming increasingly unpredictable: flows are already 
becoming lower in the dry season and higher in the rainy season24.   
 
One of the most authoritative reviews of the projected effects of climate change within the BMR  is 
the assessment undertaken on behalf of the IPCC by the University of Tokyo’s  Integrated Research 
System for Sustainability Science, who modeled potential impacts for Bangkok in 2050 in ‘low’ (B1) 
and ‘high’ (A1F1) emissions scenarios. In addition to temperature rises of between 1.2 (B1F1) and 
1.9 (A1F1) degrees Celsius25, climate change would have increase both sea levels and precipitation, 
with serious implications for Bangkok’s future vulnerability.  
 
Mean precipitation in the basin is projected to rise by 2 (B1F1) to 3 (A1) percent26. However, while 
the consequent increase in net flood volume will be more or less proportionate to this, the effect on 
peak river discharge in the Chao Phraya will be substantially greater due to the staggered flow 
patterns of the floodwater from the catchments upstream27. It will also have a significant impact on 
                                                           
19 IRIN, ‘How to build a flood-resilient city’. November 28, 2011. Retrieved at: 
http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=94319 
20 World Bank. The World Bank supports Thailand’s post-floods recovery efforts. December 13, 2011. Retrieved at: 
http://www.worldbank.or.th/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/THAILANDEXTN/0,,contentMDK:2306744
3~menuPK:50003484~pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:333296,00.html 
21 Yusuf, A. and Francisco, H. (2009). Climate Change Vulnerability Mapping for Southeast Asia. Economy and Environment Program 
for Southeast Asia.  
22 ADB/JICA/World Bank (2010). Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities, p.2. Retrieved at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Resources/226300-1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf 
23 Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Green Leaf Foundation and United Nations Environment Programme (2009). Bangkok 
Assessment Report on Climate Change 2009. Bangkok: BMA, GLF and UNEP 
24 Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Green Leaf Foundation and United Nations Environment Programme (2009). Bangkok 
Assessment Report on Climate Change 2009. Bangkok: BMA, GLF and UNEP 
25 Cited in Panya Consultants (2009). Climate Change Impact and Adaptation Study for Bangkok Metropolitan Region, p.x. Retrieved 
at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTHAILAND/Resources/333200-1177475763598/3714275-1234408023295/5826366-
1248255995902/full-report.pdf 
26 ADB/JICA/World Bank (2010). Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities, p.xii. Retrieved at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Resources/226300-1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf 




































the size of the flood-prone area, rising in the context of a 1-in-30-year flooding event by 30% in the 
high (A1F1) emissions scenario28. Furthermore, a large part of Bangkok’s increased future risk will 
result from the growing frequency of extreme weather events, such as high intensity flash 
precipitation and very wet years with strong La Nina conditions29.  
 
 At the same time, while sea levels are rising at the relatively modest rate of 25mm annually at 
present30, these gradual changes will accumulate in the coming decades. Sea levels in the Gulf of 
Thailand are projected to rise between 0.19 (B1) and 0.29 (A1F1) meters31. Given Bangkok’s low-
lying elevation, the impacts of higher sea levels could intensify the negative impact of flooding 
substantially. For instance, a simulation of the effects of future flooding in Bangkok according to the 
worst-case SLR scenarios used the baseline conditions of the 1995 flood as a comparator.  It found 
that, in the event of a 0.32 SLR by 2050, the total flooded area would increase by 26% compared to 
1995. With an SLR of 0.88 meters by 2100, the increase would be as much as 81%32.  
 
But the impacts of climate change to Bangkok in terms of flood vulnerability are likely to be 
exceeded by the costs of non-climate-related factors – in particular, the city’s chronic land 
subsidence.  Bangkok is naturally at risk  due to the soft clay layer in its ground surface and low lying 
topography, but these problems has been greatly exacerbated by the excessive groundwater 
extraction33.  However, stronger government regulation has slowed the rate of land subsidence and 
is expected to result in further reductions in the rate of subsidence, by 10% annually. According to 
official estimates, from a peak of 10cm a year in 1978, subsidence has since slowed to 1-2cm by 
2007, averaging 0.97 cm a year between 2002 and 200734. However, other estimates suggest a much 
faster rate of 5-10mm a year, with some outlying parts of the city in the southeast and southwest 
reaching as much as 30mm annually.  What is certain is that land subsidence and sea level rises will 
have a combined impact. For example, if sea levels are assumed to rise by 12.3cm between 2009 and 
2050, with land subsidence during this period totaling another 20cm, then the relative sea level rise 
will total 32.2cm35. Another study estimated that, due to the effects of subsidence and sea level rise, 
Bangkok could potentially find itself submerged in 50-100cm of floodwater by 202536. 
 
                                                           
28 ADB/JICA/World Bank (2010). Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities, p.xii. Retrieved at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Resources/226300-1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf 
29 Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Green Leaf Foundation and United Nations Environment Programme (2009). Bangkok 
Assessment Report on Climate Change 2009. Bangkok: BMA, GLF and UNEP 
30 Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Green Leaf Foundation and United Nations Environment Programme (2009). Bangkok 
Assessment Report on Climate Change 2009. Bangkok: BMA, GLF and UNEP 
31 Cited in Panya Consultants (2009). Climate Change Impact and Adaptation Study for Bangkok Metropolitan Region, p.x. Retrieved 
at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTHAILAND/Resources/333200-1177475763598/3714275-1234408023295/5826366-
1248255995902/full-report.pdf 
32 Dutta, D. (2011). An integrated tool for assessment of flood vulnerability of coastal cities to sea-level rise and potential socio-
economic impacts: a case study in Bangkok, Thailand. Hydrological Sciences Journal, 56(5).   
33 Phien-Wej, N. et al. (2006), Land subsidence in Bangkok, Thailand. Engineering Geology, 82(4).  
34 ADB/JICA/World Bank (2010). Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities, p.26. Retrieved at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Resources/226300-1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf 
35 Panya Consultants (2009). Climate Change Impact and Adaptation Study for Bangkok Metropolitan Region, p.2-3. Retrieved at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTHAILAND/Resources/333200-1177475763598/3714275-1234408023295/5826366-
1248255995902/full-report.pdf 
36 Phien-Wej et al. (2006), cited by Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Green Leaf Foundation and United Nations Environment 
Programme (2009). Bangkok Assessment Report on Climate Change 2009. Bangkok: BMA, GLF and UNEP 
































Nevertheless, the consensus is that the future costs associated with land subsidence will be very 
substantial. A report commissioned by the World Bank, working with the first set of figures, 
extrapolated a cumulative subsidence rate of 5-30cm between 2002 and 2050. The economic cost of 
this subsidence, in the context of a 1-in-30 year flood in an A1F1 climate scenario, nearly doubles 
between 2008 and 2050. Almost 70% of the total increase in the costs of a 1-in-30 flooding event in 
Bangkok in 2050 is due to increased land subsidence37. In addition to the increased flooding, land 
subsidence also reduces the effectiveness of the city’s dyke system and its underground sanitation38.  
 
Finally, as Bangkok’s rapid urbanization is expected to continue, with a larger population and a more 
developed city fabric, the city’s exposure is therefore forecast to be substantially higher even 
without climate change, land subsidence or other major environmental issues. Over 70% of flood-
related costs in the future will relate to building damage39 and flood-affected buildings are to 
increase, according to one projection, by a factor of 1.5 times between 2025 and 210040. The city’s 
continued development will therefore increase its vulnerability, even before climate change and 
other environmental impacts are factored in. For instance, a study by the OECD estimated that at 
present 0.907 million persons and $38.72 billion in assets were potentially exposed in the event of a 
1-in-100-years extreme flooding event. By 2070, in the same environmental conditions but with the 
city’s predicted future population and development, the exposure would rise to 2.392 million 
persons and $520.23 billion in assets41. In addition, the growing expanse of built-up area in and 
around the city, if not carefully planned, may conflict with the increasingly unstable weather 
patterns brought about by climate change.  In particular, the rising frequency and intensity of ‘flash’ 
precipitation events will require effective storm sewage maintenance and substantive measures to 
improve the water-absorbing capacity of the city’s urban landscape42. 
 
Projections for Bangkok’s future flooding exposure therefore factor in the likely effects of different 
climate change scenarios alongside non-climate-related environmental changes, in particular land 
subsidence. They also have to model the transformation of the city itself, in terms of populations 
and infrastructure, and the difference this will have on the overall cost of a major flood event. A 
detailed forecast of the capital’s vulnerability and exposure in 2050 for a World Bank report43, using 
various possible climate scenarios, illustrates the very substantial effects that global warming, land 
subsidence and continued urbanization will have. Firstly, it is estimated that while the current 
flooding area of a 1-in-30 year flooding event is 550 km2, by 2050 this will have risen to 719 km2 in a 
B1 and 734 km2 in an A1F1 scenario respectively. While a 625 km2 flood is currently expected to 
occur every 50 years, by 2050 will be 1/15 years in an A1F1 scenario. Similarly, the total exposure of 
Bangkok’s population to more than 30 days of flooding in a 1-in-30 year flood event will rise from 
546,748 persons at present (2008) to as much as 805,055 persons in a B1 and 954,389 persons in an 
                                                           
37 ADB/JICA/World Bank (2010). Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities, p.xv. Retrieved at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Resources/226300-1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf 
38 Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Green Leaf Foundation and United Nations Environment Programme (2009). Bangkok 
Assessment Report on Climate Change 2009. Bangkok: BMA, GLF and UNEP 
39 ADB/JICA/World Bank (2010). Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities, p.xv. Retrieved at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Resources/226300-1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf 
40 Dutta, D. (2011). An integrated tool for assessment of flood vulnerability of coastal cities to sea-level rise and potential socio-
economic impacts: a case study in Bangkok, Thailand. Hydrological Sciences Journal, 56(5).   
41 Nicholls, R.J., Hanson, S.,  Herweijer, C., Patmore, N., Hallegatte, S., CorfeeMorlot, J. Chateau, J. and Muir-Wood, R. (2008). Ranking 
Port Cities with High Exposure and Vulnerability to Climate Extremes. OECD Environment Working Papers No. 1. 
42 Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Green Leaf Foundation and United Nations Environment Programme (2009). Bangkok 
Assessment Report on Climate Change 2009. Bangkok: BMA, GLF and UNEP 


































A1F1 scenario in 2050 - a 47% and 75% increase respectively. Importantly, the costs are not only the 
direct costs of damaged housing and infrastructure, but the indirect costs of work absence, loss of 
revenue and so on44 . The costs of a 1-in-30-year flooding event also rise from the current (2008) 
$1.059 billion to as much as $4.454 billion in an A1F1 scenario by 2050, with the impacts land 
subsidence, sea level rise and storm surge included in the calculations. A large portion of this 
increase is directly attributable to land subsidence: the cost in 2050 with only land subsidence 
factored in, in current climactic conditions, is $2.982 billion – 67% of the total increase between 
2008 and 205045.  
 
The combined effect of these various factors is that not only will Bangkok be increasingly flood-
prone in the future, due to climate change and other environmental issues, but it will also have more 
to lose as the city continues to develop and expand. A global assessment of port cities, conducted by 
the OECD, estimated that by 2070 Bangkok would be the seventh most vulnerable city in the world 
to coastal flooding in terms of population, and the tenth most vulnerable in terms of assets. In 2005, 
a 1-in-100 years flooding event would involve a potential exposure of around 0.907 million persons 
and $38.72 billion in assets. By 2070, factoring in climate change, anthropogenic land subsidence 
and the substantial changes to its population and urban fabric, the total exposure would come to 
5.138 million persons and an extraordinary $1,117.54 billion in assets46.  
 
2. Case study: the 2006 flood 
 
2.1 Case study areas 
This study examines the impact of the 2006 floods, with a focus on four districts in the eastern 
region of Bangkok: Minburi, Nong Jork, Lat Krabang and Klong Samwa. As rapidly developing 
suburban settlements in a traditionally agricultural region, they provide a vivid illustration of the 
city’s most challenging symptoms, particularly with regards to flood vulnerability. Furthermore, 
during the 2006 flood, these districts were among the worst hit. The rapid urbanization of these 
districts, and their experience of the 2006 floods, highlight the very serious consequences Bangkok 
may face in the future if these current trends continue unchecked.  
 
The low-lying topography that characterizes much of the city is especially evident in eastern 
Bangkok. In the case study districts, the average land elevation is just 0.8-1.5 MSL, compared to 1.0-
2.0 for Bangkok as a whole.  The terrain slopes down from east to west and north to south, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. Consequently, Nong Jork, the district with the highest elevation (2.0MSL), is 





                                                           
44
 Panya Consultants (2009). Climate Change Impact and Adaptation Study for Bangkok Metropolitan Region, p.4-1. Retrieved at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTHAILAND/Resources/333200-1177475763598/3714275-1234408023295/5826366-
1248255995902/full-report.pdf 
As defined in the World Bank estimates, ‘direct’ damage is ”measurable and often relates to the replacement value of destroyed 
immovable assets and stocks“.  This type of damage occurs during or shortly after the natural disaster.  ‘Indirect’ damage on the other hand 
is not physical but nevertheless has associated costs for individuals and communities. This includes lost revenue and unpaid work absence. 
The latter is particularly associated with informal employment and non-salaried workers, and so imposes an added dimension of social 
vulnerability to the costs.  
45 ADB/JICA/World Bank (2010). Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities, pp.28-29, 30, 52-54. Retrieved at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Resources/226300-1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf 
46Nicholls, R.J., Hanson, S.,  Herweijer, C., Patmore, N., Hallegatte, S., CorfeeMorlot, J. Chateau, J. and Muir-Wood, R. (2008). Ranking 
Port Cities with High Exposure and Vulnerability to Climate Extremes. OECD Environment Working Papers No. 1.  

















































Figure 1: Topography of eastern Bangkok 
 
Eastern Bangkok is therefore naturally suited to serve as a flood plain for the large volumes of runoff 
heading from the north towards the Gulf of Thailand, as shown in Figure 2. A large portion of 
Bangkok’s most flood-prone territory, shaded blue, is visibly concentrated in the east. Until the mid-
20th century, this was reflected in the land use of the area, with much of it protected as an officially 
designated drainage corridor for the regular flows of floodwater through the city. However, the 
publication of the first National Economic and Social Plan reconfigured the area as an industrial 
zone, with profound spatial and environmental effects47.  
 
 




Since then, much of the landscape has been transformed by ill-advised or irresponsible construction. 
Megaprojects such as Suvarnabhumi Airport have been constructed in the floodplain and much of 
                                                           
47 Bangkok Post, ‘Heeding his majesty’s advice’. December 1, 2011. Retrieved at: 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/feature/environment/268709/heeding-his-majesty-s-advice 


































the planning regulation that has belatedly been put in place has been ignored49. All of these districts 
to varying degrees now reflect the mixed character of suburban Bangkok, where the city’s rapid 
outward growth has transformed formerly agricultural settlements into morcellated landscapes 
where traditional livelihoods such as farming still persist alongside industrial and residential uses. 
Some of the key demographic, environmental and developmental characteristics of each district are 


















56 canals: one, Khlong 
Saw Wa, used for 
transport and the 
remainder for 
agricultural irrigation.  
 







The most densely 







other development  is 
threatening 
agriculture, an 
important livelihood in 








Airport has also 
resulted in 
improved 
transport links.  
Nong 
Chok 






The largest and least 
densely populated 
district in Bangkok. 
Also the most easterly 
of the four districts 
and the furthest from 
central Bangkok.  
Relatively 
undeveloped, 
given its distance 
from the city, and 
still largely 
agricultural as a 
result.  
                                                           
49 Bangkok Post, ‘Heeding his majesty’s advice’. December 1, 2011. Retrieved at: 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/feature/environment/268709/heeding-his-majesty-s-advice 
50 Klong Samwa District Office. Retrieved at: 
http://203.155.220.239/subsite/index.php?strOrgID=001003&strSection=aboutus&intContentID=498%00 ) 
51 Minburi District Office. Retrieved at: http://www.bangkok.go.th/minburi/. For an overview of the effect of development on 
agricultural livelihoods, see Sitheechoke, N. and Napompech, K. (2010). Impacts of Minburi District Development on the Turf Grass 
Businesses of Bangkok, Thailand. International Journal of Arts and Sciences, 3(13): 82-94. 




































123.9 1227.0 Mainly 
business and 
agriculture 
Southernmost of the 
four districts, with the 
lowest elevation.  
Located in the 
catchment area 
outside the King’s 












park: the Lat Kra 
Bang Industrial 
Park.  
Table 1: Profile of case study districts 
 
While the districts have many shared features, including the ongoing importance of agriculture to 
their local economies, there are also significant differences in terms of their size and demographics. 
These in turn are strongly determined by the specific environmental and developmental 
circumstances of each district. For instance, Minburi has experienced rapid residential development 
as transport links in the district have improved with the construction of Suvarnabhumi airport. This 
has helped accelerate its population density to 2,092 persons/km2, the highest of the four districts 
by some margin. The intrusion of residential and industrial  development has transformed the 
district’s agricultural landscape into an incohesive mix, with damaging side effects such as 
subsidence, drainage problems and disconnected ‘islands’ of land development53. The more outlying 
district of Nong Chok, on the other hand, retains a relatively low population density and its 













                                                           
52 Lat Krabang District Office. Retrieved at: 
http://203.155.220.239/subsite/index.php?strOrgID=001013&strSection=aboutus&intContentID=131%00 ) 
53 Sitheechoke, N. and Napompech, K. (2010). Impacts of Minburi District Development on the Turf Grass Businesses of Bangkok, 

















































Figure 3: Satellite Image of 2006 Flooded Area in the Chao Phraya River Basin
54 
As with other instances of flooding in Bangkok, the circumstances that led to the city’s inundation in 
2006 were both predictable and unique. Heavy precipitation, large volumes of runoff from the north 
of the country and significant sea level rises due to seasonal high tides were all contributing factors. 
In response, the floodwater was managed by allowing the agricultural land north of the city to flood 
and also channelling the water to the east of the city, where the case study districts in this report are 
located. The center of the city was protected by its embankments and drainage infrastructure, 
though large parts of the surroundings areas (in particular, the case study districts) were 
inundated55. 
 
2.1.1 Continuous Heavy Rainfall 
 In 2006, Thailand was affected by a number of tropical depressions between the months of August 
and October. These resulted in short periods of intense precipitation across Thailand during this 
period, on 27-31 August, 9-12 September and 18-23 September. The last, the ‘Xangsane’ typhoon, 
occurred on 1-3 October. As Figure 4 shows, the typhoon travelled through Southeast Asia towards 
the end of September, devastating large parts of the Philippines and Vietnam before reaching 






                                                           
54 GISTDA. Summary Report on Satellite Imagery of Flooding in 2006. Retrieved at: 
http://www.deqp.go.th/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11969%3A2006-10-24&catid=7%3A2010-02-04-06-14-
10&Itemid=43&lang=th      
55 ADB/JICA/World Bank (2010). Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities, p.25. Retrieved at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Resources/226300-1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf 
















































This triggered intense flash precipitation in Bangkok. Though overall rainfall in the BMA during 2006 
was not much lower than both the 30 year average and the total in the previous year (Figure 5), 
when no major flooding occurred, 24 hours of heavy localized rain caused the city to be inundated as 
its drainage system was unable to cope with rainfall exceeding 60mm/hour. Total cumulative rainfall 
in Bangkok came to 317.3mm in September and 336.8mm in October. By way of comparison, rainfall 













Figure 5: Total rainfall in the BMA, 2004-2006
58
 
This is reflected in the very high monthly rainfall in October 2006 (Figure 6). While the total rainfall in 
2006 (1,598.7mm) was only slightly larger than in 2010 (1,500mm), in October 2006 the rainfall 
came to 336.8mm compared to just 241mm for the same month in 2010. In fact, excluding October, 
the rainfall in the remaining 11 months is almost identical in both years. On the other hand, due to 
the typhoon, rainfall in October 2006 was 40% higher than the total in October 2010.  
 
 
                                                           
56 Thai Meteorological Department. Retrieved at: http://www.tmd.go.th/index.php 
57 Marome, W.A.(2011). Improving the Characterization of Impact Variables to Extreme Flood Events: A Case Study of the Flood 2006 in 
Bangkok. CARII: Building Adaptive Capacity for Managing Climate Change Risks in Coastal Cities. Retrieved at: 
http://start.org/download/car2/1-marome.pdf 












































Figure 6: Rainfall in Bangkok, October 2006 and October 2010
59 
 
2.2.2 High levels of runoff in the Chao Phraya River Basin 
A second contributing factor to the 2006 floods was the large volume of runoff from the Chao 
Phraya River Basin. While 30% of the rainfall is stored in dams and catchment basins, the remaining 
70% is released into the alluvial plain and passes through Bangkok in October-November. Typically 
runoff from the north of the country ranges between a minimum of 1,000-2,000m³/s and a 
maximum of 4,000-5,000 m³/s. The capacity of the Chao Phraya River, on the other hand, is 2,500-
3,000 m³/s60.  
 




















































































































































Sakae 8.7 32. 57. 49.2 72.3 252. 429. 137 40. 21. 15. 8.5 1124.
                                                           
59 Meteorological Department.  
60 http://dds.bangkok.go.th/News_dds/magazine/plan50/plan02.pdf 







































































Nakorn Sawan Dam 
(m³/s) 
Water volume, Chao Phraya 
Dam 
(m³/s) 
Water volume, Rama VI 
Dam 
(m³/s) 
May 1,364 1,357 80 
June 1,364 1,343 175 
July 1,332 1,365 277 
August 1,157 741 154 
September 3,092 2,426 333 
October 5,960 4,188 759 
November 3,228 3,183 254 
December 629 450 51 




The accumulated floodwater had also strained the capacity of its upstream catchment ponds and 
dams to the limit. By September 25, the storage of the Bhumipol, Sirikit and Pa Kan dams was already 
at 91.9%, 92.0% and 103.7% respectively, with a 3,112 m³/s rate of flow into the Chao Phraya River62, 
more than its maximum capacity. As Table 3 shows, the water flow through Nakorn Sawan, Chao 
Phraya and Rama IV dams rose sharply in September and peaked in October.  
 
2.2.3 Sea Level Rise  
A third factor in the 2006 flood was high sea levels. In October 25 and November 7, it peaked at 2.22 
MSL: the maximum capacity of Bangkok is only 2.5 MSL. This sea level also severely reduced 
Bangkok’s drainage capacity, thus exacerbating the effects of the runoff and heavy rain63. This 
worsened the effects of the heavy rainfall and large volumes of runoff. 
 
3. Impact assessment of the 2006 flood 
 
Estimating the full extent of the 2006 flooding and its impact requires a detailed and wide-ranging 
assessment of its effects. Even among these four case study districts, the proportion of inundated 
area and the accompanying damage varied considerably. Reflecting the mixed character of these 
districts, as formerly agricultural regions now undergoing rapid suburbanization, the damage 
extended to national infrastructure such as roads and rail lines, community buildings, businesses, 
                                                           
61 Department of Drainage and Sewage, BMA.  
62 Marome, W.A.(2011). Improving the Characterization of Impact Variables to Extreme Flood Events: A Case Study of the Flood 2006 in 
Bangkok. CARII: Building Adaptive Capacity for Managing Climate Change Risks in Coastal Cities. Retrieved at: 
http://start.org/download/car2/1-marome.pdf 




































fisheries and farms, along with other less tangible dimensions, such as mental health, that though 
significant are not always be readily measurable. 
 
Consequently, the full impacts of flooding and other natural disasters on communities is often 
difficult to capture. In fact, this is an important gap in much of the previous research in this field. 
However, to understand the true extent of the challenges that affected cities and districts face, it is 
vital to gauge their more ‘invisible’ dimensions alongside the immediate physical destruction. In 
particular, information on social vulnerability in a post-disaster context is frequently limited or 
elusive. Though these aspects are not so readily quantifiable as damaged infrastructure, for 
example, they nevertheless play a major role in determining post-disaster hardship and recovery at a 
community, household and individual level. 
 
 This study aims to highlight this gap and the urgent need for an adequate flood-assessment proxy 
that, by incorporating a variety of quantitative and qualitative measurements, creates a more 
comprehensive picture of the impacts of flooding on communities and individuals. The research 
involved two approaches. First, it reviews the available secondary data, such as damage profiles, 
relief subsidies and mental health assessments, and examines the current information shortfalls. 
Secondly, it present the findings of fieldwork undertaken in the case study districts, using semi-
structured interviews with residents to gain a better qualitative understanding of the 2006 flooding.  
 
3.1 Secondary data 
Table 4 outlines a detailed taxonomy of physical, economic, financial, technical, environmental and 
social flood-related impacts. These extend from tangible effects like property damage to less 
material considerations, such as psychosocial change: the associated costs are both direct (such as 
loss of life, damage to physical capital) and indirect (such as reduced consumption, conflicts). 
Together, these provide a template for a holistic disaster assessment.  
 
Physical Economic Financial Technical Environmental Social 
Stock Flow     























































Loss of assets 
Loss of 
livelihoods 







Table 4: Impacts of a natural disaster (Source: Patankar, A. 2009) 
 
 
However, the available data is very limited and often fails to present a meaningful picture of the 
impacts on the ground. In table 4, the areas where data is available for the 2006 flooding is 
highlighted, drawing on previous studies and assessments, some conducted in its immediate 
aftermath.  These are discussed in more detail below: 
 

































• Total inundated area  
• Damage to property and infrastructure  
• Loss of agricultural produce 
Environment 
• Water quality 






Unfortunately, in terms of official data there are clear information shortfalls, especially relating to 
social vulnerability: even the mental health profiling used in the psychological assessment and 
presented here was conducted informally by nurses working in flood-affected areas. In addition, 
much of the official data is collected by national agencies at a country-wide level, with no 
disaggregation of the effects at a local level. Yet gauging flood-related impacts on individual 
communities, rather than just the country as a whole, is critical to understanding their actual 
consequences for worst affected. This section is not only summarizes what data is available, but also 
highlights the substantial gaps, particularly regarding the social and local dimensions of the disaster. 
In future, if the quality and scope of data collection improves, it will then be possible to develop a 
stronger, more comprehensive proxy to assess flooding impacts in Bangkok.  
3.1.1 Physical effects 
 




Figure 7: Total inundated area in Klong Samwa, Minburi, Ladkrabang and Nong Jork districts  
 
                                                           


































Figure 7 shows the extent of inundation in the districts of Klong Samwa, Minburi, Ladkrabang and 
Nong Jork districts respectively. The total area is 334,331.9 rai, with  175,851 rai  (52.6%) flooded. 
However, the proportion varies substantially between districts, from 29.1% in Minburi to 70.7% in 
Minburi. 
 
Damage to property and infrastructure 
The physical impact of flooding on districts and communities is multi-faceted. To reflect this, the 
calculations in this report use a wide variety of measurements and proxies to estimate the cost of 
the flooding, including damage to property, damage to infrastructure, and loss of land, produce and 
livestock. These exert, in different ways, direct and indirect burdens on the government, local 
communities and individual residents.  
 
Table 5 gives an overview of the reported damage in each of the four case study districts on October 
5, just after the flooding. In particular, it gives an idea of the physical damage to communal 
infrastructure and the associated impacts this has on education, social life and mobility for residents.  
 
District Settlement Education Religious Transportation 
Nong Jork  13 schools 3 temples 
4 mosques 
22 roads 
Minburi 4 villages  1 mosque 4 roads 
Ladkrabang 30 communities 
6 villages 
12 schools 6 temples 
3 mosques 
12 roads 
Khlongsamwa 10 communities 
1 village 
2 schools 3 temples 11 roads 




Table 6 outlines the damage to Thailand’s transport infrastructure and the consequent costs of 
restoring its highways, roads, railways and waterways. These are national figures for the entire 
country, collected by the Ministry of Transport. In terms of direct costs, such as the repairs to the 
physical fabric, this is valid as the expense for this is shouldered by the central government rather 
than the local authorities. What these figures arguably do not capture is the indirect costs of 
infrastructure damage in flood-affected districts. While the government bears the bulk of the direct 
costs of repairing and reconstructing roads, waterways and rail lines, the potentially substantial 








                                                           
65 Government data. 
































Infrastructure Damage Costs 
Highways
66
 286 routes on 757 roads: 31 roads 
with no access.  
1,735 million baht ($58 
million): 1,650 million baht to 
rebuild damaged roads and 85 
million baht to restore 




 496 routes:  12 roads with no access. 
467.6km of roads and 1,337m of 
bridge to be rebuilt.  
102 pipe and 49 land erosion projects. 
1,257.7 million baht (around 
$42 million) 




496 routes requiring protection from 
erosion/deterioration. 12 roads with 
no access. 
226 million baht (around $7.5 
million) 
Table 6: Damage to national infrastructure and associated costs, Thailand (Ministry of Transport) 
 
Table 7 outlines the damage to Bangkok’s rice-growers, both its terms of land damage and crop 
losses. The total cost, exceeding 84 million baht, highlights the ongoing importance of agriculture in 
Bangkok, particularly in suburban and peripheral areas such as the case study districts. In the 
country as a whole, the costs ranged from as little as 0.6 million Baht in Ranong province to as much 
as 663 million Baht in Nakornsawan.  
 














km2 90.6  km2 27.2 km2 12,742.20 84.099 
Table 7: Damage to agricultural land and crops, Bangkok 
 
Table 8 outlines the compensation awarded to farmers for flood-related losses. While most goods 
such as livestock have remained at the same nominal levels and hence in real terms are actually 
lower in value in 2010 than in 2006, the subvention for rice fields has increased fivefold, from 414 to 
2098 baht/rai. The compensation measurements, however, reflect the same flaws that affect the 
narrow scope of conventional damage assessment: the scope is technical and confined to direct, 
readily quantifiable outputs. This approach may be beneficial for larger agro-industrial operations 
that can readily convert their losses into these terms. For smaller-scale, family-managed farms and 
fisheries, on the other hand, the indirect costs in terms of their long term livelihoods are more 
complex. These costs are not factored in to conventional compensation frameworks.  
 
                                                           
66 Figures collated from 53 provinces in Thailand, as of November 29, 2009.  


































Compensation (Baht) Compensation (Baht), 2006 Compensation (Baht), 2010 
Farm produce   
Rice 414/rai 2,098/rai 
Crops 579/rai 2,921/rai 
Others 786/rai 4,908/rai 
Livestock   
Chicken 27.5/each 27.5/each 
Layer chicken 20/each 20/each 
Duck 20/each 20/each 
Sheep/Goat 1,400/each 1,400/each 
Cow (6-24 months) 3,600-15,800/each 3,600-15,80/each 
Fishery   
Fish (pond/field) 3,406/rai 3,406 rai 
Fish (floating basket/cement 
pond) 
257/m2 257/m2 
Shrimp/Crab/Shellfish 9,098/rai 9,098/rai 
Table 8: Agricultural compensation by product, 2006 and 2011 
As table 9 shows, both the damage and subsidies were far greater in 2006, illustrating the 
substantial difference between the 2006 flood and the more ‘normal’ event of 2010. In Khlong 
Samwa, for instance, the total inundated area came to 14,254 rai, at a cost of 7.259 million Baht: in 
2010, the coverage was only 494 rai, at a cost of 1.269 million Baht.  
District 






 2006 2010 2006 2010 2006 2010 
Khlong Samwa 14,254 494 772 47 7.259 1.269 
Minburi 5,877 464 441 54 1.891 1.278 




32 4.377 0.987 
Nong Chok 16,817 1,010 672 52 7.090 2.129 
Table 9: Flood-related agricultural impacts and compensation, 2006 and 2010 
































3.1.2 Environmental effects 
Flooding can exert serious strain on local ecosystems, destroying habitats, degrading land quality 
and contaminating other essential natural resources. One of the main issues during the 2006 flood, 
was water pollution. Like other forms of environmental damage, the effects are often diverse and 
long-lasting. Official ‘costs’, such as government spending on basic rehabilitation, represent only a 









In Figure 8, pollution mapping of Thailand’s rivers shows that of the 5 main rivers, the two in the 
flood basin, the Chao Phraya and the Tahjeen, were both heavily contaminated. While the Tahjeen 
River was classified as ‘polluted to very polluted’ (with 2-4 mg oxygen/liter), the Chao Phraya was 
‘very polluted’ (<2 mg oxygen/liter). Water pollution in fact represents one of the indirect costs of 
flooding that affects, among other areas, agricultural fisheries. Hidden costs such as these are 
generally overlooked in flood damage assessments, and do not feature in compensation payments.  
 
3.1.3 Social effects 
The flood-related effects that are arguably the hardest to quantify are social. As a result, these tend 
to feature less in damage assessments than the physical costs in terms of infrastructure, crops and 
so on. Yet in reality, the social consequences for individuals and communities may represent a 
‘second disaster’, with long term implications for a city and its residents. Integrating social 
vulnerability appropriately into disaster assessments is an essential first step to addressing these 
effects – and a prerequisite for the meaningful recovery of communities struggling with the human 
cost of environmental catastrophe.  
 
Mental Health 
There is a striking absence of official data on the social impact of flooding on communities. The 
proxy used here, mental health, in fact draws on informal assessments conducted by nurses in flood-
affected areas. Figure 9 illustrates the result of these assessments of selected community members 
                                                           


































and their high levels of stress, trauma and disorientation. It also illustrates the causal link between 
the poor psychological state of the subjects and other related health issues.  
 
 
Figure 9: Psychological state of selected members of flood-affected communities, 2006 
 
However, the assessment also reported high levels of psychological recovery, in terms of resilience, 
adaptability and self-reliance, following a mental health rehabilitation program carried out by the 
researchers. These findings suggest positive directions for future post-disaster processes in Bangkok, 
with a strong emphasis on mental health as a significant element within a broader relief and recovery 
strategy. This should include not only the direct victims of flooding, but also ‘secondary’ victims such 
as their relatives and the volunteer workers. Again, this is also an important flood-related impact that 
is often overlooked.  
 
In summary, the long-term consequences of the disaster on communities are highly localized, social 
and psychological as well as technical and economic, and involve in addition to the direct costs of 
damaged goods and infrastructure a variety of ‘hidden’ indirect costs that are often not recognized 
in official assessments.  In this sense, the relative scarcity of available information highlights the 
need for more holistic and community-based approach to data collection. 
 
3.2 Fieldwork data 
The primary research was conducted in the four selected districts of Nong Jork, Minburi, Ladkrabang 
and Khlongsamwa, all located outside the King’s dyke in eastern Bangkok.  A total of 380 surveys 
were undertaken to assess flood-related impacts across four main sectors: 300 household samples, 
50 agricultural samples, 28 business samples and 2 industrial samples, namely the Bangchan and 
Ladkrabang industrial estates, the only ones in the study area.  
 
12 communities in total from the 4 districts were selected for the surveys. These were a mix of poor 
and middle-income communities (Table 10).  
 
 
































District Communities Income level 
Nong Jork Lampakchee and Lamtaoting Poor 
Minburi Jairanai, Garden Home and Buakaw Middle-income 
Ladkrabang Sudthawad and Leabklongmorn Poor 
Klongsamwa Teerawan and Baanpoon Middle-income 
Table 10: Sample communities in case study districts 
 
In order to gauge the true effects of the flooding, the researchers designed a series of proxies to 
better measure the impacts, direct and indirect, on livelihoods and the local economy (Table 11).  
 
Sector Proxies 
Household Flood level / Flood duration / Cost of physical damage / Work absence / 
Health (physical and mental) 
Agricultural Flood level / Flood duration / Cost of physical damage / Work absence / 
Product price 
Business Flood level / Flood duration / Cost of physical damage / Work absence /  
Stock / Custom and trade 
Industrial Flood prevention plan69 
Table 11: Proxies for gauging flooding effects, by sector 
 
HOUSEHOLD SECTOR 
Proxy variables Sub-proxies Total 
Loss Incurred Food and 
utilities 
Transportation Repairs Flood 
prevention 
 
 15,000 600 25,000 5,000 44,400 
Work absence Daily 
income 
Day (s) absent    
 300 3   900 
Health Medication     
 300    300 
     45,600 
                                                           
69 It was not possible to access information in this sector, either at the employer or factory worker level, and so the impact could not be measured. 
However, as most of the factory labor force resides close to the industrial estate, the information acquired through the household surveys was an acceptable 
substitute. In addition, the researchers were able to access information regarding the flood prevention plan of both industrial estates to analyze the gap in 




































Proxy Variables Sub-Proxies Total 
Loss Incurred Lost customers Stock 
damage 
Repairs Flood prevention  
 15,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 30,000 




   
 300 3   900 
     30,900 
 
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
Proxy Variables Sub-Proxies Total 
Loss Incurred Field damage Flood prevention  
 30,000 12,000 42,000 
Work Absence Daily income Day(s) absent  
 500 30 15,000 
   57,000 
Table 12: Proxy measurements for flood-related costs of flooding, by sector 
 
This provides a fuller picture of flood-related costs to individuals and the community. Table 12 above 
summarizes the average loss for each household, business and farm in the sample communities.  
While it includes repair costs to housing, vehicles and other equipment, it also extends to the 
intangible or indirect losses that result from illness, work absence or additional transport costs 
caused by flooding.  Revenue shortfalls or unpaid leave create an added burden that conventional 
measurements of costs and losses often fail to capture. As Table 12 shows, these indirect costs are 
substantial for households, businesses and agriculture. In the case of businesses, the indirect costs of 
lost customers, work absence and the ‘invisible’ cost of flood prevention in fact exceed the direct 
costs of repairs and physical damage.  
 
Table 13 is a detailed breakdown of the total costs, sorted by sector, month and district, of the 
flooding between August and November. For the sake of clarity, the effects on each sector and 
district is color coded according to its intensity, from ‘no impact’ (no color) to ‘high’ (blue), as the 
legend below the table explains. These measurements are used to assess the relative flooding levels, 
economic loss, physical damage, health effects and work absence resulting from the 2006 flood. 
Data is also presented for the less severe flood event of 2010 by way of comparison.   
 
The results highlight the importance of a localized analysis of the impacts of flooding, as both the 
intensity and the nature of its effects vary considerably from district to district. Of the four, Minburi 
































was the worst affected in 2006 and 2010. The impact was particularly pronounced in September and 
October, as residents suffered loss of livelihood as a result of economic disruption and health risks.  
 
Work absence is also an important indirect cost in the flooding. In Klongsamwa and Ladkrabang, the 
two most densely populated districts, some residents were unable to travel to work, especially in 
October when the inundation was at its peak. Ladkrabang in particular is a major agglomeration 
economy, with an industrial estate and the then recently constructed Suvarnabhumi Airport, opened 
in September just before the flooding hit. However, as table 14 shows, work attendance remained 
relatively unaffected through the flooding, suggesting a comparatively high level of adaptation. 
Nevertheless, within the agricultural sector work absence was a major problem as fields and land 
were inundated, in the worst cases potentially extending into weeks.  
 
 Interestingly, the impacts were comparable across different income levels.  In particular, the 
relatively low impact of work absence on poor and affluent households was in fact similar for the 
lowest income (<10,000 Baht/month) and the highest income (>50,000 baht/month) households. 
From these results, it would seem that low income households demonstrated a relatively high level 
of adaptation to the flooding. There are probably a number of dimensions to this: for example, the 
limited ability of low income households to shoulder the costs of work absence, especially when 
unlike higher income households they may not have the security of formally salaried employment. In 
this case, the adaptation strategies of low and high income households, however ‘successful’, are 
likely to be substantially different in nature.  
 
The survey also illustrated some interesting dimensions to flood preparedness at a household level. 
The results highlighted poor levels of preparedness in 2006: for instance, only 26% of households had 
stocked food and only 31% drinking water before the flood.  However, this proportion rose 
substantially for the 2010 flood (to 37% and 41% respectively), suggesting that many households had 
learnt important lessons from the previous event and prepared more effectively. And when 
respondents were asked whether in future they would be willing to stock up on food and water 
supplies before flooding, for both goods around 75% of households stated that they were willing to 
do so. This suggests that local communities have the capacity to develop better preparation 
strategies and that there is still further potential to improve on these responses. This is where a well-
coordinated strategic partnerships could be very effective.  
 
Health care costs, whether for minor pharmaceutical purchases or more serious referrals, are 
another important indirect cost that is often overlooked in damage assessments. These costs are 
often not insubstantial. In Nong Jork, where much of the area is farmland, parts of the district 
experienced protracted flooding, with some areas submerged in over a foot of water for more than a 
month. As a result, the generally low income population was faced with a variety of health issues, 



































Month Work Health Month Work Health
Level No. Loss Level No. Loss Level No. Loss Level No. Loss





Month Work Health Month Work Health






Month Work Health Month Work Health






Month Work Health Month Work Health





Household Impact (2006) Household Impact (2010)
Community Home Community Home
Household Impact (2006) Household Impact (2010)
Community Home Community Home
 Household Impact (2006)  Household Impact (2010)
Community Home Community Home
Home
Household Impact (2006) Household Impact (2010)
Community HomeCommunity
 
Table 13: Intensity of costs by month, district and sector, August-November 2006 and 2010 
 
2006 Flood 
10,000- 30,000- 10,000- 30,000-
30,000 50,000 30,000 50,000
 Flood Level 57.14% 54.07% 52.22% 63.16% 32.14% 41.48% 47.78% 42.11% 45.45% 66.67% 60.00% 68.75% 57.14%
No. of Days Flooded 62.50% 47.41% 52.00% 52.63% 57.14% 38.52% 44.44% 42.11% 78.79% 75.00% 80.00% 56.25% 57.14%
Loss Incurred 44.64% 43.70% 45.56% 31.58% 30.36% 28.15% 28.89% 36.84% 42.42% 50.00% 40.00% 43.75% 50.00%
Work Absence * * * * 80.36% 87.41% 85.33% 84.31% 90.91% 91.67% 80.00% 56.25% 42.86%
Health * * * * 66.07% 59.26% 74.44% 68.42% * * * * *
Production Price * * * * * * * * 75.76% 58.33% 100.00% * *
Stock * * * * * * * * * * * 31.25% *
Customer * * * * * * * * * * * 43.75% 64.29%
PROXY 
PARAMETERS
Household Sector (300HH) Agricultural Sector(50) Business Sector(30)
Community Home
<10,000 >50,000 <10,000 >50,000 Farm Livestock Fishery Consumer Goods Services
 
2010 Flood 
10,000- 30,000- 10,000- 30,000-
30,000 50,000 30,000 50,000
 Flood Level 39.29% 31.85% 39.00% 42.11% 32.14% 31.11% 31.00% 36.84% 51.52% 50.00% 60.00% 56.25% 50.00%
No. of Days Flooded 32.14% 30.37% 31.00% 31.58% 32.14% 34.07% 34.00% 31.58% 72.73% 58.33% 60.00% 43.75% 42.86%
Loss Incurred 42.86% 41.48% 41.00% 36.84% 33.83% 35.56% 36.00% 31.58% 39.39% 58.33% 40.00% 31.25% 35.71%
Work Absence * * * * 87.50% 85.93% 85.56% 89.47% 81.82% 75.00% 60.00% 56.25% 50.00%
Health * * * * 66.07% 65.93% 67.78% 52.63% * * * * *
Production Price * * * * * * * * 90.91% 66.67% 60.00% * *
Stock * * * * * * * * * * * 18.75% *
Customer * * * * * * * * * * * 50.00% 78.57%
PROXY 
PARAMETERS
Household Sector (300HH) Agricultural Sector(50) Business Sector(30)
Community
<10,000 >50,000 <10,000 >50,000 Farm Livestock Fishery Consumer Goods Services
Home
 
Table 14: Intensity of flood impact by sector and income level, 2006 and 2010 
 
Flood Level No.of flood days Loss Incurred Work Absence Health
High 30 cm > month >10,000 > week Admission
Medium 15 cm 1-4 week 5,000-10,000 3-5 days District Officer
Low 5 cm < week <5,000 1-2 days Store Purchases
No Impact No impact No impact No impact No impact No impact  
Key to Tables 13 and 14 
































Another important finding from the survey is that that the costs of the flooding, through lost income 
and damaged infrastructure, is generally more severe for the community as a whole than individual 
households. This suggests a different perspective on the effects of flooding and the value of viewing 
its impacts at a community level: the conventional measurements used in official data, besides 
national aggregations, is typically the unit of the individual household. If the impacts at a community 
level are more severe, as these results suggest, then this would reinforce the importance of collective 
adaptation and mitigation strategies at a community level. Currently, preparedness in the event of 
extreme flooding is generally undertaken privately by individual households, with government 
encouragement focusing on self-reliance and personal initiative. But to minimize the very substantial 
community-wide costs of the flooding, there needs to be a platform for collective action.  
 
The results also show that within the agricultural sector, farmland  was the worst affected by flooding 
in both 2006 and 2010, with levels in excess of a foot lasting over a month. Therefore, from one 
perspective, farmland is arguably the most vulnerable to flooding.  Nevertheless, it is important to 
note that fisheries were the most affected by the increasing cost of production in 2006. The 
government therefore must factor these different effects into its assessments and compensation 
strategies to reflect the varying costs to different agricultural sectors.  
 
As for small businesses, the impact is less straightforward and depends in particular on the product 
of the enterprise. In this case, the sub-proxies that sort the findings by occupation and business type 
are instructive. For instance, while the service sector was weakened by flood-related disruption, 
demand for basic consumer goods actually rose among residents who were more reliant on local 
shops to provide them with food and other provisions. Again, these nuances potentially have 
important implications for how post-disaster economic recovery strategies should be targeted.    
 
Together, the data on the impacts of the flooding in terms of health, work absence and other costs, 
direct and indirect, highlight the limitations of the dominant approach to flood protection in 
Thailand: as largely a matter of water management. This is reflected in its institutional governance 
and the strongly technical responses to flood-related threats, as discussed in section 4. Yet in reality, 
flood events impact on education, health, social welfare, community cohesion and other areas that 
present strategies, with their emphasis on megaprojects and structural investments, generally fail to 
reach.  
 
4. Adaptation responses  
 
4.1 Current adaptation measures  
Bangkok has long been supported by the historic network of khlong and the polder system, 
supported by the King’s Dyke, that protect the inner city (see section 1.2.2). Nevertheless, as this 
study has shown, large areas of suburban Bangkok were inundated in 2006 and at a substantial 
social and economic cost to local communities. This highlighted the need for further protective 
capacity and so, as with the 1983 and 1995 floods, further measures were proposed in its wake, 
including the creation of a diversion canal at the upper Ta Chin river to channel some of the water 
away from the Chao Phraya70. The strategic focus since then - for example the Royal Irrigation 
Department (RID) master plan - has been primarily infrastructural, with an emphasis on creating and 
enhancing drainage and pumping71. In partnership with the Department of Drainage and Sewage, 
                                                           
70 Vongvisessomjai, S. (2007). Flood Mitigation Master Plan for Chao Phraya Delta. Paper presented at the 4th INWEPF Steering 
Meeting and Symposium. Retrieved at: http://web.rid.go.th/ffd/papers/Paper-Session%201/p1-
04%20Flood%20Mitigation%20Master%20Plan.pdf 



































the RID developed a 450 km2 protected area in the eastern suburbs beyond the King’s Dike, 
supported by a system of monitors and flood walls along the main canals to restrict inflows of 
floodwater from nearby. Three pumping stations have been constructed at Hok Wah Sai Lang, Saen 
Saeb and Pravetburirom to provide the system with an additional CMS of drainage capacity72.  
 
Despite the substantial investment in flood protection in the last three decades, the city’s flood 
management system may prove inadequate in the years to come. Already, during the 2011 flooding, 
it was reported that the system was struggling to cope with the massive volumes of runoff flowing in 
from the north: according to former officials, the infrastructure had been primarily developed to 
cope with localized flooding from heavy rainfall73. In addition, the King’s Dyke is designed to cope 
with low level flooding, as opposed to a major flood event74. In the future, with the effects of climate 
change, land subsidence and other factors, the existing and planned dykes and drainage may not 
even be able to protect flood-vulnerable areas such as the western parts of Bangkok against more 
than a 1-in-10-year flooding event75. While Bangkok has a strong potential adaptive capacity, it may 
nevertheless find that it fails to keep pace with the increasing threat and exposure brought about by 
climate change and rapid population growth76. 
 
 
STRUCTURAL MEASURES NON-STRUCTURAL MEASURES 
Water management Land use control Loss reduction 
Main pump Land regulations  
Polder embankments Public information/education  
Dykes Flood proofing  
   Retention area (basin)  
Canal improvement Flood forecasting/ warning 
Drainage (inner pumps, sub-khlong, 
pipes) 
 Flood fighting 




                                                           
72 Department of Drainage and Sewage, BMA (2009). Flood Protection in Bangkok. Paper revised from Vitoonpanyakij, C. (2007). 
Flood protection in BMA 2006. 
Bangkok Post, ‘Drainage system not up to task’. October 30, 2011. Retrieved at: Flood Protection in Bangkok. Paper revised from 
Vitoonpanyakij, C. (2007). Flood protection in BMA 2006.http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/263836/drainage-system-not-
up-to-task73 Bangkok Post, ‘Drainage system not up to task’. October 30, 2011. Retrieved at: 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/263836/drainage-system-not-up-to-task 
74 IRIN, ‘How to build a flood-resilient city’. November 28, 2011. Retrieved at: 
http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=94319 
75 World Bank (2009). Climate Change Impact and Adaptation Study for Bangkok Metropolitan Region, p.xii. Retrieved at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTHAILAND/Resources/333200-1177475763598/3714275-1234408023295/5826366-
1248255995902/executive-summary.pdf 
76 Yusuf, A. and Francisco, H. (2009). Climate Change Vulnerability Mapping for Southeast Asia. Economy and Environment Program 
for Southeast Asia.  
77 Department of Drainage and Sewage. Retrieved at: http://www.rid.go.th/thaicid/_5_article/2550/chanchai.swf 
































Whether Bangkok proves itself capable of developing comprehensive and holistic responses to 
climate change and other environmental threats will be of critical importance to the city’s future. In 
part, any long term solution will probably require additional, well-targeted investment in physical 
infrastructure. The World Bank has already proposed a range of future investments to enhance the 
capital’s pumping and drainage capacity78. However, it will need to be accompanied by a broader 
legislative, regulatory and planning framework to address the multidimensional character of flood-
related threats. Much of Bangkok’s strategy to date has been characterized by structural and 
preventive measures, in particular ‘megaprojects’, with an emphasis on mitigation. As Table 15 
shows, structural measures are primarily about the technical aspects of water management, 
supported by the physical hardware of dykes, embankments, drainage tunnels and so on. But there 
are also important non-structural approaches that should be implemented, with a focus more on 
regulating land use and reducing exposure, such as planning regulations and community education. 
To support the city’s adaptation to the reality of climate change in the decades ahead, Bangkok must 
afford a much greater priority to these measures. Some non-structural measures are already in place. 
For example, the Flood Control Center is an information and decision making tool, with a flood 
forecasting system that predicts rainfall intensity across 650 km2 of the east bank.  The focus is still 
fundamentally on short term mitigation, however: the timeframe is generally 3-6 hours ahead of the 
flooding79. Furthermore, though the coverage within the central part of the city is extensive, there 
are also striking gaps, as figure 10 shows: there are no centers located in the eastern suburbs, for 
example, in the case study districts.  
 
 
Figure 10: Flood control centers, Bangkok 
 
While there has also been some emphasis on other non-structural measures, particularly in outlying 
urban areas such as the district in this case study, this arguably reflects expediency rather than a 
commitment to adaptation: much of Bangkok’s existing infrastructure is devoted to protecting its 
inner centre, while the suburbs of the city are largely unprotected. This has been a major source of 
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 In eastern Bangkok, where the case study communities are located, pumping capacity to channel floodwater into the Tha Chin River and 
the Gulf of Thailand is still inadequate, according to the study: it suggested expanding pumping capacity from 737 to 1,065 m³/s and so 
raising the total capacity of the canals from 607 to 1,580 m³/sec. In the western area of the city, the three major pumping stations at Khlong 
Phasi Charoeng, Sanam Chai, and Khun Rat Phinit Chai currently have a combined capacity of only  84 m³/s. Other approaches, already 
proposed by the BMA, include a coastal erosion protection strategy and embankments along the shoreline of the eastern area of the Chao 
Phraya River to protect the industrial community area from rising sea levels. The study estimated that for1m1-in-30 year flood in an A1F1 





found that the funding necessary to protect Bangkok from a 1-in-30- year or 1-in-100-year flood event was 35 billion or 49 billion baht 
respectively, and concluded that in both cases the investment would be economically feasible.  ADB/JICA/World Bank (2010). Climate Risks 




































tension during flood events, such as in 2011, when the capital’s protective infrastructure failed to 
protect large swaths of the city’s suburbs from inundation. In fact, by blockading the flow of the 
floodwater from entering the city, this ‘flood protection’ was regarded by some flood-affected 
residents as an aggravation.  In Khlong Sam Wa, for instance, there were standoffs between locals 
and the police over community demands that the sluice gate there be opened to relieve flooding in 
the area80, with residents subsequently breaking a hole in it81.  
 
To date, the emphasis has been weighted too heavily on mitigation and short term prevention, 
generally through structural means. The BMA’s strategies focus primarily on three approaches: 
 
• Flooding prevention: this is achieved through both structural and non-structural measures. 
While the former is typically employed in dense, inner city districts, the latter is often favored in 
low density residential and agricultural areas. This potentially suggests that in suburban areas, 
such as the case study districts, full prevention may not be achievable, but the negative effects 
of inundation can be substantially reduced through effective adaptation measures.   
 
• Post-flood disaster recovery: focused on immediate mitigation through operating and 
maintaining pumping and drainage capacity, as well as developing a short term action plan. In 
2006, this included the installation of additional pumps in high risk areas, the release of surplus 
water into irrigation areas and upstream water retention.  
 
• Medium-term post-flood disaster recovery: maintaining existing infrastructure and constructing 
additional capacity to sustain and enhance protective capacity, accompanied by measures to 
prevent and resolve flooding. Careful coordination, monitoring and evaluation is necessary to 
achieve this.  
 
The weaknesses of this approach are clear, especially in the context of chronic land subsidence and a 
rapidly changing climate. What is needed instead is a meaningful strategy of long term adaptation 
that would prepare Bangkok for the possibility of ‘safe failure’. This would mean that, in the event of 
the partial or total failure of its protective infrastructure against a future flood, the capital would be 
sufficiently adapted to recover quickly and without catastrophic consequences. This is a far securer 
approach than relying solely on infrastructure for protection, while doing little to improve the city’s 
adaptive capacity. If Bangkok’s history of flooding has demonstrated anything, it is that even well-
developed infrastructure is not infallible.  
 
There have, in fact, been urgent calls along these lines for many years. After the 2006 flooding, for 
instance, there were proposals to develop a broader developmental vision for the capital that would 
minimize its exposure to future flooding. Additional flood protection was planned and budgeted at a 
national and city level until 2014, along with a long-term land use plan up to 2057 with designated 
development nodes and protected zones for environmental drainage82. In practice, though, the 
effectiveness of these measures has been weak. For decades, what regulation has been put in place 
has frequently been sabotaged, ignored or circumvented. One example, back in 1992, is the BMA’s 
belated planning restrictions in the eastern floodplain, with detailed zoning for landfills and housing.  
Had these regulations been observed, it is likely the eastern area of Bangkok would have retained 
                                                           
80 Bangkok Post. Khlong Samwa still tense. October 31, 2011. Retrieved at: 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/breakingnews/264082/khlong-samwa-still-tense 
81 Bangkok Post. Khlong Samwa sluice gate ‘fixed’. November 2, 2011. Retrieved at: 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/breakingnews/264440/khlong-samwa-sluice-gate-fixed 
82 ADB/JICA/World Bank (2010). Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities, pp.25-26. Retrieved at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/Resources/226300-1287600424406/coastal_megacities_fullreport.pdf 
































more of its natural capacity as a floodway, and the destruction inflicted by the 2006 flooding in the 
case study districts would have been substantially lower.  Yet in practice, the code was widely 
ignored83. Bangkok also has a system of ‘green diagonal’ zoning in areas of Khlong Samwa,Minburi, 
Ladkrabang and Nong Chok, where the construction of most property types is prohibited and limited 
to single houses on a plot of 1,000 wah.  Regulations also impose a minimum of 100 wah for houses 
in certain areas to the west of the city. This is intended to benefit farmers and provide them with the 
land they need for cultivation. However, through a legal loophole the regulations have been 
exploited to facilitate the construction of luxury housing in areas such as Thonburi, in western 
Bangkok84.  
 
In the wake of the 2011 flooding, the city is now proposing to introduce designated floodway zones 
in the eastern and western suburbs of Bangkok, protected by development restrictions, in its 
forthcoming 2012 city plan85. Whether this time the regulations are properly imposed remains to be 
seen and will depend in no small part on the city’s ability to resolve the ongoing issues of fragmented 
governance and poor cooperation described in sections 4.2 and 4.3.  
 
 4.2 Flood governance and strategic frameworks 
By their very nature, flooding and other environmental disasters are multidimensional in their 
devastation: their solutions must therefore be multidimensional too. Rising sea levels, for example, 
will necessitate improved neighborhood dykes and drainage, as well as a well-managed coastal 
retreat strategy and substantial infrastructure to protect harbors.  Similarly, the growing frequency 
of extreme weather events will require a holistic range of responses that encompasses prevention, 
mitigation, adaption and short term relief and involves a variety of stakeholders, from central 
government and the local authorities to communities and the private sector. Measures should 
include flood-proofed buildings and better drainage, but also extend to related areas such as energy 
diversification. As for coping with the immediate aftermath of a natural disaster, preparation should 
be both ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’: effective emergency planning by the relevant public bodies 
should be balanced, at a household level, with measures like an emergency stock of provisions to 
ensure a period of self-sufficiency if supplies are disrupted by a major flood event86. 
 
This approach requires a holistic and highly integrated collaboration between different departments 
and administrations. In practice, however, Bangkok’s flood governance is a major obstacle to 
effective action. Historically, Thailand’s institutional authority has suffered from fragmentation by 
multiple agencies with autonomous, overlapping or conflictual mandates.  Tensions and 
contradictions, often highly politicized, also exist between central and local governing bodies. This 
pattern is evident is in Bangkok’s flood adaption policies. The lack of cooperation and integration 
between these various bodies has in fact been identified as one of the main obstacles to future flood 
management in the basin87.  The barriers are typically: 
 
                                                           
83 Bangkok Post, ‘Heeding his majesty’s advice’. December 1, 2011. Retrieved at: 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/feature/environment/268709/heeding-his-majesty-s-advice 
84 Bangkok Post. Lessons learned for city planning. December 12, 2011. Retrieved at: 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/business/economics/270348/lessons-learned-for-city-planning 
85 Bangkok Post, ‘Floodways key to keeping capital safe’. November 20, 2011. Retrieved at: 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/267040/ 
86 Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Green Leaf Foundation and United Nations Environment Programme (2009). Bangkok 
Assessment Report on Climate Change 2009. Bangkok: BMA, GLF and UNEP 



































• Specialist/institutional: reflecting designated technical expertise or even ingrained special 
interests.  
 
• Local/central: reflecting conflicting or overlapping responsibilities.  
  
• Geographic: reflecting the absence of a substantive coordinating authority within greater 
Bangkok.  
 
Figure 11 summarizes the different central and municipal government bodies responsible in various 
ways for flood prevention/relief and post-disaster recovery. What is immediately clear is the 
divergent roles and mandates that each organization has, with specific institutional remits to 
prevent, alleviate and resolve flood-related issues such as pollution, road maintenance, mental 
health and environmental degradation. In fact, a variety of sector-specific agencies are operating 
within the broad remit of flood management, including the Electricity Generating Authority of 
Thailand (EGAT), the Royal Irrigation Department (RIG) and the Public Works Department (PWD)88.  
The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives is responsible for agricultural water management and 
flood protection for a large number of urban centers. The Ministry of the Interior, on the other hand, 
deals with disaster preparedness and prevention at a local level. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Environment develops climate change adaptation research, and the Ministry on 
Science and Technology plans future water management strategies for the country89. Flood 
protection within the Chao Phraya Basin is also fragmented by central and local administrative 
mandates.  There are administrative bodies with localized governance remits, such as the Local 
Administration Department (LAD) and the BMA within Bangkok90, as well as city-level specialist units 
such as the Department of Drainage and Sewage and the Flood Control Center, both responsible for 
different aspects of flood prevention in Bangkok91. As a result, flood protection strategies may 
involve a wide array of different actors with separate mandates92.  
 
 
But while this might at first appear as positive evidence of a multidimensional and integrated 
disaster prevention approach, due to Thailand’s institutional divisions the overall effect is not 
cooperative and holistic. For instance, the confused institutional structure means that there is often 
little clarity among stakeholders over which agencies are overseeing various aspects of flood 
protection: respondents in the surveys undertaken for this report demonstrated a range of divergent 
opinions on which department was primarily responsible, suggesting poor linkages between public 
authorities and communities. Furthermore, in important ways, the BMA has only limited control 
over its own flood protection strategy.  Firstly, in terms of financing, there is the BMA’s requirement 
to secure funding for its flood protection through grant subsidies from the national government, 
rather than locally controlled levies. Secondly, in terms of governance, it has no formal influence 
over flood-related issues outside its geographic remit, such as water management strategies 
                                                           
88 Sapphaisal, C. (2007). Planning and Flood Mitigation for the Chao Phraya River Basin. Retrieved at: 
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89 Stockholm Environment Institute. Scoping Assessment on Climate Change Adaptation: Thailand. Retrieved at: 
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flood protection areas in the eastern suburbs by RID and DDS. Department of Drainage and Sewage, BMA (2009). Flood Protection in 
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upstream, particularly the release or retention of runoff in the country’s major dams.  While flooding 
in the city may be significantly affected by these issues, they are generally formulated by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, with no official platform for the BMA to advise or influence 
its decision making. Thirdly, the authority of the BMA is also limited in other ways, in relation to 
other local bodies. While Bangkok itself has extended far beyond its original boundaries and now 
encompasses the surrounding 5 provinces, this is not reflected in a single executive agency: the BMR 
still comprises multiple autonomous authorities with only limited shared cooperation. This means 
that the BMA has little or no say over many decisions that in practice impact heavily on Bangkok city. 
For instance, while the BMA has imposed regulation on natural floodways in areas of Bangkok 
province, including the eastern suburbs, it has only been able to impose these controls within its 
own geographical remit, not throughout the BMR. Therefore it had no control over the construction 
of Suvarnabhumi airport within the neighboring province of Samut Prakan, even though the 
development in the heart of the eastern floodplain had a predictable impact on the drainage 




Figure 11: Governance framework for disaster prevention and emergency relief 
 
What is also striking is the strong institutional emphasis on short term solutions, as figure 12 shows: 
the priority focus areas of the different agencies within the management framework are reactive 
and immediate. Though the Department of City Planning and the Department of Drainage and 
Sewage have some medium term vision, there is no substantive overarching policy framework to 
develop a long term strategy. Furthermore, strategy is constrained significantly by the four-year 
terms that govern political office at both the city and national levels. The substance of government 
policy and action plans are structured to a considerable degree around these cycles, while long term 
strategic frameworks remain largely conceptual.  
 
                                                           




































Figure 12: Governance framework for post-disaster recovery 
 
These two issues - weak institutional  integration, and short term priorities - are particularly evident 
in Bangkok’s climate change policies.  Officially, climate change has been acknowledged by the 
government as a national threat since the Seventh National Economic and Social Development Plan 
(1992-1996)94. But to effectively alleviate the effects of climate change requires, as the BMA has 
acknowledged, the involvement of a wide variety of sectors including public health, building 
regulations, renewable energy generation, disaster monitoring, disease surveillance, community 
engagement, water services, transportation and recycling95. However, though there has been some 
degree of integrated strategic development at a national level, and even recognition among 
different agencies (including bodies within the BMA) of the need for greater institutional cohesion, 
this has not translated into a comprehensive and integrated policy approach.   For instance, while 
the Bangkok 5-Year Action Plan for Climate Change acknowledged the need for cross-sectoral 
cooperation, it largely overlooked the critical issue of vulnerability reduction96. The World Bank also 
found that, while a number of municipal bodies within the BMR had developed future strategic 
frameworks, climate change considerations had not been factored into their projections97.  
 
Developing an adequate long term response to flooding will require an integrated and multi-
disciplinary policy framework, coordinated to ensure coherence but flexible enough to 
accommodate localized strategies. However, this will be difficult to achieve without substantive 
institutional reform.  
 
                                                           
94 Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Green Leaf Foundation and United Nations Environment Programme (2009). Bangkok 
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4.3 Private sector and local community participation 
In the context of climate change and other environmental threats, Bangkok will need to develop a 
longer term, cross-sectoral vision that engages the participation of diverse stakeholders and 
maintains a local as well as a national   strategic focus. Yet to do so will require a substantial 
realignment of the government’s approach in favor of a more open and collaborative relationship 
with other stakeholders, particularly the private sectors and local communities. These efforts, at 
present partial at best, could galvanize a more coherent and cooperative adaptation response.    
 
4.3.1 Private sector  
When tackling climate change, government authorities must make efforts to collaborate more 
effectively with the private sector. Businesses and industry themselves have a vested interest in 
improving flood protection systems, given their exposure: for instance, the cost of the 2011 flooding 
to the manufacturing sector alone has been put at $32 billion98.  
 
Since 2006, the BMA has undertaken some initiatives to promote partnerships along these lines, 
such as the 2007 BMA Declaration of Cooperation on Alleviating Global Warming Problems, with 36 
private and public sector signatories99. More recently, in the wake of the 2011 floods, a coalition of 
state and private sector bodies was up to help prevent future disasters100. The government has also 
suggested that it will offer ‘soft loans’ to industrial operators to invest in flood protection 
infrastructure101. This shows at least positive recognition of the need for better cooperation, even if 
the long term effectiveness of this commitment has yet to be determined.  
 
The Bang Chan Industrial Estate, in the case study district of Min Buri, is an interesting example of a 
private sector approach to flooding. This was the first large industrial estate to be constructed and as 
a result is relatively central, located within a low-lying section of Minburi that is inside the King’s 
Dyke. Since 2006, it has taken substantive steps to develop an independent flood protection 
strategy. This has a number of elements, including: 
 
• Strengthening protection through more sandbags. 
• Maintaining drainage systems to ensure effective floodwater dispersal. 
• Continuously evacuating excess water. 
• Ongoing monitoring of water levels. 
• An emergency response team to prepare and respond to flood threats.  
 
Among the structural measures the industrial estate has taken is the development of a detailed map 
of the water channels into and out of the Lorlae and Sanaab canals (Figure 13).  
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Figure 13: Water channels into and out of the Lorlae (top) and Samsaab (bottom) canals, Bang Chan 
 
A network of sluice gates and drainage stations has also been installed, as shown in figure 14, to 




Figure 14: Sluice gate (red cross) and drainage station (circled area) network, Bang Chan 
 
However, while these responses suggest a growing sense of initiative, the strategy is compromised 
by two fundamental weaknesses. Firstly, the focus is still on flood prevention through heavy 
structural investment, with little in the way of actual adaptation. Secondly, there was no meaningful 
































participation of the local communities. Yet the canals around the estate are a public and the water 
management decisions of a large industrial estate such as Bang Chan has potentially serious 
implications for surrounding communities, particularly during flooding. A collective response, 
therefore, involving local stakeholders and with a substantive adaptation component, would have 
been more appropriate. Community participation, as discussed in the next section, should be a 
central component in public sector as well as private sector flood management strategies.  
 
4.3.2 Local communities 
It is also essential that the government develops a more collaborative relationship with local flood-
vulnerable communities. Engaging communities in the design and delivery of flood-related strategies 
not only raises the probability of effective uptake and implementations, but also enhances their 
quality by allowing local knowledge and experience to inform the response.  
 
There have been some tentative efforts. For example, in 2008 the BMA implemented a ‘canal water 
quality improvement’ campaign to raise awareness of the importance of canal environments, with 
the participation of local canal-side communities102. Still, there is still a widespread lack of sustained 
and substantive cooperation between different bodies and institutions. This is due in large part to 
the absence of a clear platform or institutional structure to facilitate cooperation, both among 
individual communities and also between them and other sectors, in particular public authorities. 
This was particularly clear, as mentioned in section 4.2, when participants in the research surveys 
conducted for this report were asked to name which agency, in their opinion, was responsible for 
various aspects of flood prevention and protection. The range of responses suggests that linkages 
between the relevant authorities and local residents were not well-developed or clearly defined.  
 
As part of its study, the research team for this report conducted community workshop103 in 
December 2011 with the aim of developing a clearer picture of flood-related challenges and 
responses during the 2011 flooding  in 3 communities (Buakaw, Wangtongpattana and Jaroenchai) in 
the area. The overall objective was to outline possible collective adaptation strategies for these 
communities in the future. To maximize the benefits of the meeting, participants were invited from a 
range of stakeholder groups.  Around 20 participants were in attendance, including a hydrology 
expert from the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment, the team researchers, urban 
development experts, a workshop facilitator, 3 community leaders and other local residents. 
 
As a result of the discussions, a clear picture emerged of the physical and social/communal problems 
experienced in the area as a result of the flooding:  
 
Physical problems 
• Water stagnation – particularly in low-lying areas and in older communities where the more 
recent surrounding communities were located on higher ground.  
• Mobility and transport issues – some roads were impassable as a result of flooding.  
• Waste – uncollected garbage and waste was a potential pollutant  health hazard.   
• Ineffective drainage – blockages occurred in the drainage systems and canals, reducing local 
drainage capacity.  
 
                                                           
102 Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Green Leaf Foundation and United Nations Environment Programme (2009). Bangkok 
Assessment Report on Climate Change 2009. Bangkok: BMA, GLF and UNEP 
103 The community workshop was conducted in the Buakaw center on the morning of December 25, 2011, between 1030 and 1200. 
Around 20 participants were in attendance, including a hydrology expert from the Ministry of Natural Resources and the 




































• Lack of collaboration – communities did not cooperate effectively with neighboring communities. 
• Slow official response – there were some delays in district-level responses  
• Health threats - both physical (through dengue fever and polluted water) and mental (through 
stress and trauma) 
• The absence of a community-level advance warning system – insufficient information provided to 
communities regarding the intensity and timing of flooding.  
 
Drawing on these insights, the participants together developed the outline of a possible strategic 
framework to promote a more effective collective response to water management and future 
flooding adaptation:  
 
• Greater cooperation between communities – this could be facilitated through the use of 
community surveys and the creative of a collective drainage channel by clearing the surrounding 
canals to allow water on Buakaw Road, the main route between the 3 communities, to drain into 
the Bung Kwang or Sansaab canals.  
• Plan and indentify the primary access points and transport routes – in the event of future 
flooding, the participants determined that the 2 main routes would be  accessed through 174 
Ramkhamhang road and the Thanakorn community as these are at the highest elevation.  
• An expanded flood prevention system - plan for a larger inundation zone for the water flow 
through the Bung Kwang canal 
• Drainage maintenance - canals and drainage systems should be cleared regularly by district 
authorities and other related organizations.  
• Water pump installation – a water pump should be permanently installed in the area to drain 
floodwater into the Bung Kwang canal 
• Community flood warning system - develop several flood markers in the area as reference points 
for community residents to gauge flood levels and prepare after official warnings.  
• Pre-disaster waste management plan – remove household waste regularly from the flood-prone 
areas to prevent water pollution and treat household waste with a sanitary tank. As the 
communities were built before the Estate Act, when no regulations existed requiring a communal 
sanitary tank, a local sanitary tank should be installed south of the community near the Bung 
Kwang canal.  
 
The research team is also preparing a flood prevention map for the communities, informed by these 
findings. This workshop, bringing together local knowledge and professional expertise on an open 
platform to facilitate productive knowledge-sharing, serves as a potential blueprint for mainstream 
approaches. By engaging with the community, public officials would develop a better understanding 
of specific localized flood-related impacts and also be able to harness their involvement productively 
in a collective adaptation framework. As the concluding section of this report highlights, this should 
be a central component of Bangkok’s flood adaptation in the future.  
 
5. Conclusion: Mainstreaming adaptation into long-term planning  
 
This study highlights the very real threats that Bangkok will face in the future as climate change and 
other environmental hazards exert increasing stress on the fabric of the city. Yet at the same time, 
alongside these authoritative projections, the recent past should also serve as a vivid reminder of 
the city’s vulnerability. In this study, the 2010 flooding was used as a baseline comparator to assess 
how much progress, if any, the city had made in protecting itself from inundation. Unfortunately, 
however, as the fieldwork for this report was concluding the city was presented with an even more 
extreme flood event. 2011, it transpired, was one of the worst years in the capital’s history as much 
































of Bangkok was submerged beneath floodwater. According to the Federation of Thai Industries, the 
cost to the seven hardest hit industrial estates could reach $13 billion, involving 891 factories and a 
total of 460,000 workers104.  
 
While there is not room in this study to examine the various causes of the flooding in detail, it is 
worth noting a number of elements that highlight the persistence of many key issues. Firstly, the 
official response to the flooding was sharply criticized for its lack of institutional coordination, the 
divisive relationships between different agencies and the strong degree of politicization that 
accompanied relief efforts. While some institutional reforms have been made since 2006, the overall 
challenges of fragmented governance were still apparent. A recent seminar on the flood highlighted 
the absence of an integrated and inclusive management approach to flooding disasters, and the role 
this played in amplifying its destructive impact105. Secondly, the spatial limitations of the city’s 
structural fortifications were also evident. In today’s context, when Bangkok is a sprawling 
metropolis with much of its population and industry concentrated in the suburbs outside its core, 
the strong focus on securing the city centre does little to alleviate the suffering of hundreds of 
thousands of the city’s residents. In fact, as the frequent assaults by flood-affected communities on 
barriers and dams showed, the protection of inner Bangkok was sometimes regarded as coming at 
the expense of other neighborhoods that were forced to suffer deeper and more prolonged bouts of 
flooding as a result106. Thirdly, the primary response in the wake of the flooding has been on 
maintaining and extending the city’s physical infrastructure. In January 2012, it was even rumored in 
the media that a number of experts in the country’s water management committee were 
considering resigning over the government’s plans to invest hundreds of billions of baht in additional 
infrastructure - measures that they believed would not be spent effectively nor resolve the country’s 
long term challenges107. Finally, though, commentators diagnosed the same pressing need for a 
more considered and effective approach to city planning and land regulation108.  
 
What is clear is that, if Bangkok fails to adapt successfully in the future, flood disasters could become 
a regular and recurrent problem for large areas of the city. The costs will not only be the substantial 
direct effects of damaged housing and lost livelihoods, but also the longer term implications for 
Bangkok as a national centre and regional hub. In the wake of the 2011 flooding, some 
parliamentary lawmakers have even proposed that the capital be moved to the higher land elevation 
of Nakhon Nayok109. While Bangkok has successfully overcome the challenges of its natural setting in 
the past, as its economic and demographic vitality testifies, it needs to develop a sustained and 
meaningful strategic response to a future of climate change and environmental instability if its 
strength as a global city is to be maintained.  It is not clear that infrastructure alone will be able to 
provide residents of suburban areas like the districts in this case study protection from future 
flooding. As noted earlier in this report, it was clear during the 2011 flooding that some local 
                                                           
104 IRIN, ‘How to build a flood-resilient city’. November 28, 2011. Retrieved at: 
http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=94319 
105 The Nation. ‘Give all parties a say in managing water: Panel’. January 3, 2012. Retrieved at: 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/Give-all-parties-a-say-in-managing-water-Panel-30173056.html 
106 For example, see Loy, I. ‘Why a Bangkok neighbourhood flood barrier was torn down’. Public Radio International, The World. 
November 7, 2011. Retrieved at: http://www.theworld.org/2011/11/why-a-bangkok-neighborhood-flood-barrier-was-torn-down/ 
107 The Nation. Experts threaten walkout on flood prevention schemes, source claims. January 10, 2012. Retrieved at: 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/Experts-threaten-walkout-on-flood-prevention-schem-30173458.html 
108 Bangkok Post. Lessons learned for city planning. December 12, 2011. Retrieved at: 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/business/economics/270348/lessons-learned-for-city-planning 



































communities considered that the infrastructure protecting inner Bangkok was making their own 
situation worse.  
 
Firstly, flood protection measures must develop a long term planning vision. Too much effort is 
expended on reactive measures once flood events have already occurred, with limited preparation 
for or anticipation of projected future trends. Furthermore, strategic directions are often only 
partially or inconsistently implemented, as with development restrictions in the eastern parts of 
Bangkok where the case study districts are located. For outlying areas such as these, far from the city 
centre and in many cases located in flood-prone territory, the protection afforded by infrastructure 
will only go so far. Adaptation to the realities of climate change and environmental instability, for 
example through well-designed land use regulations and rigorous forecasting, will be essential for 
the city to achieve a ‘safe failure’ when a future flooding event exceeds the capacity of the city’s 
defenses. In the wake of the 2011 floods, it has been announced that parts of Khlong Sam Wa, 
Minburi, Nong Chok and Lat Krabang will be designated as flood zones in the draft Bangkok 
development plan, published in 2012. Future housing developments will be denser, vertical 
condominium-style complexes alongside designated water drainage routes where construction will 
not be permitted. Western areas of Bangkok will also be preserved for drainage, with largely 
agricultural land and high rise housing alongside the electric train routes. 
 
Secondly, this approach must be underpinned by a strategy of collective adaptation. One of the key 
findings of this study was that the damage caused by the 2006 flooding was typically higher at a 
community level than for the average household. This suggests that a platform for meaningful 
communal cooperation, drawing on the middle ground between highly centralized public 
interventions and the ‘privatized’ approach of household preparedness and self-reliance, would be 
extremely valuable.  
 
Going beyond internal communal collaboration, there needs to be a broader vision of meaningful 
stakeholder participation between communities, government and the private sector. The data from 
this research shows the substantial direct and indirect costs that businesses incur as a result of the 
flooding. At present, the interaction between them and the government is primarily defined by 
compensations and subsidies. Yet given their substantial interest in developing a more secure and 
adaptive flood response, the government could engage them in partnerships to help strengthen 
preparedness - for example, by developing adequate protective infrastructure for vulnerable 
industrial estates that, unlike the measures adopted at Bang Chan, extend beyond mitigation to 
adaptation and involve other relevant stakeholders such as local communities.  Through substantive 
communication and outreach, the government could also ensure a more harmonious post-disaster 
response in flood-hit communities (for instance, by educating them about the necessity of protective 
barriers that may worsen flooding in their districts and compensating them appropriately for the 
added cost these may impose). The findings from the surveys in this study showed that, though 
preparedness at a household level had been relatively poor in 2006, responses had improved 
considerably by 2010 and interviewees expressed a strong willingness to do so. But government-
community partnerships should be a two-way process and be conducted in a spirit of genuine 
partnership. In this sense, the community workshop conducted by the researchers of this study in 
December 2011 with community members and a government expert should be considered as a 
blueprint for a more participatory approach.  
 
Fourthly, flood protection strategies must consider not only the technical and economic implications 
of flooding, but also the social and human dimensions. Flooding has been widely regarded in the 
past as a water management issue, rather than a complex phenomenon that impacts on livelihoods, 
urban development and other fields. Yet as the study findings show, the risks of flooding are not 
only environmental, but socioeconomic. In particular, the research highlighted the substantial 
































indirect costs, in terms of medical care and livelihoods, for households and communities. Flood 
prevention therefore requires an integrated approach that spans health, waste management and 
the dynamics of agglomeration economies. It cannot be successfully achieved through engineering 
alone. The reason why many megaprojects fail is because they seek to ‘solve’ purely technical 
problems while largely overlooking the important social realities that play a major determining role 
in the resilience and vulnerability of flood-prone areas.  
 
Fifthly, to be effective, adaptation strategies must be supported by adequate and multidimensional 
data. As the review of the available secondary data section on the flooding showed (section 3.1), 
previous risk assessments have been hampered by information shortfalls, ranging from a lack of 
baseline climate data to the marginalization of non-technical considerations such as socioeconomic 
vulnerability, water security and health profiles. The research for this study highlights the 
importance of localized data, with a focus on the specific impacts on districts and communities, to 
identify the worst affected areas. Furthermore, it shows how the size and nature of flood-related 
impacts varies by occupation, income group and business type. Replicating this fine-grained 
approach to data collection and analysis in future, with a focus on the holistic and local impacts, 
would help develop a clearer picture of flooding effects on the ground - leading in turn to better 
responses.   
 
Finally, to help achieve all of the above, the dysfunctional nature of the city’s flood management 
must be addressed through national and municipal governance reform. This should resolve a broad 
range of ongoing challenges, including poor institutional coordination, deficient city planning, 
funding constraints, poverty-related vulnerability and building code development. These in turn will 
require better cohesion between national and municipal bodies, stronger cooperation between BMA 
and neighboring provinces of the BMR, and a supervisory platform or executive body to integrate 
the competing interests of different agencies into an overarching strategic framework. A nuanced 
flood protection strategy will also necessarily require a site-specific perspective and potentially the 
decentralization of some authority to districts and communities. Responses should also be holistic, 
partnering different disciplines and agencies to create cross-sectoral responses to the complex 
problems of flooding and other environmental disasters.  
 
By integrating these approaches into an informed and collaborative strategy that recognizes the 
effects of flooding on not only the physical fabric of the city but also its citizens and communities, 
Bangkok may be better placed in the future  to face the very real threats of climate change and 
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Part I  
 
Introduction 
The Philippines ranks third in the world in terms of being at risk to climate change-related risks and 
disasters. Over the years, the number and scale of natural disasters have increased and its effects 
intensified by the lack of preparedness among the affected communities and most of all, on the part 
the government, non-government, and private sectors to respond pro-actively. 
 
In early July 2008, the World Bank estimated that the Philippines loses P15 billion annually110 to 
disasters like typhoons and floods. This amount represents about 0.7 percent of the gross national 
product (GNP). In October 2009, Typhoons Ondoy (Ketsana) and Pepeng (Parma)111 caused a total of 
Php 3.8 billion in damages and Php 24.8 billion in immediate losses to agriculture, fisheries, and 
forestry sector. Immediate reconstruction costs were estimated to be about US$ 4.42 billion or 
almost 3 percent of the national GDP for the next three years (Joint Assessment of Typhoons Ondoy 
and Pepeng, World Bank, 2009).  
 
The Philippines gets an average of 20 typhoons annually. In 2009, Metro Manila weathered 10 
strong typhoons bringing about heavy rainfall and floods to the metropolis.  In 2011, damages of 
typhoons Pedring and Quiel were estimated to amount to Php 15 billion. Meanwhile, as this report is 
being written, tropical storm (later upgraded into typhoon) Sendong (international name, Washi) 
brought heavy rainfall and flash floods to Northern Mindanao and Eastern Visayas in southern 
Philippines killing over a thousand people, higher than those lost/killed during the Ondoy and 
Pepeng in 2009. This is the worst climate-related disaster in the last decade to have hit the 
Philippines.  Initial estimates of damages to property and agriculture is estimated to reach P1.03 
billion; although not as high as that of Ondoy and Pepeng, the loss of lives, physical injury and 
displacement is much higher (1, 572 deaths, 1,079 missing, 1, 792 injured, and 102, 899 families 
displaced).  Initial assessments showed that unpreparedness on the part of the affected 
communities and the government agencies/officials in charged of disaster risk reduction was a major 
factor in raising the damages and costs of the disaster. This study, hopefully, will contribute to the 
making of a culture of preparedness, adaptation and resilience among us, Filipinos, and to other 
similar groups at risk to the effects of climate change. A partial list of deadly typhoons/storms in 
2011 showed damages to property, agriculture and fisheries to have reached more than P20 billion 
(see Appendix A). Thus, investments on disaster and climate risk vulnerability assessment are crucial 
to minimize losses from these calamities (Porio 2011).  
 
The Study, Data Collection, and Structure of the report 
With funding support from the Asia Pacific Network for Global Change Research (APN) and 
coordinated by the Somaiya Institute of Management Studies and Research, Mumbai (along with the 
other research partner in Bangkok, Thammasat University)112, this report is based on a study 
                                                           
110 But this amount seem to be an underestimate as seen in the partial list of 2011 storms/typhoons and 
related damages in the appendix. 
111 Hereinafter these events will just be referred to by their local names, Ondoy and Pepeng. 
112 Coordinated by Dr. Archana Patankar of the Somaiya Institute of Management Studies and Research, 
Mumbai and Dr. Anand Patwardhan of the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Mumbai and collaborated 
by Dr. Ann Marome Wijitbusaba of the Asian Institute of Technology fro the Bangkok Case Study and Dr. 


































conducted from April 2011-December 2011 in Metro Manila, particularly in the Pasig-Marikina flood 
basin, with special focus on the cities of Marikina and Pasig. These cities suffered extreme flooding 
brought about by the tropical storm, Ondoy in late September 2009 and Pepeng in early October 
2009.  
 
In this study, the impacts and responses to Ondoy in these cities were compared to another flooding 
event in 2011, the heavy rains and floods brought by Pedring and Quiel in September 2011 and early 
October 2011. Until tropical storm Sendong hit northen Mindanao and Eastern Visayas in December 
2011, these were considered the worst to have brought extreme flooding to the national capital.  
 
Part I of the report provides an introduction to the political and economic context of Metro Manila 
and its relationship to the climate change-related events and processes. Part II presents the findings 
regarding flood vulnerability and impacts/responses in the cities of Marikina and Pasig, a major flood 
basin of Metro Manila (see figures 1-9 below). Part III outlines the prospect of mainstreaming 
climate vulnerability assessments/profiles into long-term urban development policies and programs. 
 
This study focuses on the institutional measures adapted at city/local government, community and 
household levels in response to the extreme flooding of Ondoy (Ketsana) in 2009. The overall aim of 
the study is to enhance climate change adaptation by integrating climate risk into long-term 
development plans and disaster risk management. 
 
Methodology/Data sources 
The study utilized three major data sources, namely, 1) secondary data sources, 2) key informant 
interviews, 3) household and commercial surveys, and 4) focus group discussions (FGDs).  A main 
secondary source utilized here to complement the current APN survey is the 2008 climate change 
household survey conducted by the author in the three flood plains of Metro Manila. 
This study interviewed 200 households113, sampled from those severely flooded communities in the 
extreme flooding of Ondoy in late September and Pepeng in early October 2009 located in the flood 
basin of the Pasig-Marikina River Basin, one of the three flood basins of Metro Manila (see map 
below). The other two flood basins are located in the cities of Kaloocan, Malabon, Navotas, and 
Valenzuela (KAMANAVA) and in the city of Taguig and the municipality of Pateros known as the West 
Mangahan area. These areas often experience flooding coming from the nearby riverine systems and 
the regular tidal/storm surges (see figure 1 below). To obtain the losses/damages and responses at 
the commercial-industrial level, the study conducted a survey of 100 commercial-industrial units or 
50 in each of the cities. 
The above data sources were supplemented with key informant interviews and FGDs among local 
and national officials, civil society leaders, influential private sector leaders, and community 
leaders/residents. Overall, the study assessed the vulnerability of Metro Manila residents and 
commercial-industrial establishments to extreme flooding in 2009 (Ondoy and Pepeng), their 
adaptive responses and potentials for mainstreaming these adaptations to urban planning, 
governance, and to medium/long-term development.  
                                                           
113 Originally, the study planned to interview 300 households obtained through systematic sampling with 
a random start but had to reduce this to 200 because the people were tired of being interviewed about 
the effects and their responses to Ondoy. In the same manner, 100 owners/managers of commercial and 
industrial units were expected to be interviewed in both cities but in the end we were able to process 87 
interview protocols because 13 respondents had several call backs that eventually we dropped them out 
of the sample.  
































1. Metro Manila: Demographics, Urban Development, Environment and Socio-Economic 
Characteristics 
In third world cities like Metro Manila where urban growth and sprawl remains largely unregulated, 
the vulnerability of populations, especially marginal sectors, to climate change-related effects like 
floods is quite high, reducing their potential for adaptation and resilience.  
Metro Manila or the National Capital Region (NCR) has a land area of 636 square kilometers in semi-
alluvial plain formed by the sediment flows from the Meycauayan and Malabon-Tullahan river basins 
in the North, the Pasig-Marikina river basin in the East (Bankoff 2003), and the West of Mangahan 
river basin. These river systems used to be actively used as transport gateways to the central district 
of Manila until heavy siltation and the land-based transport rendered this system ineffective (see 
maps below).  
The NCR is composed of a coastal margin with a reclaimed area in Manila Bay, the central plateau, 
and the Marikina Valley. The city is open to Manila Bay on the west and connects to a large lake, 
Laguna de Bay, on the southeast. Thus, “the metropolitan area is a vast drainage basin that 
experiences frequent inundations from overflowing rivers and storm waters that render the existing 
system of esteros (modified natural channels) and canals constructed during the Spanish and 
American colonial periods inadequate” (Liongson 2000 cited in Bankoff 2003). Manila and the 
surrounding cities are prone to flooding alongside Marikina Valley and along the coast of Laguna de 
Bay. The effects of climate change on these river systems are highlighted by sea level rise (SLR) and 
increases in monsoon rains, typhoons, and floods. Traversing the north-south direction of the 
metropolis are several fault lines:  1) Marikina Valley Fault, 2) Philippine Fault, 3) Lubang Fault, 4) 
Manila Trench, and the 5) Casiguran Fault. This environmental context interacts in complex ways 
with the patterns of human activities in the metropolis, giving rise to patterns of survival strategies 
among the residents and institutional and regulatory responses of the local government units and 
the national government agencies in charged of disaster risk reduction and management policies 
and programs (Porio 2011).  
With Metro Manila as the center of political, economic, and socio-cultural activities of the nation, its 
vulnerability to climate changes becomes heightened. Its strategic location by Manila Bay and the 
mouth of the Pasig River accounts for the growth of the capital city. Being near a river and a good 
harbor made possible the development and expansion of the city of Manila to its suburbs in the last 
30 years. With large in-migration and rapid population growth, the city expanded to the suburbs, 
surrounding municipalities, and to risky areas for habitation (e.g., swampy areas, near or above 
esteros or water canals, along the river or earthquake fault lines, etc.). In response to this rapid 
population growth, urban infrastructural development continued though not as well as expected for 
a burgeoning population. This is seen in increased investments in housing, basic services (water, 
sewerage, electricity), and infrastructure (roads, bridges, flyover, etc.). While large public and private 
investments try to operate within existing regulatory frameworks, the ability of government 
agencies to impose building and infrastructure standards is quite weak. Meanwhile, the growth and 
expansion of informal settlements have gone largely unregulated. Thus, in Metro Manila, many 
buildings and infrastructure are built on dangerous and risky areas (e.g., near the seashore or flood 
zone, unstable ground and prone to landslides, etc.), without permits (Porio 2011).   
Socio-economic forces like land use, infrastructural development, building practices, urban 
development policies and programs have greatly shaped the settlement patterns of the city. The lack 
of effective interaction among these forces had resulted in a built environment that poses high risks 
to residents and infrastructure alike. Rapid urbanization, population growth, and the weak 
infrastructural and economic bases of the metropolis have heightened its vulnerability to the effects 
of climate change. Metro Manila’s population expanded from 5.93 million in 1980 to 7.95 million in 


































Statistics Office (NSO) reported that Metro Manila has 12 million residents but the average daytime 
population is about 16 million (see Figure 1 below). In 2000, the population density in the metropolis 
was 15, 617 persons per square kilometer but is projected to increase to 29, 146 in 2020. These 
forces have dramatically increased the demand for goods and services as well as the waste 
generation in the metropolis. Since this trend shows no signs of abating, the impacts of climate 
change on the vulnerable populations of the metropolis will definitely be heightened in the coming 
years (Porio 2010).   
 
 
Figure 2. Population Trends of Metro Manila (1970-2020) 
 
 



















Source: Corpuz, A. (2010) Continuous increase in population and density
 
































Adding more vulnerability is the large portion of the population in the metropolis that does not have 
security of tenure in their housing, jobs, and livelihood sources. The 2008 Philippine Asset Reform 
Report Card estimated that only 61 percent of households in Metro Manila have sufficient access to 
basic services. Most informal settlements (mostly urban poor) do not have adequate access to the 
water and sewerage nor electrical services. Of the national housing backlog of 4 million households 
(or about 24 million people), about 6 million is accounted by Metro Manila alone. The Philippine 
Human Development Report of 2010 estimated the Philippines to have a poverty incidence of 32 
percent. With high poverty incidence and  population density and the shortage of proper services, 
Metro Manila has become very vulnerable to storms, typhoons and floods in recent years (Bankoff 
2003).   
Metro Manila’s primacy and the lack of rural development have lead to large number poor and 
lowly-skilled migrants looking for work in the city. Because the economy expanded in services and 
light export-oriented (e.g., electronics, assembly work) industries, majority of the migrants are 
young, single, and female. This female-dominated migration stream feeds on the migration of 
Filipino women overseas, who in turn, get absorbed in the services sector of their places of 
destination. Locally, most of these migrants get absorbed by the informal economy where entry is 
easy because the skills demand is not high but the remuneration levels and job security in this sector 
are low (Porio 2011).  
1.1 Environmental and social characteristics 
The 2008 survey of flood-prone households (Porio 2011) showed that these vulnerable communities 
are located near in low-lying areas, mostly wetlands/swamp lands, around the following river system 
and its tributaries (Pasig-Marikina River, Napindan River in West Mangahan, and the Malabon and 
Tullahan Rivers in the KAMANAVA areas) which are connected to the sea through Manila Bay and to 
the lake system of Laguna de Bay. Aside from their being flood prone, these areas also suffer the 
effects of heavy monsoon rains, typhoons, and the regular tidal surges. Most of the surveyed 
households belong to informal or slum/squatter settlements, with no security of tenure in their 
housing and no adequate access to basic services like water, electricity, sewerage and drainage 
systems. The households in these communities regularly suffer the risks from floods, water surges 
during storms and high tides, in addition to sickness of household members and from lack of 
community security (e.g., incidence of drug abuse, theft and other petty crimes). 
 
1.2 Climate change, environmental, and social risks 
The social and physical location of these flood-prone communities make them vulnerable to storm 
surges and floods from typhoons and heavy monsoon rains from June to November, the traditional 
rainy season for Metro Manila. The Pasig-Marikina flood basin is prone to flash floods from the 
Sierra Madre mountains while the KAMANAVA flood basin is particularly susceptible throughout the 
year to the effects of sea level rise (SLR) and tidal storms or surges. During the last few years, the 
residents also reported changes in the climate patterns marked by increases in water levels during 
tidal/storm surges as seen in the water marks left of their house posts.  These pose additional risks 
to their household appliances, garments, and higher losses in their work days. 
 
1.3 Economic risk and social vulnerability 
The 2008 climate change survey also showed that while respondents recognized the risks of floods 
and storm/tidal surges to their homes and communities, economic problems were their over-riding 
concern. This was followed by security-related risks like thefts/hold-up, fire, and drug abuse in their 
neighborhoods. These security-related issues are closely linked to the physical congestion and 
economic insecurities (i.e., high unemployment/underemployment) of their communities/families. 
Given these socio-economic risks, their vulnerability to the effects of typhoons, floods, and sea level 



































In turn, these household level risks and vulnerabilities also increase with the expansion of 
residential, commercial, and industrial development in their immediate localities and cities. This 
could be observed in the rapid expansion of construction projects around the Mangahan River Basin, 
which do not have the necessary infrastructure support like proper drainage, sewerage, and road 
systems. The consequent flooding become intense as the areas near the Napindan Channel and 
Laguna de Bay are not really suitable for habitation nor for commercial-industrial use as these are 
mostly wetlands. Meanwhile, these have not deterred building activities in these areas because 
developers just fill up the marshy areas and raise the building height of ground floors. 
One major source of risk in these flood-prone areas is the continuous building of temporary 
structures in already congested, informal settlements alongside formal residential subdivisions 
located in/near danger zones of the community. Respondents reported that land filling activities of 
middle/upper-class real estate development have increased the flooding and environmental damage 
as traditional waterways have disappeared with these activities. Substandard sewerage and road 
systems have also worsened the living conditions of the urban poor informally settled around these 
areas.  Informal housing built against dike walls, along creeks, rivers, tributaries, and swampy areas 
abound in this part of the metropolis. Slum lords, taking advantage of the expanding rental markets 
and the lack of regulation by local officials, also contribute to the risks faced by those residing in 
nearby factories of Pasig City, Taguig City, and the fish port in Navotas City. Heightening the risk 
exposure of these households are inadequate services like water, electricity, health and substandard 
roads, drainage, and sewage systems (Porio 2011).   
 
 
Figure 1: Map of the Flood Prone Areas of Metro Manila River Basins (yellow circles). Source: JICA 
Research Institute and Porio (2009) 








































Figure 2: Map of Metro Manila Showing Flooded Areas in 10, 30, 100 Year Floods. 
Source: JICA Research Institute (2009). 
The following sections show the geographical characteristics of the specific study sites, namely, 
Marikina City and Pasig City. As the following topographical and flood maps will show, the two cities 
are very vulnerable to flooding because they are located in the heart of the Pasig-Marikina flood 
basin, just below the Marikina watershed nestled in the Sierra Madre Mountain Range and the 
Montalban hills. Nearby is also the La Mesa Dam and watershed. So, during the Ondoy floods in 
2009, the cities of Marikina and Pasig, literally became a depository basin for the volume of water 
from the heavy rains (180mm) equivalent to 1 month rainfall. Moreover, the West Valley fault also 









































Figure 4: Marikina-Pasig River Basin. Source: Marikina City Disaster Risk Reduction Management 
(DRRM) Office and the Metro Manila Earthquake Impact Reduction Study (MEIRS 2004) 





































Soil  Erosion 21,336 32
Flooding 16,692 25
Not Affected 17,267 26




Upper Marikina 54,412 81





Upper Marikina 499 77





E.C. Godilano, Ph.D.  
Figure 5: Marikina Watershed and  Marikina-Pasig River System Source: Metro Manila Earthquake 
Impact Reduction Study (MEIRS 2004) 
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Figure 8: Earthquake Fault Lines (East-West Valley) Transecting Metro Manila Source: Metro Manila 
Earthquake Impact Reduction Study (MEIRS 2004) 
 
 
































Residential Building Damage Risk
















Figure 9: Projected Residential Building Damage Due to Earthquake,  Source: MEIRS Study (2004) 
 
1.4 Other Complicating Forces 
Other factors like earthquakes could intensify the damage impact of extreme floods like that of 
Ondoy. The MEIR Study (2004) projected that the impact scenario for Metro Manila in 7.2 magnitude 
earthquake from the West Valley Fault (located along the cities of Pasig and Marikina, see figures 8-9 
above) could damage: 
• ~40 percent of the residential buildings (175,000-heavily damaged; 345,000-partly damaged) 
• ~38 percent of the 10-20 story buildings 
• ~14 percent of the 30-60 story buildings 
• ~28-35 percent of the public buildings (8-10 % -heavily damaged; 20-25%-partly damaged) 
• Estimated 33,500 deaths and 114,000 injuries 
• Additional deaths from fires 
The above projected earthquake damage impact could make extreme flood events like those of 




































Typhoon Pedring brings heavy rains and flooded Roxas Boulevard in Manila (Photo by Rem Zamora 
for abs-cbnNEWS.com) 
1.5 Topography of Metro Manila and Climate Change Vulnerability of Populations  
The topography and geological characteristics of Metro Manila and its inherent vulnerability to 
strong winds and floods were revealed during the height of the typhoon Pedring in late September 
2011. Its susceptibility to the storm surges and strong winds pummeling on Manila Bay makes its 
foundation quick to be saturated with water making it weak. Rough winds caused a section of the 
breakwater to collapse, and blew Manila Bay's waters past the seawall and onto Roxas Boulevard. 
For the first in history, the public saw the main thoroughfare, the United States Embassy, Sofitel in 
the CCP Compound, restaurants along the Bay flooded. The waters even reached the Baseco 
Compound, a 14 hectare property owned by Manila Port Authority, and informally settled by 6,000 
urban poor families. 
According to the head of the of the Department of Science and Technology, the following factors 
lead to the collapse of the Manila Bay Seawall (along Roxas Boulevard), namely, 1) heavy monsoon 
rains continuous for four days, 2) strong storm surge 3) high tide, 4) soft soil and subsidence, 5) 
strong rough winds. 
The climate authority suggested stronger compliance (enforcing stricter building and zoning codes, 
evacuation of people once the storms and surges hit the bay, etc.) to safer engineering solutions. 
1.6 Socio-economic and demographic characteristics of “at risk” population in Manila’ 
major flood basins 
The following description is mainly based on the 2008 household survey conducted in the three 
flood basins of Metro Manila, namely, 1) Pasig-Marikina, 2) West Mangahan, and KAMANAVA Area 
(see figure 1 above). Based on the survey, the respondents were mostly female (86 percent) as they 
were the ones available/open to be interviewed, compared to the unwilling male members of the 
household. Their ages ranged from 18-92 years old, with a median age of 42 years old. They were 
mostly legally married (61 percent), or were in live-in/cohabitation arrangements (20 percent), while 
the rest were widowed, separated or single (18 percent). Their mean household income was P10,033 
































per month but their median monthly household income was P8,000, suggesting some disparity 
among the respondents. Of the communities surveyed, West Navotas and San Joaquin in Pasig and 
Ibayo Tipaz in Taguig City had the lowest monthly median incomes of P8,000 while Longos in 
Malabon City and Bangkulasi in Navotas City (KAMANAVA Basin) with P23,250 and P18,000, 
respectively, had higher median income levels. Most of the very poor households (old, 
widowed/separated, no income and dependent on the relatives’ food support), also came from 
these low income communities. These urban poor settlements remain very vulnerable because of 
dilapidated housing structures and absence of services and drainage systems in their water-logged 
environments. Most respondents had 8.5 years in schooling and only respondents from Malabon 
attained some college education (11.20 years). Their low education and income, in part, explain their 




2. Impacts and Adaptation Responses to the 2009 Ondoy Extreme Flooding 
 
2.1 Description of the APN Study Population in Metro Manila  
 
2.1.1 Socio-economic characteristics 
Most of the respondents from the 10 sample communities came from households (HH) with average 
size of 5.5 members (5 for Marikina City and 6 for Pasig City). Most of them  had an average number 
of 3 children, except in the upper-class communities of Industrial Valley Complex in Marikina City 
and in Sta. Lucia, Pasig City where households had an average of 2 children. In terms, of male-female 
ratio of HH members, Pasig City had an equal ratio but Marikina had more females (3) than males (2) 
in their households. Moreover, their average ratio of earning members to dependent HH members 
was one (1) for three (3) members or 66 percent dependency. Almost a quarter (22 percent) had 
elementary education, 53 percent with high school education, and 26 percent had college education. 
But all respondents, on the average, had 10 years of schooling. 
 
2.1.2 Housing characteristics and community socio-eco strata 
The materials that their homes were made of seem to reflect the socio-economic stratification of the 
people in these cities. Twenty-nine percent had houses made of second hand or scrap materials, 
while 63 percent had houses made of GI sheets, lumber and cement for flooring, and 8 percent had 
GI sheets for roofing and tiles or cement for their flooring. These households seem to represent the 
low-income, lower middle to upper middle, and upper class strata, respectively. This is supported by 
the income and occupational profiles. About 30 percent were retired or 
unemployed/underemployed, while slightly over a third (34 percent) of them were professionals and 
skilled workers, and 35 percent into trading/marketing activities or overseas workers. Their average 
schooling is 10 years or high school graduate while their median income is P16,000/month (average 
mean income: PP42,000). The average income here of respondents is double that of the poverty 
income threshold of Metro Manila which is P9,000/month for a family of five. 
At the time of the floods, most (74 percent) of their housing structures were single-storey and only a 
few (26 percent) were made of two storeys or more. The floor areas of their homes averaged from 
50-80 sq. meters. Most (68 percent) of these buildings and housing structures, however, were 
constructed within the last 10-20 years while 22 percent were 30 years older or more. On the whole, 
most of them (83 percent) owned their dwellings while the remaining sample population were either 
renters or living rent-free in their dwelling and home lot. According to the owners, they hardly 



































Based on the structures of their homes and the housing materials used by the respondents in Pasig 
City, their capacity to adapt to floods and other climate change-related effects do not seem to be 
well-developed. In this city, more than half of the homes (56 percent) were single detached, 
consisting of one floor only and made of not very strong materials. But the residents of Marikina 
City, however, seem to fare better because about half of their homes had two floors or more. But in 
general, most (80 percent) of them do not regularly maintain their homes; they only do occasional 
repairs when needed. Thus, the culture of safety and preparedness is not at all present among the 
residents, despite the fact that they already experienced a major deluge (“delubyo” the local term 
for extreme flooding, akin to the biblical floods during Noah’s time) during the 2009 Ondoy floods. A 
bit of an exception is the one-third of Marikina City who had either raised their floors or have added 
a second or third floor to their homes after the Ondoy floods. In part, this is because these 
households have the capacity to make these improvements or adjustments to the extreme flood 
events. 
That at the time of the survey, there were more housing structures in Marikina City which were 
made of more than one storey could be the effect of post-Ondoy rehabilitation efforts. After the 
Ondoy’s devastation, the Marikina local government encouraged residents to leave the ground floor 
open so waters could freely flow through their homes and make the 2nd and other floors for 
habitation. In fact, the re-drafted building code of the city that is now being deliberated for approval 
by the city legislative council requires that all new construction must leave the ground floor open for 
waters to pass and the second floor for habitation (for elaboration see later section on institutional 
responses to floods). 
The above socio-economic patterns become more meaningful when considered within the larger 
context of Metro Manila’s vulnerable poor. According to the Asian Development Bank (2009), over 
35 percent of Metro Manila’s population lives in informal settlements, suffer from “insecure land 
tenure, lack adequate health and educational facilities, and (are) unable to access capital, credit or 
social safety nets. They are further exposed to makeshift housing, unsafe water, poor sanitation, 
crime, fire and sudden flooding”. 
2.1.3 Major problems encountered during flooding 
Most of the respondents identified the following major problems that they encountered: 1) shortage 
of transport, fuel, food and water supplies, 2) disruption of electricity, water distribution, and 
communication services 3) garbage/mud pollution, 4) sickness, 5) rise in price of commodities, 6) 
damage to their housing structures, and 7) children unable to go to school while their parents also 
could not report for work. In the latter case, some schools in Marikina City and Pasig City were 
closed for almost a month during the Ondoy floods in September-October 2009 because either these 
were used as evacuation centers or were heavily damaged. Most factories in the flooded areas also 
closed and/or relocated to other places outside the city after the 2009 floods, resulting in enormous 
loss of work for the residents. 
 
2.2 Specific Impacts of Flooding: Damages to Home/Property, Losses and Absences from 
School and Work 
Majority (90 percent in Marikina City; 71 percent in Pasig City) asserted that that they suffered 
highly from the Ondoy floods in 2009. But in 2011 only a few (1-4 percent) of them were highly 
affected by Pedring and Quiel floods in 2011 (see photo above in page 14). Perhaps, this is in part 
because the rains in 2011 were not so heavy and occurred in a span of 2-3 days compared to 180mm 
rainfall (equivalent to 1 month rainfall) in six (6) hours during Ondoy.   
































Pasig City Flood Maps
SEPT. 26, 2009
Typhoon ONDOY 
First Hit early morning 5 am to 8 am
2nd Hit morning 9 am onwards
Flooded Areas
Water Level:
RED – 2 feet up
BLUE – 2 feet below70 percent flooded
FLASHFLOOD along major and minor streets. 
Houses near the river (Santolan) water level 
reaching 20 feet above with strong current. 
 
 
2.2.1 Damage/repair to housing structures 
On the average, the flood waters in their homes reached an average of 20 ft., while in some it 
reached the maximum height 30 ft. in 2009. But of the two cities, Marikina had suffered more with 
75 percent of their dwelling structures fully or partially damaged while only 35 percent of Pasig had 
suffered the same.  
 
2.2.2 Major repairs and reconstruction 
Most (81 percent) of their major repairs and reconstruction were concentrated on adding and 
repairing/repainting the floors, walls, and roofing of their homes while the rest (19 percent) either 
constructed a new home, fixed their plumbing, drainage system and toilets. The length of time 
needed to repair or reconstruct their houses was dependent on the extent of the damage and the 
availability of resources. On the average, it took them 30 days to complete the repair and 
reconstruction of their homes, with a small minority (10 percent) unable to do so because of not 
having the resources to do it or were prevented by the authorities to reconstruct their homes as 
these were located in danger zones. In Marikina, affected residents spent an average of P141,000 
but maximum of P4 million (compared to P12,000 in Pasig City but maximum of P150,000) to repair 
their damaged homes and appliances. Overall, it took them an average of 2.5-3 months to 
completely reconstruct their damaged dwelling structures. The disparity is due to the fact that 
extreme flooding in Marikina hit more upper/middle-income households while in Pasig City the 




In terms of losing household assets, almost half (45 percent) of the surveyed households reported 
having lost severely, while 30 percent lost mildly and 16 percent had negligible losses. Severe losses 
mean losing most of their household appliances and electronic equipment/gadgets. Negligible loss 



































2.2.4 Loss of workdays/schooling due to damage/interruption of basic services 
On the average, 30 man-days were lost by the residents in 2009 because of the flood damage to 
their homes, basic services, and infrastructure (roads, bridges and water channels) while in a few (5 
percent) households the number of days lost totaled 365 days or equivalent to 1 year. For example, 
the water supply was interrupted for 22 days in 2009 (compared to zero in 2011). In the same 
manner, electricity could not be delivered for about a month (Marikina) and 14 days (Pasig) to about 
half of the sample population in 2009 compared to almost nil (1 day) in 2011. Children’s schooling 
also suffered with about 70 percent of the households unable to send their children to school. In 
terms of income loss, the respondents averaged losing P21,000 per household (average salary of 
public school teacher is P10,000) with some reaching P500,000 income loss due to Ondoy floods in 
2009 compared to P20,000 during the Pedring and Quiel floods in 2011. 
 
2.2.5 Sickness/Diseases during Floods 
Most (almost 80 percent) of the respondents suffered from coughs/colds and fever due to the 
floods. About 40 percent complained of diarrhea and stomach ailments. About one third (32 
percent) said they suffered from skin diseases/allergies. But it is quite alarming that almost one-fifth 
of the respondents suffered from deadly diseases like leptospirosis (18 percent) and dengue (15 
percent).114 Majority (84 percent) of the respondents were also alarmed with the increase of 
climate/flood-related diseases such as diarrhea, dengue, and leptospirosis. As shown in the summary 
of expenses table below, these diseases also happen to be quite costly among medical services. In 
subsidized government health centers/hospitals, treatment for dengue could cost P35,000 - P60,000 
while treatment for leptospiroses ranged P10,000 to P50,000. In private hospitals/medical centers, 
expenses could be double or triple these amounts. 
On the average, they spent P 6,517 for medical expenses, with some families spending a maximum 
of P70,000 during the Ondoy floods. Of those who got sick, only half (50 percent) of them said they 
were benefited by the medical services provided by the government and/or non-government 
organizations (NGOs). But majority of them said they were able to receive free medicine, first aid kits 
and services like water chlorination and dengue-infested area fumigation or defogging. 
2.2.6 Loans 
Only a fifth (20 percent) of them took out loans because of the 2009 floods; with an average loan of 
P10, 517. Of those who have taken loans, about half of them paid interest of less than 10 percent 
while the other half paid high interest ranging from 12-30 percent per month! Of those who have 
loaned money, only half of them (50 percent) were able to pay their debt/loan at the time of the 
survey. The used the loaned money to build and repair their homes, replace equipment and 
livelihood losses. 
 
2.2.7 Summary costs of basic services before, during, and post-Ondoy floods 
Below is a comparative summary table of costs and losses incurred prior, during, and after the 
Ondoy floods based on the recollection of respondents during FGDs. The number of absences from 
school and/or workdays lost rose a 100 percent for both men and women. But their average income 
losses rose to 300 hundred percent for male-headed households but a bit lesser (200 percent) for 
women-headed households. This is perhaps due to the longer closure of factory-based work for 
males while home-based work for females opened earlier than the former. But the worst is the 
increase in their expenditure for medicines, sanitation, and health care which rose a thousand 
percent during the Ondoy floods. 
 
                                                           
114 The percentages do not add up to 100 percent because of multiple responses. 
































Comparing male and female-headed households show that women bear a heavier burden in times of 
disasters, especially during extreme floods during Ondoy as seen in the tables below. But in non-
extreme situations like that of Pedring and Quiel in 2011, the damages were negligible. 
 
Summary of Costs/Losses Due to Floods (monthly)
Pre-Ondoy Ondoy Period Post-Ondoy
Men 
HH






Absences from school 6 8 14 17 6 7
Number of workdays lost 
from sickness due to flood
5 7 9 10 5 8
Number of work days lost 
due to flood
6 8 20 22 6 9
Average income loss due to 
floods
P1,715 P3,250 P7,250 P6,450 P2,750 P3,400
Average amount of spent on 
medicine
P300 P400 P3,200 P3,000 P500 P450
Average losses (appliances, 
etc.)
P25,000 P20,000
Average income P6,250 P5,000 - - P6,500 P4,200
Source: Porio (2011). 
Summary of Costs of Basic Needs/Services (in pesos, 
monthly, US$ 1=P43)
Pre-Ondoy Ondoy Period Post-Ondoy
Men 
HH





































(mud, waist deep; 
cleaning – 2 weeks – one 
month)
P300 P310 P2,000 P2,000 P360 P320








































Percent Increase/Decrease of  Costs/Losses  Between Men- and 
Women- headed Households Due to Floods (monthly)
Pre-Ondoy Ondoy Period Post-Ondoy
Men 
HH






Absences from school 33% 21% 17%
Number of workdays lost 
from sickness due to flood
40% 11% 60%
Number of work days lost 
due to flood
33% 10% 50%
Average income loss due to 
floods
90% -11% 24%
Average amount of spent on 
medicine
33% -6% -10%
Average losses (appliances, 
etc.)
-20%
Average income -20% - -35%
Source: Porio (2011) 
 
Percent Increase/Decrease of  Costs/Losses  Between Men- and 
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Absences from school 33% 21% 17%
Number of workdays lost 
from sickness due to flood
40% 11% 60%
Number of work days lost 
due to flood
33% 10% 50%
Average income loss due to 
floods
90% -11% 24%
Average amount of spent on 
medicine
33% -6% -10%
Average losses (appliances, 
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-20%
Average income -20% - -35%
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Ordinary check-up PhP300-500 up to 1,500
Sputum analysis/check-u[ PhP750-1,500
1. Dengue (referred to public hospitals 
where patient pay minimal payment)*
PhP35,000-60,000
2. Leptospirosis (referred to public hospitals 
where patient pay minimal payment or free)*
PhP10,000-50,000
Services given pro-bono or charge minimally to urban poor by medical missions
Blood analysis P2320 = PhP750-3,200
Urine analysis P90 = P700
Blood typing P90 = P700
ECG P90 = P1,500 – 2,500
X-ray P90 =P500
Physical Exam A (including  Blood Chem, Blood typing and ECG)
P490 = P2,500 
Cost of Health Services in Health Center/Hospital
to Climate Change-Related Complaints
 
Source: Porio (2011) 
 
3. Adaptation Strategies to Floods/Monsoons: Family/Household Level115 
Most of the adaptations made by families/households can be categorized into the following: 1) 
physical-structural adjustments, and 2) changes in lifestyles and habits. Of the physical-structural 
type of adaptation, quite a substantial number (about one-third) added a floor or raised the floor 
and strengthened the foundation of their homes. They also moved the storage of goods, valuables, 
and irreplaceable goods to a higher level so these won’t get wet or damaged (60 percent). They also 
prepared ready packed clothes/toiletries and emergency supplies like flashlights, boats and secured 
emergency evacuation place with relatives/friends. Meanwhile, they also become more diligent in 
cleaning their surrounding canals/drainage channels for garbage/debris (35 percent). Almost all of 
them asserted that they try to monitor the weather through radio/TV. The local warning system 
installed by their local governments alerted them to the rising water levels in the river and direct 
them to prepare and evacuate. A small minority (5 percent) said they just pray to god to protect 
them. 
Not surprisingly, in preparation for bad weather and floods, most families (89 percent) prepared or 
stocked on food like rice and groceries, water and medicines. Only a third of the respondents said 
they stocked on candles, flashlights and other emergency supplies. For electricity, 90 percent of 
them contacted the local provider, the Manila Electric Company, in case of electricity disruption, 
while a minority called their community officials and/or neighbors/electricians. Almost three-fourths 
of them said the provider’s response was quite or moderate, only a few (about 10 percent) said the 
response was slow and the remainder saw no need to contact anybody. In the same manner, the 
majority (88 percent) contacted their water provider, Manila Water, for disruption in water services. 
Only a few (12 percent) said they contacted their barangay/community officials, neighbors and 
                                                           


































friends. Again, majority (67 percent) said the provider’s response was very quick or moderately 
quick. Only 2 percent said it was very slow while the remainder did not see any need to contact their 
water provider.  
When asked whom do they contact when their homes gets flooded, majority of them (49 percent) 
contacted their city/barangay disaster reduction office while 17 percent called their neighbors, 
friends and relatives and the remainder (35 percent) did not call anybody but relied on their own 
selves. Of those who called for help from their officials and neighbors/relatives, majority of them (95 
percent) found the latter’s responses very quick or moderately quick and only 5 percent found the 
response very slow. 
3.1 Funding support for relief/rehabilitation needs 
When queried about their funding needs during floods, not surprisingly almost all off them (99 
percent in Pasig and 90 percent in Marikina) said food and other basic subsistence needs should be 
given priority by the officials. But in Marikina which was severely hit by the floods almost half (43 
percent) wanted assistance in housing/shelter and reconstruction. Others said they needed fund 
support for clothes (61 percent in Marikina compared to 27 percent in Pasig), medicines (6-11 
percent), and livelihood restoration (3 percent).  
 
3.2 Preparation, insurance and compensation 
An overwhelming 83 percent have no form of insurance whatsoever while a small minority (17 
percent) had purchased life, property and medical insurance. This small minority had employment in 
the formal sector and/or came from upper-income groups. But after the Ondoy floods in 2009 and 
Pedring/Quiel floods 2011, only 9 of the 17 percent were able to make insurance claims. Most of 
them could not file claims because damages due to the Ondoy floods belong to the category of 
“fortuitous events” or “acts of God” and not covered by their insurance. 
 
3.3 Response and recovery.  
When queried about flood assistance, an overwhelming 83 percent claimed to have been assisted by 
the local/city government with food and clothing. They received this assistance on the average after 
48 hours, minimum 14 hours and maximum of 504 hours (or about 21 days). Only 1 percent claimed 
to have received financial assistance  of P4,000 (about US$ 9) because of the death of a family 
member during the flood. 
During and after the floods, the following measures were taken by the barangay/city government to 
reduce the impact of flooding in their communities: 
1. Evacuation of residents, especially those in informal settlements along the rivers, 
creeks and other danger areas  
2. Clearing and rebuilding of roads and bridges 
3. Rebuilding of the water supply network  
4. Clearing and rebuilding of water channel and drainage networks (including rip-
rapping of river/creek walls and elevating water dikes) 
5.  Pumping flood waters out of the area 
6. Relocation/resettlement of affected residents 
7. Acquisition of equipment/supplies necessary during calamities (e.g., rubber boats, 
fire trucks) 
8. Defogging of mosquito infested areas, especially those with high incidence of dengue 
cases 
9. Capability building programs (training/seminars, information 
campaigns/dissemination) 
































In short, the immediate, medium and long-term responses of the city/local government can be 
summarized into: 1) evacuation, 2) restoration of basic services and 3) rebuilding of infrastructural 
support. Given the above interventions, majority of the respondents (65 percent) feel satisfied with 
the interventions provided by the national/local government agencies. A small number (35 percent) 
wished the government could provide better services such as water, sewage and sanitation but most 
of all sustainable livelihood and land/housing for those displaced by the floods. Thus, when asked 
who is responsible for preventing and responding to hazards and calamities, an overwhelming 
majority (70 percent) pointed to the barangay/city LGU as the one responsible while others 
identified the family (17 percent), civil society (8 percent) and the private sector (5 percent) as being 
responsible.  
Glaringly highlighted in the identified medium and long-term responses of the city governments of 
Marikina and Pasig is the absence of a continuous-systematic training and capability program for the 
staff of the agencies responsible for disaster risk reduction and, more importantly, for the 
vulnerable, flood-prone communities and residents.  
When asked whether they knew of the existence of their own barangay and/or city disaster risk 
reduction and management council (DRRMC), only 25 percent were aware but only 7 percent knew 
of their location in the barangay and/or city hall. Logically, only 5 percent and 2 percent were aware 
of the emergency numbers and website of the DRRMC, respectively. And only 2 percent had 
contacted their emergency numbers to ask for information about typhoons/floods or assistance.  
Surprisingly, majority of them (86 percent) have heard of climate change and have accepted it as 
part of environmental change. In fact, when asked how they understand the phenomenon, majority 
were able to enumerate the following indications: ozone depletion, sea level rise, air pollution, 
heavy rains/floods, droughts, water shortage, melting of glaciers and rapid/intense weather 
changes. But they were not agreed on the causes of climate change as they gave varying responses 
like: environmental pollution (50 percent), increasing population (36 percent), and God’s 
wrath/mankind’s sins (14 percent). But on the whole, they acknowledge that the major causal forces 
of climate change are: people’s lifestyles (68 percent) as mainly responsible, followed by inaction or 
negative actions of government (20 percent), industries (10 percent), and God (2) percent). 
Majority of them (71 percent) obtained their information from television while some heard it from 
friends/relatives (13 percent), radio (8 percent), government agencies (2 percent) or have read 
about it in magazines/newspapers (7 percent). Thus, almost everyone (83 percent) think climate 
change is a serious problem that local/national governments should take into consideration in 
formulating their urban planning policies and implementing their development programs.  
When asked what the government should do to prevent or mitigate the effects of climate change, 
they enumerated the following:  
• Stricter norms for pollution reduction (26 percent) 
• Decrease vehicles and enhance public transport (24 percent) 
• Effective implementation of regulations/laws (30 percent) 
• Eradicate factories and other polluting industries (10 percent) 
• Rehabilitate environment like planting trees (10 percent) 
When community residents were asked what they can do as individuals to help their government 
tackle the effects of climate change, an overwhelming 50 percent said to strictly follow proper 
environment waste management policies (reduce, reuse, recycle), observe government laws and 
ordinance (25 percent) and the remainder (25 percent) directed people to plant trees and conserve 
energy.    In the same manner, when they were asked for suggestions on how the city or barangay’s 


































respond better to their needs, only very few (less than 10 percent) could suggest that DRRMC 
monitor flooding more effectively. This is quite logical because as indicated earlier only a quarter (25 
percent) were aware of the DRRMC’s existence. 
3.4 Risk communication.  
In Marikina City, communicating the risk of city flooding is very much institutionalized in their early 
warning system, indicated by the siren signals (e.g., first siren is preparation for evacuation, with 
water level at 14 meters) according to the water level in the Marikina bridge (e.g., third siren is 
evacuation, water is reaching the critical level of 16 meters). Meanwhile, Pasig City has also installed 
an early warning system communicated through the city’s disaster risk reduction management 
council (chaired by the mayor) and to the barangay/community DRRM counterpart bodies (chaired 
by the barangay captain). 
But in other parts of the metropolis, communicating flooding and related to people and making 
them move accordingly constitute the most challenging task for LGUs as most residents do not want 
to leave their homes because of theft/loss of belongings. They’d rather climb up to the ceilings/roofs 
of their houses than move. 
 
4. Damage and Losses from Commercial-Industrial Establishments and Adaptive Strategies 
The commercial and business survey targeted 100 establishments (50 in each city) but the study 
ended processing only 85 research protocols. Fifteen protocols were not included in the data 
processing because these remain incomplete interviews despite several call backs or recalls. And 
there was no more time for substitution due to weather problems (typhoons, heavy rains and 
floods). 
 
4.1 Physical characteristics, building type and ownership 
Majority (65 percent) of them were constructed 1-storey buildings while the remainder (35 percent) 
were constructed multiple storeyed and/or multiple buildings/structures. Majority (41 percent) of 
the buildings were made of reinforced concrete with steel, blocks, bricks, wood and metal while the 
remainder (59 percent) was made of a combination of blocks, bricks, wood, metal, and steel. 
Majority (55 percent) of the establishments were renting the buildings that they were using and only 
45 percent owned them. Thus, it is understandable why only 43 percent do regular maintenance of 
their buildings and premises while the remainder do it only occasionally. The total area occupied by 
the establishments ranged from 22 - 2,500 sq. meters, with a mean value of 1, 412 sq. meter and a 
median value of 300 sq. meters, suggesting a high disparity among the establishments. Most (62 
percent) of these buildings were 1-20 years old while 18 percent were 21 to over 40 years old and 
the rest did know when or how old were their build structures. But overall, the buildings were on the 
average 15 years old. 
 
4.2 Number of shifts/work hours 
While a majority (62 percent) had only 1 work shift, 38 percent of the establishments had 2-4 
workshifts; with 42 percent of them had workers staying/living in the premises. The number of 
workers ranged from 4-268 workers with an average of 29 workers per establishment. About 42 
percent have employees staying/living in the premises of the commercial-industrial establishments.  
 
4.3 Specific damages/losses and expenses for repairs 
Most damages here were incurred only during the extreme floods of  2009, not in 2011 (the 
comparative year). With regards to damages to their buildings and properties, the respondents 
reported an average of P85,316, with values ranging from a miniscule P1,500 to P1 million; while 
damages to equipment, appliances and furniture amounted to a median average of P100, 000 (mean 
































average: P925, 816; minimum of P3,000 and a maximum value of P12.8 million). Including other 
damages, respondents reported having incurred total damages of median average of P140,000 
(mean average: P1.3 million; minimum value of P3,000 and a maximum value of P13.3 million). 
Their expenses for repair for buildings amounted to median average of P10,500 (mean average: 
P90,580), with minimum value of P400 to a maximum value of P1 million. Meanwhile, their expense 
repairs to equipment/appliances amounted to a median average of P50,000 (mean average: 
P319,434), with a minimum value of P1,000 and a maximum value of P2 million. Including other 
repair/replacement expenses, their total expenses incurred amounted to a median average of 
P63,400 (mean average: P283,942), with a minimum value of P13,000 and a maximum value of 
P479,788). 
After the floods, other costs involved disinfecting, sanitation and rehabilitation. The respondents 
reported spending a median average of P5,000 (mean average: P24,237), with minimum value of 
P150 to a maximum value of P300,000. Flood fighting/control costs on the other hand, yield a 
median average of P37,500 (mean average: P63, 484) with minimum value of P1,770 and a 
maximum value of P300,000. Costs of removing debris from the premises amounted to a median 
average of P8,000 (mean average: P52,232), with a minimum value of P300 and a maximum value of 
P500,000. Meanwhile, the respondents reported a median average loss of net income due to flood 
interruptions of P50,000 (mean average: P192,142), with a minimum value of P1,000 and a 
maximum value of P1 million. Total annual revenue lost to floods had a median average of P225,000 
(mean average: P1.9 million), with a minimum value of P3,000 and P2.2 million.  
4.4 Major problems encountered by establishments 
Major problem encountered by establishments (population affected ranged from 54-90 percent) 
was the 1) lack of access to transport due to damages in bridges/roads, equipment, and heavy mud 
sludges, 2) disruption of communication, water and electricity services, 3) shortage of fuel, food 
supplies, and other necessities, and 4) the commensurate rise in prices of these basic necessities.  
Given these problems, work in factories, offices and service establishments have to be stopped as 
well, ranging from 4-8 weeks. 
 
4.5 Work stoppage during floods and loss of work afterwards 
Majority (96 percent) of the establishments stopped work or closed operation because of damage to 
their physical structures, equipment and/or their places remained inaccessible due to the floods. The 
median average height of floods was almost 4 meters (mean average: 5.42 meters), with a 
mimimum value of a fraction of a meter to a maximum of 20 meters. The average time needed to 
recover was 1-2 months; minimum time was 1 week and maximum time was 1 year and 11 months.  
Thus, on the average in both cities, 27 people lost their jobs (minimum value of 7 and a maximum 
value of 150 workers, suggesting a wide range of the size of the establishments and damages as 
well). 
Comparing the floods in 2009 and 2011, definitely the floods in the latter years were negligible in 
terms of damages and other impacts. In fact, in 2011, the average total damage was only P10,000. 
To summarize, most business and commercial establishments in this study faced high exposure and 
vulnerability to flooding and other climate-related risks. Majority of them only had one storey 
buildings which were mostly submerged at the height of Ondoy floods; thus, they incurred high 





































5. Institutional and Regulatory Responses: Structural-physical, Political- Economic and 
Cultural 
In general, respondents in the survey blamed the following activities for the extreme floods:  illegal 
logging, mining, quarrying in the upstream Marikina watershed and the consequent siltation, 
clogging, of the river systems and minor water channels. The increasing pollution and overfishing of 
Laguna Lake overfishing (manifested in the overpopulation of fish cages, most of them cemented, 
thus obstructing water flow) also compromised the draining capacity of the lake of the volume of 
dumped water from the uplands like the Marikina watershed, the Wawa Dam, and the La Mesa 
Dam.  
The above geo-physical and man-made sources of floods and related disasters have also been 
intensified by the uncontrolled/unregulated real estate and commercial development in the uplands 
of Marikina (e.g., Antipolo, Montalban, Binangonan, Taytay, etc.). This is further compromised by the 
settling of large populations of informal settlements in danger areas like along river lines and hills, 
slopes, and ravines prone to landslides. Most of these areas have weak/temporary housing, low 
infrastructural support, and low access to basic services.   
Given the above challenges and learning from the lessons brought about by the disastrous events of 
2009 and the lesser floods of the past two years, several policies and programs were enacted by 
Congress. Two overarching frameworks for adapting to climate change were crafted, the 2010 
National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management and the 2011 National Framework Strategy on 
Climate Change.  Each was drafted in compliance with the law by virtue of the “Philippine Disaster 
Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010” and the “Climate Change Act of 2009” The first 
provides for the creation of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council; the 
second, for the Climate Change Action Plan approved for implementation by President Benigno 
Aquino III towards the end of November 2011. 
Former President Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management 
Act of 2010, amending the 30-year old Presidential Decree 1566, the old law covering risk reduction 
and management matters. This law mandated that each city/municipality must institute each have a 
disaster risk reduction and management plan. Meanwhile the Climate Change Action Plan made the 
first law more actionable by specifying the programs to be implemented by the Climate Change 
Commission and the other agencies of the Aquino government. 
The crafting of local risk reduction and management plans at the barangay (community), city, and 
provincial levels, one of the principal outcomes of the law, provide a very promising scenario. These 
local plans drawn locally and elevated to the city level make design strategies contextually-specific 
and more appropriate, responsive and effective for local needs. 
 
6. Strategies of Private Sector and Communities 
Were the adaptive responses of private sector and communities enough? Did these led to into 
medium and long term capacity on the part of the business sector and the community? Most of the 
manufacturing sector relocated their activities to other parts of the city where flooding is less likely 
to occur. For example, Pure Foods in Marikina City transferred their manufacturing to Laguna, a 
province located nearby the national capital region while others moved to higher ground (the 30 
percent that were not flooded during Ondoy like Marikina SSS vilages). This was a strategy adapted 
by large commercial and industrial establishments in the city like the conglomerate, Fortune 
Tobacco.  For those who remained or did not relocate, they just strengthened their buildings or build 
upper floors where they conduct their business. Meanwhile in Pasig, most of the factories were 
compelled by the City Environment Office (CENRO) to follow safety standards. So, majority of them 
who refused to follow the safety standards imposed by the city moved to cities and municipalities 
































who were not so strict in imposing environmental laws. Overall, this poses problems when 
considered at the macro level, because local government units (LGUs), in order to attract business 
often relax the compliance standards that they impose on business/commercial establishments.  
Part III  
 
7. The Prospective Scenario: Mainstreaming into Long-Term Planning and Development  
As shown in the tables below, it is imperative that climate change-related vulnerabilities and risks be 
mainstreamed into long-term development planning and development. 
 
Source: Velasquez, J. (2011). 
The above tables show that floods and storms have caused the most economic damage to the 
country. Damages from floods and storms have increased 18 times since the 1970s. Thus, the 
fundamental lesson that has to be inscribed into our people’s life-ways and our institutions is the 
urgent need to develop a culture of disaster prevention, mitigation, adaptation and safety behavior. 
But Philippine society especially government institutions seem to refuse to take responsibility in 
implementing the required engineering, land zoning, infrastructure planning and sustainable 
relocation of people. Meanwhile, commercial and other private sector interests and informal settlers 
continue to build over, across, beside waterways or in mountain slopes/hills that obstruct, constrict, 
deflect water/river flows. Presumably environmentally certified programs and riverside 
beautification projects continue to be made heavily of concrete preventing water absorption and 
flAmidst this bleak contemporary scenario, the following rehabilitation and recovery design 
principles have been suggested by government officials, business/community leaders and residents, 



































7.1 Rehabilitation and recovery. 
From the household/commercial surveys, key informant interviews and focus group discussions 
(FGDs) among key stakeholders, the respondents suggested the following principles for recovery and 
reconstruction.  
• Design of the recovery and reconstruction program must be transparent, accountable and must 
deliver evidence-based results and outcomes. 
• The approach must be community-based, people-centered, and equitable approaches; and 
reduction of future risks in recovery and reconstruction. 
 
If followed, these principles will enhance the effectiveness of recovery and reconstruction efforts, 
increase transparency and accountability, and ensure that resources are distributed and applied to 
those really in need. In fact, most of these are embodied in the 2010 National Disaster Risk 
Reduction Management Framework and the 2011 Climate Change Action Plan. 
 
• Flood management: Given its vulnerability to flooding, protecting Metro Manila requires 
institutional changes, comprehensive planning, and investment in both restoration and 
infrastructure for effective flood management system. 
• Housing: The vast majority of damage to housing stock was concentrated in the informal sector, 
so reconstruction means providing better alternatives for informal settlers. 
• Disaster Risk Reduction: The existing disaster risk reduction system needs to become more 
proactive, coherent, and effective; and 
• Local Governance: LGUs should have the key role in implementing the recovery and 
reconstruction program and future measures to mitigate disaster risks. 
• Enterprise sector: A mix of financing mechanisms are needed to help small and medium-scale 
enterprises recover from damage and losses and to implement rehabilitation and relocation 
plans. 
Six major strategies specifically for reducing flood and earthquake impact in Metro Manila:116 
• Enhance legal framework and institutional capacity for effective disaster management system 
• Build capacity for relief and recovery 
• Strengthen community-based preparedness system for disasters 
• Strengthen/”climate-proofed” buildings, structures, especially infrastructure system 
• Enhance the national and local governments’ system resistance to earthquakes and floods 
• Promote research and technology for disaster prevention, mitigation and adaptation 
 
 
7.2 On-going and Future Action Plans 
• Response and recovery planning (evacuation plans, crisis management plan, resource 
assessment and allocation, public safety, search and rescue) 
• Preparedness and awareness (short term actions): e.g., school safety programs, public 
information, community preparedness 
• Mitigation and Prevention (long term actions): e.g., building code implementation and 
enforcement, land use planning and zoning, insurance and risk transfer 
• Capacity building: equipment acquisition, training (e.g., first aid, search and rescue), certification 
and qualification, organizational-institutional strengthening 
                                                           
116 Most of these were gleaned from the FGDs (focus group discussions), KIIs (key informant interviews) 
and household interviews. But most of these are also embodied in the 2004 MEIRS study, the 2010 
National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Framework and in the 2011 Climate Action Plan. 
































To summarize, this study found that Metro Manila, in particular, the cities of Marikina and Pasig are 
highly at risk to floods and have suffered severely from extreme flooding impacts of Ondoy (Ketsana) 
and Pedring (Parma) in 2009.  
Adapting McGranahan et al (2007), this study recommends the following process of integrating or 
mainstreaming the findings of this study into a “City Adaptation Plan for Climate Change” as shown 
in the structures created and processes illustrated below. 
Assessment of vulnerability to 
socio-economic stresses
Assessment of vulnerability to 
climate change impacts
Develop adaptation options and actions
National/Regional climate 
change strategy;
Local (barangay/city) climate 
change assessments
Local economic development 
strategies; integrated 






Overlay to identify vulnerable areas
Process for Developing a City Adaptation Plan 
for Climate Change (cf.McGranahan et al)
 
             Figure 
One major innovation that this study would like to suggest is to complement the above process with 
a bottom-up process whereby the particular environmental and social-political-economic 
vulnerabilities (as reflected in their local risk and vulnerability maps and data bases produced 
through participatory action research methods) of the affected communities are also taken into 
consideration. This can be integrated in the “Local Climate Action Plans” and the “Local Disaster Risk 
Reduction and Management Plans” which builds into an integrated  “Municipal/City Climate Action 
Plans” and “Municipal/City Disaster Reduction and Management Plans”. Highlighted in these 
localized plans and city-wide integrated plans/programs are the particular community and 
household adaptive strategies that are empowering, effective, transparent, and accountable. 
The integration of climate vulnerability assessments and climate action plans into the urban planning 
and development of the city should be spatially-anchored and should recognize the overlaps among 
political-economic and environmental boundaries. This should be calibrated in the 
management/decision-making structures in urban governance systems. More importantly, it should 
reconcile these boundaries within the context of centralized-decentralized models of governance. If 
these issues are calibrated well at the governance level, then moving towards water-based urban 
design, vertical urbanism and green economy, technologies and architecture can be programmed or 
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Appendix A. Deadly Storms/Typhoons (Out of the 19) in 2011 in the Philippines (plus 
earthquakes) 
 
Month Name of Storm Damages  
January  Typhoon Basyang and other 
storms 
Deaths - 68; Missing - 26; Displaced - 2 million 
Damages to property/agriculture: P1.78 billion 
 
March 5.2 magnitude earthquake 
(Ilocos) 
5.8 magnitude earthquake 
(Manila) 
Minor damage  
May Typhoon Bebeng Deaths - 44; Displaced – 500,000 in 12 provinces 
mostly in Bicol; 
Damage – P1.37 billion (or US$ 31.7 million) 
 
June Typhoon Falcon Deaths – 70; Displaced – 69,000; Damage – P10 
billion 
 
July Typhoon Juaning Deaths – 52 ; Damage P1.7 billion  
August Typhoon Mina Deaths – 16; Damage P1.009 billion  
September  Typhoons Pedring & Quiel Deaths – 77 ; Displaced – almost 1 million; Damage 




Typhoon Sendong Deaths – 1585; Missing – 1,079; Injured – 1, 979; 




5.1 earthquake (Surigao, 
Northern Mindanao) 
Minor damage  
 
 
































7.4 Young scientist’s report 
 
INTERNSHIP REPORT 
Project title:  Asia Pacific Network for Global Change Research (APN) funded research project 
‘Enhancing adaptation to climate change by integrating climate risk with development planning and 
disaster management’ 
Project duration: June 1 —July 31, 2011 
Name of the Student Intern: Ms. Jyoti Nair 
Report:  
Any city has its own threshold capacity to overcome the hazards but it is the adaptive capacity of the 
city that helps it to live with it when it bound to face the event recurrently.  For Mumbai floods are 
one such event which is not new. The extremity of the 2005 event caused the people to raise 
questions on the adequacy of the existing system to help the people and infrastructure survive 
through any such extreme event in near future. To tackle this issue the municipal authority came up 
with several measures to reduce the flooding. Through the project the aim is to identify such specific 
infrastructure redevelopment projects or strategies being undertaken to minimise the impacts. The 
study aims at identifying the medium and long term measures to tackle hazards such as climate 
related extreme events. Since, the project aims not just on climate change but also focuses on the 
disaster management aspect of the risk climate change is accompanied with; helped me  shift focus 
from change in the climate and consider the disasters that we should foresee.  
The application part of all what we read with regard to climate change is not very different from 
theory yet when it comes to on field work things were a revelation to me. The objective of the 
project was explained to me on the very first day and with that in mind I have learned through the 
work the ground realities of adaptation.  
My participation in the project has taught me several new things. Apart from the subject based 
knowledge, the exposure has taught me few more nuances of communication skills. 
Through the course of the internship the tasks allocated and completed are:  
1. To identify case studies relevant to the study through literature review: This helped me get 
acquainted with this form of scientific writing and gave me a broad and fresh perspective of 
the flooding situation and the studies done worldwide.  
2. To construct questionnaire for focused group discussions and personal interviews with the 
local government officials. 
3. To Interview local government officials based on the questionnaire:  meeting with the 
officials was an experience in itself. With the caliber of the authority they have it was an 
great opportunity to meet some high level officers such as Ms. Uma Adusumilli, Chief urban 
Planner of MMRDA , Mr. Mahesh Narvekar, Chief Officer, Disaster management cell and all 
the Asst. Municipal commissioners at each ward covered. And the interviews helped 
understand how the system deploys work and configures the project responsibilities. The 
interviews with the officials at BMC, detailed many facts about the ongoing infrastructure 
development projects such as BRIMSTOWAD and how they came into action post 2005 flood 
event. The vision to perceive any hazard of such magnitude was lacking until 2005 and it 
required an event of such magnanimity to open the eyes to the potential vulnerabilities. The 
ward level difficulties were discussed at ward level and asked for their view on the ongoing 


































officials complained of the existing hierarchy but they were well equipped through the 
disaster management authority to face hazards. We found that the perceptions on climate 
change were fairly scientifically correct and a challenge sighted was the garbage 
accumulation in the drainage system due to irresponsible public’s lack of civic sense. There 
were missed reviews on the priorities of development over environment or vice versa.  
I want to thank Dr. Archana Patankar, Project leader, for taking me into the project as the student 
intern thereby helping me fulfil my academic criterion and giving me an opportunity to be able to 
interact with the local level government officials. I am grateful for her patience; and the guidance 
she provided me through the two months. Also, I want to extend my gratitude to Ms. Reema Ved, 
Research Associate, for being a friendly senior and for accompanying and supporting me through the 
interviews. 
I look forward to take this exposure to help me focus better on the research goals I have to set for 
myself in the near future.  
 
Jyoti Nair 
M.Sc. Climate Science & Policy 
TERI University 
New Delhi, India 
jyoti.nair10@gmail.com  
































7.5 List of acronyms/abbreviations 
 
APN- Asia-Pacific Network for Global Change Research 
APTU- Faculty of Architecture and Planning, Thammasat University 
BMR- Bangkok Metropolitan Region 
BRIMSTOWAD- Brihanmumbai Stormwater Disposal System 
CRF- Central Relief Fund 
CENRO- City Environment Office 
DMC- Disaster Management Cell 
DMAP- Greater Mumbai Disaster Management Action Plan 
DRRM- Disaster Risk Reduction Management 
EGAT- Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand 
FGDs- Focus group discussions 
GDP- Gross Domestic Product 
IIT- Indian Institute of Technology 
IRDR- Integrated Research in Disaster Risk 
ICSU- International Council for Science 
IPCC- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
INR- Indian Rupees 
KAMANAVA- Kaloocan, Malabon, Navotas, and Valenzuela 
LAD- Local Administration Department 
LGUs- Local Government Units 
MCGM- Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai 
MMRDA- Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority  
NSO- National Statistics Office 


































OECD- Organization for Economic Corporation 
PWD- Public Works Department 
RID- Royal Irrigation Department 
RIG- Royal Irrigation Department 
SIMSR-  K.J. Somaiya Institute of Management Studies and Research 
START- Global Change System for Analysis, Research and Training 
UNEP- United Nations Environment Programme  
